Thurber Const. Co. v. Kemplin
Decision Date | 23 January 1935 |
Docket Number | No. 8060.,8060. |
Citation | 81 S.W.2d 103 |
Parties | THURBER CONST. CO. et al. v. KEMPLIN et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Travis County; J. D. Moore, Judge.
Suit by John Kemplin, the F. C. Crane Company, and others against D. H. Purvis & Son and others, wherein the Thurber Construction Company and others intervened. From an adverse judgment, named intervener and last-named plaintiff appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
John Hancock, Clarence Wightman, and Eugene T. Adair, all of Fort Worth, for appellant Thurber Const. Co.
W. B. Handley and C. J. Shaeffer, both of Dallas, for appellant F. C. Crane Co.
Cofer & Cofer, of Austin, and Murphy & Murphy, of Gainesville, for appellees.
This suit involves the proper distribution of funds retained by the state highway commission under a contract dated April 23, 1931, by it with D. H. Purvis & Son, for the construction of state highway No. 5, from Gainesville, Tex., to the Grayson county line. Purvis & Son subcontracted the construction of said project to Abe Anderson & Son, who in turn subcontracted same to L. G. Owen and D. H. Seigler. In October, 1931, after the work contracted for had been about 75 per cent. completed, these parties became unable to continue said work, and Purvis & Son forfeited said subcontracts except as to D. H. Seigler, who had not defaulted; and on November 25, 1931, entered into the following contract with appellant, Thurber Construction Company:
Thurber Construction Company fully performed its contract at its own expense, and the completed highway was accepted by the highway commission on August 2, 1932. Numerous claims were filed with the highway commission by those furnishing labor, materials, etc., to subcontractors Anderson & Son, and to L. G. Owen, for which they had not been paid, and by D. H. Seigler, who had fully performed his subcontract. All of these claims, except perhaps a part of that of Seigler, had accrued to the claimants prior to the date of said contract made with appellant to complete the unfinished portion of said project, and represented labor and materials furnished to the subcontractors who had defaulted prior to November 25, 1931.
This suit was by said claimants either as plaintiffs or as interveners, some 77 in number, against Purvis & Son, Abe Anderson & Son, L. G. Owen, and the highway commission, to establish their claims, and have same declared a lien upon and paid out of the funds retained by the highway commission under its contract with Purvis & Son, and under the provisions of articles 5472a and 6674m, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. The highway commissioner answered that it had funds retained by it in the sum of $15,016.53, which it tendered into the registry of the court to be paid out as the court should determine.
Appellant intervened, set up its contract of November 25, 1931, above quoted, alleged its complete performance thereof at an expense to it for labor, materials, etc., of $15,003.63, none of which amount had been paid to it by Purvis & Son; that its claim was for labor, materials, etc., furnished by it as subcontractor in the performance of its contract with Purvis & Son; and sought to have its claim adjudged to be prior to those of the other claimants and to be paid first out of the funds retained by the highway commission.
The case was tried to the court without a jury. Judgment was rendered establishing the claims of appellees in the aggregate sum of more than $17,000, denying to appellant any portion of the funds paid by the highway commission into the registry of the court, reducing F. C. Crane Company's claim from $1,846.25 to $586.25, allowing $2,000 as attorneys' fees to the attorneys for appellees to be taxed as costs, and ordering the remainder of said fund prorated amongst said claimants. From this judgment the Thurber Construction Company and F. C. Crane Company have appealed. Further facts will be stated in the discussion of the issues raised.
In findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court found and concluded that under the contract above set forth Thurber Construction Company took over the original contract between Purvis & Son and the highway commission, agreed to complete said highway for the remainder of the original price due Purvis & Son thereunder, "became assignees of the said D. H. Purvis & Son and stand in the shoes of the original contractor * * * and that the said Thurber Construction Company, so standing in the position of the original contractor and as its assignee, is not entitled to share in said moneys with those who furnished labor and material." The court also concluded that under said contract with appellant "the claim of the latter to the moneys in the hands of the State Highway Commission was expressly made subject to the claims of those furnishing labor and material."
The first contention of appellant is that the court erred in concluding that said contract constituted an assignment by the original contractors of their contract with the highway commission. This contention, we think, must be sustained. The trial court's judgment denying to said appellant any right to participate in said fund was obviously based upon that conclusion, and not upon the insufficiency of its pleading of said account nor the insufficiency of its proof of same. It is not contended that the highway commission dealt with or considered Thurber Construction Company as assignee of said Purvis & Son contract, nor that any of the parties thereto so considered it. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the highway commission continued to deal with the original contractor until the final completion and acceptance of said project. The contract with Thurber Construction Company relates only to a portion of Purvis & Son's undertaking. The provision for compensation was obviously for the purpose of fixing the rate and amount of said compensation, and the contract did not alter the primary obligation of Purvis & Son and their surety to complete their contract with the state. Clearly, we think, Thurber Construction Company was not an assignee of Purvis & Son, but merely a subcontractor under them and nothing more. Republic Supply Co. v. Allen (Tex. Civ. App.) 262 S. W. 113; 60 C. J. 669; 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3d Rev.) 3163; 4 Words & Phrases, Second Series, p. 725. That Purvis & Son were primarily obligated to pay Thurber Construction Company its compensation for the performance of its contract is clear. And, even if they had bound themselves to pay same out of the funds due or to become due them from the state, that would not constitute an assignment of such fund. Koenig v. Rio Bravo Oil Co. ...
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