Thurston v. Roanoke City School Bd., Civil Action No. 97-0731-R.
| Decision Date | 09 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 97-0731-R. |
| Parties | Mollie B. THURSTON, Plaintiff, v. ROANOKE CITY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
John Palmer Fishwick, Jr., Lichtenstein & Fishwick, Roanoke, VA, for Plaintiff.
Wilburn C. Dibling, Jr., City Attorney, City of Roanoke, Roanoke, VA, William X. Parsons, Office of City Attorney, Roanoke, VA, for Defendant.
FINAL ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion filed today, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. This case is ordered stricken from the docket.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONThis matter is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Mollie B. Thurston ("Thurston") brought this action against the Roanoke City School Board (the "Board").1 She challenges the manner in which the Board dismissed her from her teaching position at Fishburn Park Elementary School ("Fishburn"). Thurston, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), alleges that the Board deprived her of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to Thurston, she attained "continuing contract status" under Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-304 (Michie 1997), and when the Board fired her, it deprived her of her property interest in public employment without notice and a hearing. Thurston argues, in the alternative, that if she had not attained continuing contract status, she was a probationary teacher. She contends that when the Board did not renew her annual contract that it failed to abide by Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-304 (). The Board moved for summary judgment on all issues. Thurston moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether she attained continuing contract status. Finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact, this court grants the Board's motion for summary judgment and denies Thurston's motion for partial summary judgment.
In the fall of 1992, the Board hired Thurston for a part-time position as a Family Training Specialist ("FTS"). The Board hired Thurston as a full-time FTS for the 1993-94 school year. Thurston signed a standard "Annual Form Contract for Professional Personnel" ("Annual Form Contract"), which listed her position as a "Family Training Specialist." (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. C.) A line on the contract was circled to indicate that she held a "valid Virginia license issued by the Board of Education." Thurston signed an identical contract for the 1994-95 school year. In 1993, a supervisor told Thurston that an FTS would need a teaching certificate. (Thurston Dep.)
As an FTS, Thurston worked with parents to show them how to educate their children. She conducted training sessions with parents, visited the homes of students and parents, trained teachers, and observed students in the classroom. (Id. at 17.) During "home visits," Thurston instructed parents and students at the same time. (Id. at 28.) When Thurston was in the classroom, she was always supervised by a classroom teacher. (Id. at 25-26.) Her supervisor used the standard "Teacher Performance Review Summary" to evaluate her performance. She was the only FTS employed by the Roanoke City School System (the "School System"). (Gibson Dep. at 7.)
The Annual Form Contract, which Thurston signed as an FTS, was used primarily for teachers. The Board also used the Annual Form Contract for professional staff who were not teachers and who had no interaction with students, such as the Controller, the Director of Food Services, the Director of Transportation, and the Supervisor of Facility Maintenance.
In April 1995, the funding for the FTS program was cut, and the School System notified Thurston that her position would be eliminated. Thurston learned of a position as a classroom teacher at Fishburn, and she submitted her application. When processing her application, the School System followed the procedure for hiring a new teacher, not the procedure used for teachers transferring from one position to the another. (Pleasants's Aff. at 1.) Thurston attended new teacher orientation, which was not required for those with teaching experience in that school division. (Id.) She signed the same Annual Form Contract she had signed when she was an FTS, except the contract specifically listed her position as "teacher." (Def.'s Mot. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. 18.) The Board renewed her contract for the 1996-97 school year, and she again signed an Annual Form Contract. She did not sign a "Continuing Form Contract With Professional Personnel," which is issued to teachers who, after completing a three year probationary period, have attained continuing contract status.
The school system was not satisfied with her performance as a teacher. In March 1997, Fishburn principal Thomas Dunleavy advised Thurston that he intended to recommend nonrenewal of her annual contract. On March 17, 1997, Thurston submitted a letter of resignation ("Resignation Letter"), which had an effective date of June 30, 1997. Once the Board received the letter, the school system terminated the nonrenewal process for Thurston's annual contract. Thurston knew that the Board would stop the nonrenewal process. (Thurston Dep. at 96.) In fact, Thurston intended for the Board to rely on her Resignation Letter. (Id.) The Board was scheduled to act on her Resignation Letter on April 8, 1997. (Pleasants's Aff. at 2.) On April 7, 1997, Thurston rescinded her Resignation Letter. On April 11, 1997, Superintendent Harris attempted to notify Thurston by letter of his intention to recommend nonrenewal of her contract. (Id. at 2.) The Board sent the letter by certified mail, but it was returned unopened. The Board approved the nonrenewal of Thurston's contract in June 1997. (Id. at 2.) Thurston then initiated this suit.
Thurston claims that the Board violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving her of property without due process of law. According to Thurston, the Board violated her due process rights because she had attained continuing contract status and, thus, had a protected property interest that the Board deprived her of when it fired her without notice and a hearing. See Va.Code Ann. § 22.-1-309, 311-12 (establishing procedures for dismissing a teacher who has attained continuing contract status). Alternatively, Thurston claims that she was a probationary teacher. She argues the Board failed to comply with Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-304 because it failed to notify her by April 15, 1997 that it would not renew her annual contract.
A public school teacher in Virginia who has attained continuing contract status has a property interest protected by the due process clause. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Lee-Warren v. School Bd., 792 F.Supp. 472, 473 (W.D.Va.1991) (); Wilkinson v. School Bd., 566 F.Supp. 766, 769 (E.D.Va.1983) (); Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-304 ().
The issue in this case is whether Thurston was a "teacher" during the two years she worked as an FTS. Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-303 requires that a teacher serve a probationary term of three years. After three years of service, the teacher is entitled to a continuing contract. See § 22.1-304. If Thurston was a "teacher" when she was an FTS, then she completed three years of probationary service and attained continuing contract status after the 1995-96 school year. If Thurston was not a "teacher" when she was an FTS, then she was a probationary teacher with two years' of service when the Board decided not to renew her contract.
The Virginia Code does not define the term "teacher." The Virginia State Board of Education (the "State Board") defines "teacher" as "a person (i) who is regularly employed full time as a teacher, visiting teacher/school social worker, guidance counselor, or librarian, and (ii) who holds a valid teaching license." 8 VAC 20-440-10. Under Virginia law, courts defer to interpretations of statutes by public officials charged with their enforcement. See Southern Spring Bed Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 205 Va. 272, 136 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Va.1964).2
FTS is not listed in the State Board's definition of teacher. Nevertheless, Virginia law does not allow a school board to rearrange titles to prevent a teacher from attaining continuing contract status. Cf. 1982-83 Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 451, available at 1982 WL 175691 (). The State Board's regulation and the record, however, provide little basis on which to conclude that Thurston was a "teacher" when she worked as an FTS.
The definition of "teacher" in clause (i) of the State Board's regulation may encompass positions that do not carry the title of "teacher." An FTS, however, is not such a position, as is demonstrated by examining the other positions specifically listed in clause (i). See Third Nat'l Bank v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977) (...
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