Thurber v. La Roque
| Decision Date | 15 April 1890 |
| Parties | THURBER et al. v. LA ROQUE et ux. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This was a civil action brought by the plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the defendant W. D. La Roque, to subject the land described in the fifteenth paragraph of the complaint or the money expended by the said W. D. La Roque in purchasing said land, and in placing improvements thereon, to the satisfaction of their judgments, tried by BYNUM, J., and a jury at the November term, 1889, of the superior court of Lenoir county, upon the issues set out in the record proper.
The facts admitted and found by the jury were that the said W. D La Roque had contracted by parol, on or about the 1st day of January, 1886, to purchase said land, being a lot in the town of Kinston, from one Washington, and on the 12th day of May 1886, paid said Washington $40 in cash, in part payment of the purchase money, and at the same time executed to him three notes, jointly with his wife, the feme defendant, for the balance of the purchase money, and at different dates,--one for $110, and two others for $100 each,--making a total of $350 as the purchase money; that on the said 12th day of May, 1886, the said Washington, at the instance and request of the said W. D. La Roque, conveyed the said lot of land to the feme defendant, Annie P. La Roque, in fees taking from the said defendants a mortgage on the land to secure the $310 unpaid purchase money; that afterwards the said W. D. La Roque paid $160 of the purchase money, and expended $650 in placing a residence and other permanent improvements upon the said land, all being his own money, and without any consideration therefor on the part of his said wife; that the said conveyance by the said Washington to the said Annie P La Roque was without any consideration upon her part moving to the said W. D. La Roque other than her signing the said notes of $310 and the mortgage to said Washington to secure the unpaid purchase money; that the said Annie P. La Roque, after the said 12th of May, 1886, paid $150 of the said purchase money, and expended $250 in placing the said residence and improvements on said lot, all being of her own separate property; that there was allotted to the defendant W. D. La Roque, on or about the 3d day of February, 1887, his personal property exemption under an execution issuing upon the judgment of the plaintiffs G. M. Lamb & Co., set forth in the complaint, to the amount or $316; that all the judgments in the amendment to the complaint are true and correct as therein stated; that some of the debts on which the judgments of the plaintiffs mentioned in the complaint were rendered were contracted before the 12th of May, 1886, and all of them during the year 1886; that the house and improvements were not completed, but were being made, during 1887; that the said W. D. La Roque was insolvent at the time of the commencement of this action; the defendant W. D. La Roque claimed his homestead in the said lot and improvements to the extent of his interest as shown above; that said Annie P. La Roque claimed the property as her own by virtue of the deed of conveyance from Washington to her.
Upon the admissions of defendants and the verdict of the jury as set out in the record proper, the plaintiffs moved, "upon the admission in the answer and the findings of the jury, that the land conveyed by Washington to Annie P. La Roque be declared subject to a lien for the sum of six hundred and twenty-six dollars, the balance of the sum paid by W. D. La Roque for the purchase of said land and in placing improvements thereon after said conveyance, to-wit, eight hundred and ten dollars, after deducting therefrom the deficiency in value of the personal property exemption heretofore allowed him, to-wit, one hundred and eighty-four dollars; that said land be sold for the satisfaction of said sum of six hundred and twenty six dollars; and that said sum, when realized, be applied in payment of the plaintiffs' judgments." Which motion was refused, and the plaintiffs excepted. Plaintiffs then moved, "upon an admission and findings, that the said land be declared subject to a lien for the sum of four hundred and sixty-six dollars, the balance of the sum paid by W. D. La Roque for the improvements on said land and the improvements thereon after said conveyance, to-wit, the sum of six hundred and fifty dollars, after deducting therefrom the deficiency in value of the personal property exemption heretofore allowed him, to-wit, one hundred and eighty-four dollars; that the land be sold for the satisfaction of said sum of four hundred and sixty-six dollars; and that said sum, when realized, be applied in payment of the plaintiffs' judgments." Which motion was refused, and the plaintiffs excepted. The plaintiffs then moved, "upon an admission and findings, that the said land be declared subject to a lien for the sum of three hundred and ten dollars, the balance of the sum paid by W. D. La Roque for the purchase of said land and the improvements thereon after said conveyance, to-wit, eight hundred and ten dollars, after deducting therefrom his personal property exemption of five hundred dollars; that said land be sold for the satisfaction of said sum of three hundred and ten dollars; and that said sum, when realized, be applied in payment of the plaintiffs' judgments." Which motion was refused, and the plaintiffs excepted. Plaintiffs then moved, "upon said admissions and findings, that the said land be declared subject to a lien for the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, the balance of the sum paid by W. D. La Roque for the improvements thereon after said conveyance, to-wit, six hundred and fifty dollars, after deducting therefrom his personal property exemption of five hundred dollars; that said land be sold for the satisfaction of said sum of one hundred and fifty dollars; and that said sum, when realized, be applied in payment of the plaintiffs' judgments." Which motion was refused, and plaintiffs excepted.
