Thurman v. United States

Decision Date05 May 1970
Docket NumberNo. 23886.,23886.
Citation423 F.2d 988
PartiesDonald Dean THURMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

LeRue Grim (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

James J. Simonelli (argued), John P. Hyland, U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for appellee.

Before CHAMBERS and BROWNING, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,* District Judge.

THOMPSON, District Judge:

The District Court denied Appellant Thurman's motion to vacate judgment and sentence (28 U.S.C. § 2255).

In June, 1961, Thurman was indicted on two charges, conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) and armed postal robbery with life in jeopardy (18 U.S.C. § 2114). After a jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to five years on the conspiracy count and twenty-five years (mandatory) on the robbery count. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Subsequently, the conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered. Thurman v. United States, 316 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963).

On August 8, 1963, Thurman was in Court with retained counsel. He withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of guilty to both counts. On the following day, Thurman was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on the conspiracy count and to twenty-five years' imprisonment on the postal robbery count, to run consecutively, but the Court suspended execution of the twenty-five year sentence and placed him on probation for five years to commence on expiration of the five year sentence. The term of probation commenced on January 25, 1966 on Thurman's release from prison. In 1968, Thurman was arrested as a probation violator and after extensive hearings, his probation was revoked on October 15, 1968.

In the meantime, i. e., on June 25, 1968, Thurman filed the Section 2255 motion from the denial of which the instant appeal is taken. With one exception, the contentions on appeal are frivolous. The argument that a more severe sentence was imposed after reversal of the original judgment by the Court of Appeals, because the sentences on the two counts were ordered to run consecutively rather than concurrently, does have a surface allure.

In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), it was decided that upon resentencing after vacation of the initial sentence, "a more severe" sentence cannot constitutionally be imposed unless reasons based on objective information of identifiable conduct by the defendant after the original sentencing are made a part of the record. No such reasons are recited in this record. We must determine whether the second sentence against Thurman was in fact a more severe sentence in violation of due process.

This inquiry cannot be answered by a dicta that consecutive sentences are necessarily more severe than concurrent sentences. The totality of the impact of the sentence on the defendant must be considered.

On March 19, 1962, at the original sentencing after the Court imposed the sentence of five years on Count I and twenty-five years on Count II, to run concurrently, defendant's attorney suggested that execution of the twenty-five year sentence should be suspended. The colloquy between Court and counsel is copied in the margin.1

When Thurman was resentenced on August 9, 1963, he had been interviewed by the probation officer on the previous afternoon, who had reported to the Court. The colloquy at resentencing is quoted in the margin.2

Patently, an argument that a twenty-five year term concurrent with a five year term is less severe than a five year term followed by five years' probation under an unexecuted twenty-five year sentence exalts form over substance. Thurman did not consider it so, nor did his attorney, nor did the Court. Everyone thought he was receiving lenient treatment rather than a more severe sentence. There is no basis for a charge of vindictiveness or of apprehension of retaliatory motivation which influenced the Court in Pearce, supra, to find a deprivation of due process.

The reason that the suspended twenty-five year sentence was declared to be consecutive is evident. If execution of a sentence is to be suspended and a defendant placed on probation, the maximum permissible term of probation is five years (18 U.S.C. § 3651; Fox v. United States, 354 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1965)). To realize its intention that Thurman should be subject to probationary supervision for five years after serving the five year conspiracy sentence, the sentencing Court was required to make the sentences consecutive, else the probation would have been substantially served during the prison term under the conspiracy charge. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932); Green v. United States, 298 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1961). In fashioning the new sentence, which, in its impact on defendant was substantially less severe than the original sentence, the District Court acted reasonably and properly and within the requirements of due process of law.3

Affirmed.

* Hon. Bruce R. Thompson, United States District Judge, Reno, Nevada, sitting by designation.

1 "MR. MULL: Yes. Well, I am very happy if that does apply.

"There's one other thing I'd like to call the Court's attention to, or just suggest to the Court, that before this Court some years ago there was a case, United States v. John Breckenridge in which a similar offense was charged, first count, second count, the same as in this charge. In that case after three trials the Defendant was convicted and he was given probation on the second count and on the first count he was given five years.

"THE COURT: I am mindful of that also, Mr. Mull.

"MR. MULL: The Court's mindful of that case also?

"THE COURT: Yes. I am mindful of that, and I have thought of that, but in going over Mr. Thurman's — he's hurt people. He's hurt people. In looking over his record Mr. Thurman has hurt people. That is all there is to it. It's not only that he's committed a crime against the United States in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • State v. Oliver
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • September 1, 1984
    ...160 (1981); United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.1980); United States v. Hargis, 568 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.1977); Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 148, 27 L.Ed.2d 151 (1970); Engle v. United States, 332 F.2d 88 (6th Cir.), cert. de......
  • United States v. Price
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 5, 1973
    ...sentence prescribed by section 2114 as mandatory, but we did not consider the issue here presented. In Thurman v. United States (9th Cir. 1970) 423 F.2d 988, we upheld the district court in suspending execution of a twenty-five-year sentence of an offender convicted for a violation of 18 U.......
  • Lechuga v. State, 50426
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 23, 1975
    ...court holds that probation . . . is not part of the sentence imposed upon a defendant.' Rejecting the reasoning of Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1970), that 'more severe' as used in Pearce means something more than longer sentence and that 'totality of the impact of the s......
  • McCulley v. State
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1972
    ...that it is only more severe sentences that come within the scope of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, relying upon Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988 (9th Cir., Feb.1970). In Thurman the court set the issue by stating that the 'totality of the impact of the sentence on the defendant must......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT