Thurman v. Stephens
Decision Date | 20 October 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 4:13-CV-440-Y,4:13-CV-440-Y |
Parties | TRACY LEE THURMAN, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner, Tracy Lee Thurman, a state prisoner, against William Stephens, director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
After having considered the pleadings and relief sought by Petitioner, the Court has concluded that the petition should be denied.
On March 23, 2010, in the 266th Judicial District Court, Erath County, Texas, a jury found Petitioner guilty of delivery of a controlled substance--methamphetamine--in the amount of one gram ormore but less than four grams. Petitioner pleaded true to a prior felony conviction, and the jury assessed his punishment at 99 years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. (J. of Conviction by a Jury 56, ECF No. 13-3.) Petitioner appealed his conviction, but the Eleventh Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Petitioner's petition for discretionary review. (Mem. Op., ECF No. 12-3; Thurman v. State, PDR No. 1902-11.) Petitioner also filed a state habeas application challenging his conviction, which was denied without written order by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. (Ex parte Thurman, State Habeas R. cover, ECF No. 15-3l.) Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition in the Galveston division of the Southern District of Texas and the action was subsequently transferred to this district and division.
In two grounds for relief, Petitioner claims that the Texas courts (1) violated his right to a fair trial by failing to adhere to the announced principles in Murray v. Carrier and (2) violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to being provided effective assistance of counsel. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.)
A § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided for in the Anti-Terrorism and EffectiveDeath Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if a state court arrives at a decision that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent or that is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). This standard is difficult to meet but "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
Additionally, the statute requires that federal courts give great deference to a state court's factual findings. Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct. This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit findings of fact and those findings of fact implicit in the state court's mixed-law-and-fact conclusions. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001). The applicant has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000).
Finally, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief in a state habeas-corpus application without writtenopinion, as in this case, it is an adjudication on the merits, which is also entitled to the presumption of correctness. Singleton v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1999); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under these circumstances, a federal court may assume the state court applied correct standards of federal law to the facts, unless there is evidence that an incorrect standard was applied, and infer fact findings consistent with the state court's disposition. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963)2; Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 n.3 (5th Cir.2002); Valdez, 274 F.3d at 948 n.11; Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 183 (5th Cir. 1997).
Petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial by the trial court's unauthorized (under article 36.29(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure) dismissal of a juror after trial had begun and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's "reasoning" for the dismissal so as to preserve the issue for appeal. Article 36.29(a) provides, in relevant part:
Not less than twelve jurors can render and return a verdict in a felony case. It must be concurred in by each juror and signed by the foreman. Except, . . . however, after the trial of any felony case begins and a juror dies or, as determined by the judge, becomesdisabled from sitting at any time before the charge of the court is read to the jury, the remainder of the jury shall have the power to render the verdict; but when the verdict shall be rendered by less than the whole number, it shall be signed by every member of the jury concurring in it.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.29(a) (West Supp. 2013).
Petitioner's claim was addressed by the state appellate court as follows:
In this case, as we have previously noted, the juror, in response to a question asked by the trial court, stated that the knowledge he had of the relationship between the witness and the juror's wife would have such an effect on his mental condition or emotional state that it would keep him from being a fair and impartial juror in the case. Consequently, the trial court could reasonably have found that the circumstance of the juror's knowledge that his wife had left him because of a State's witness would have had such an effect on his mental condition or emotional state that it would keep him from being a fair and impartial juror in the case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the juror was disabled within the meaning of Article 36.29(a).
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