The court then, on motion of the defendants' counsel, rendered judgment (1) that the defendant Annie P. La Roque is the owner of 400-1250 of the said house and lot, and improvements thereon; (2) that the defendant W. D. La Roque was and is entitled to his homestead exemption, to be set apart and allotted to him and his family according to law, in the remaining interest, to-wit, 850-1250 of said lot, house, and improvements, against the judgments of the plaintiffs, or executions issuing thereon; (3) that defendants recover their costs of suit, to be taxed by the clerk. To this judgment, plaintiffs excepted, as follows: "(1) The plaintiffs except to so much of the judgment in this case as adjudges that the defendant Annie P. La Roque is the owner of 450-1250 of the said house and lot, and the improvements thereon; (2) the plaintiffs except to so much of said judgment as adjudges that the defendant W. D. La Roque was and is entitled to his homestead exemptions in said lot, to be set apart and allotted to him and his family according to law, in the remaining interest, to-wit, 850-1250 of said lot, house, and improvements, against the judgments of the plaintiffs, or execution issuing' thereon; (3) the plaintiffs except, to so much of said judgment as adjudges that the defendants recover of the plaintiffs their costs" of the action; (4) the plaintiffs except to the judgments as a whole."
Plaintiffs appealed.
Strong, Gray & Stamps, for appellants.
George Rountree, for respondents.
AVERY, J., (after stating the facts as above.)
The position that no resulting trust was raised by the transaction between Washington and the defendants (husband and wife) La Roque, for which plaintiffs' counsel contended, is untenable. The general principle that a consideration is necessary to raise a trust, and that equity will protect, against one holding the legal title, the beneficial interest of him who pays the purchase money for property, had its origin in the old doctrine governing uses. Patton v. Clendenin, 3 Murph. 68; Pegues v. Pegues, 5 Ired. Eq. 418. "When a person has in his possession money or other personal estate belonging to another, or when a title in lands is made to him, based on a consideration, the ownership where of was in another, he holds the personal estate or the legal title to the lands as trustee for the true owner." 2 Bish. Mar. Wom. 118; Mosely v. Mosely, 87 N.C. 69. The rule that a resulting trust is raised in favor of the person who pays the purchase money for land, though the title may be made to another, is subject to qualification. Where the person who pays the price is under a legal, or even, in some instances, a moral, obligation to maintain the person in whose name the purchase is made, there is a presumption in equity that the purchase is intended as an advance or gift to the recipient. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1039; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1197, 1202, 1203; 2 Bish. Mar. Wom. § 121. The relationship between husband and wife is a sufficient consideration to raise this presumption when the former furnishes the consideration, and causes the conveyance to be made to the latter; but the presumption is repelled by proof that the deed was executed to defraud the husband's creditors, and a resulting trust arises in their favor, subject, however, in this case, to the husband's claim of homestead, if sustained. Levy v. Griffis, 65 N.C. 236; Perry, Trusts, §§ 148, 149; Guthrie v. Gardner, 19 Wend. 414; Fatheree v. Fletcher, 31 Miss. 265; 2 Bish. Mar. Wom. §§ 124, 127. The doctrine is based upon the idea that the equitable interest in land is drawn, as if by irresistible, magnetic attraction, to the person who pays the price; and where it is bought with a mixed fund the beneficial...
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