Thurlow v. Thurlow
| Decision Date | 27 September 1944 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | RANDOLPH L. THURLOW v. OSCAR G. THURLOW. administrator,& another. |
May 1, 1944.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., QUA, RONAN & WILKINS, JJ.
Will, Ratification by beneficiary. Election. Estoppel.
Full enjoyment by a wife, for nearly five years after the death of her husband of all the benefits of a bequest by him of the income of a fund for her life with a right to use the principal at her discretion precluded the administrator of her estate from claiming title to certain corporate stock which to the wife's knowledge had stood in the names of herself and her husband "or survivor" but by his will, with whose provisions she was familiar, had been included in the fund as part of his own estate and bequeathed to a nephew of his wife at her death.
PETITION, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Essex on August 17, 1943.
The case was heard by Phelan, J.
E. E. Crawshaw, (R.
E. Burke with him,) for the petitioner.
E. Foss, for the respondents.
This petition is brought against the respondent in his capacity as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Amanda D. Lunt, late of Newbury, and also in his individual capacity, to require him to pay over to the petitioner the proceeds of the sale of sixty-two shares of stock in Towle Manufacturing Company, which have been sold by him as assets of the estate. The petitioner claims that title to the stock was in him by virtue of a provision contained in the will of George W. Lunt, deceased husband of Amanda.
The Lunts were an elderly couple possessed of a substantial property, a large part of which consisted of savings bank deposits in their joint names. The husband died in 1938 and the wife in 1943. They had no children. The petitioner was a nephew of Mrs Lunt. In his younger years he had lived with the Lunts much of the time and had worked on Lunt's farm. His relations both with his aunt and with his uncle by marriage had been intimate and affectionate. The Towle stock at all material times stood in the names of "George W. or Amanada D. Lunt or survivor." We therefore assume in favor of the respondent that this stock was held by husband and wife in some form of joint tenancy so that upon the death of the husband before that of the wife title thereto would have become vested in the wife (see Phelps v. Simons, 159 Mass. 415; Splaine v. Morrissey, 282 Mass. 217) and would have passed to the respondent as her administrator, if it had not been for another factor involved in the contention of the petitioner, which raises the decisive issue in the case. This contention is that George W. Lunt by his will, which was admitted to probate in 1938, purported to deal with this stock as his own absolute property and as such included it in the residue of his estate, which he set up as a fund for the benefit of his wife during her life; that he specifically bequeathed the stock to the petitioner at his wife's death; and that the wife, after the death of the husband, accepted the provisions of the will made for her benefit with full knowledge of all material facts and therefore became estopped, and that her administrator is likewise estopped, from asserting any interest in the stock at variance with the disposition of it made in the husband's will. The Probate Court, without making any express findings of fact, dismissed the petition, thereby rejecting the petitioner's contention. The evidence is reported.
It is a well settled rule "that if any person shall take any beneficial interest under a will, he shall be held thereby to confirm and ratify every other part of the will, or in other words, a man shall not take any beneficial interest under a will, and at the same time set up any right or claim of his own, even if otherwise legal and well founded, which shall defeat, or in any way prevent the full effect and operation of every part of the will." Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303, 308. "The main principle was never disputed, that there is an obligation on him who takes a benefit under a will or other instrument to give full effect to that instrument under which he takes a benefit; and if it be found that that instrument purports to deal with something which it was beyond the power of the donor or settlor to dispose of, but to which effect can be given by the concurrence of him who receives a benefit under the same instrument, the law will impose on him who takes the benefit the obligation of carrying the instrument into full and complete force and effect." Lord Hatherley in Cooper v. Cooper, L. R. 7 H. L. 53, 69, 70, cited in Noyes v. Noyes, 233 Mass. 55 , 59. [1]
The will of George W. Lunt, after a provision for the payment of debts and funeral expenses and a legacy to Amanda D. Lunt of all his household furniture and furnishings and wearing apparel continued as follows: ...
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