Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint

• Decision Date: 06 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12713,12713
• Citation: 603 P.2d 1001,100 Idaho 667
• Parties: Harold I. TIBBS and Virginia A. Tibbs, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal Corporation and Bonner County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1001

603 P.2d 1001

100 Idaho 667

Harold I. TIBBS and Virginia A. Tibbs, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal Corporation and Bonner County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12713.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 6, 1979.

Gary A. Finney and Philip H. Robinson, Sandpoint, for defendants-appellants.

Raymond T. Greene, Jr. and Bruce H. Greene of Greene & Hunt, Sandpoint, for plaintiffs-respondents.

THOMAS, Justice Pro Tem.

On August 14, 1975, the plaintiffs Harold and Virginia Tibbs commenced an action against the City of Sandpoint and Bonner County seeking compensation for the reduction in value of their property which they claimed resulted from the expansion of an airport owned and operated jointly by the defendants. The airport was adjacent to the plaintiffs' land. It had been there since 1949, but the air traffic had not previously affected the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' property. In 1972 the runway was extended an additional 730 feet so that at its nearest point it came within about 11/2 feet of plaintiffs' fenceline. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the extension of the runway the airport is now being used more frequently and by larger and noisier airplanes which have been flying over their property at much lower altitudes.

At the trial plaintiffs presented evidence in support of these allegations. Testimony was offered to show that the airplanes had an adverse effect upon livestock and prevented the plaintiffs from using the land nearest the airport for pasture. There was also testimony that low flights interfered with the farming of the property. There was further testimony that plaintiffs' property had been previously suited for rural residential use but now was not suitable for residences of any type, and it was doubtful that any structure could be built on the portion of property most affected by the air traffic.

The defendants offered testimony from a real estate appraiser who had done some preliminary work in assessing the value of the property, although he had not completed an actual appraisal. His opinion was that the plaintiffs' property had suffered no loss in value as a result of the extension of the runway. This opinion was based on his observations of the flight patterns of the airport and his investigation and experience around other airports.

The case was submitted to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court ordered a new trial, essentially on the grounds that the "verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence and against the law . . . ." Defendants have appealed from the order for a new trial.

The appellants first assert that the trial court should be reversed because of its failure to set forth in particular its Reasons for granting a new trial. The appellants apparently confuse the requirement that a movant set out specific reasons in support of his motion for a new trial, Paullis v. Liedke, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968), with the less demanding requirement that the court granting the motion need only state the Grounds upon which it is granted. This Court has previously pointed out that a trial court need not specify its Reasons for granting a new trial; it is sufficient for the court to set down the statutory Grounds for its order. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977). Although we encourage trial courts to specifically set forth their reasons for ordering a new trial, failure to do so is not error. The issue on appeal is whether the grounds stated would justify the granting of the motion. Id.

Appellants next contend that the trial court erroneously disturbed the factfinding function of the jury by granting the motion for a new trial. In support of this position they cite Ryals v. Broadbent Development Co., 98 Idaho 392, 565 P.2d 982 (1977). However, this Court has recently severely limited the impact of the Ryals decision:

"(W)e do not believe that the plurality opinion in Ryals, in which only two members of the Court concurred, is controlling authority in this case. The Ryals plurality opinion suggested that where a jury returns a special verdict on the issues of negligence and proximate cause the trial court's authority to grant a new trial is limited to the narrow standard enunciated in National Produce Distributors v. Grube, 78 Idaho 33, 297 P.2d 284 (1956), and the dissenting opinion in Deshazer v. Tompkins, 93 Idaho 267, 460 P.2d 402 (1969) (Shepard, J., dissenting). We now see no reason why special verdicts should be treated differently than general verdicts, and we reaffirm the rule which this Court first approved as early as Jacksha v. Gilbert, 4 Idaho 738, 44 P. 555 (1896), and as recently as Everton v. Blair, 99 Idaho 14, 576 P.2d 585 (1978), that:

'The trial court is vested with broad discretion in granting a new trial. On appeal, the determination of the trial court will not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion.' Id. at 15, 576 P.2d at 586. " Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 189, 579 P.2d 683, 686 (1978).

We are therefore limited in our review to the appellate standard of "abuse of discretion." As this Court has aptly stated:

"We decline to ascribe a definitive meaning to the amorphous phrase 'abuse of discretion' solely for the purpose of this case, but it will suffice to say, that where the trial court has exercised such discretion after a careful consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and without arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles of justice, we will not disturb that action." Lisher v. Krasselt, 96 Idaho 854, 857, 538 P.2d 783, 786 (1975).

In discussing the type of discretion to be exercised in disposing of a motion for a new trial, this Court has indicated:

"(T)he trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or justice." Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967).

The trial court explained its decision to order a new trial as follows:

"The overwhelming evidence at the trial indicated that damage did occur to plaintiffs' property by reason of the overflight. It was apparent to the Court that no credible evidence was offered by the defendants to show that no damage had occurred to plaintiffs' property by reason of the operation of the airport and it would be the opinion of the Court that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence . . . ."

Defendant appellants contend that the court below erred in assuming that they had some type of a burden of proof as to damages. Appellants emphasize the trial court's statement to the effect that defendants failed to show that no damage had occurred. This statement is taken by the appellants to mean that they were erroneously saddled with the burden of going forward with evidence. However, when the lower court's statement is examined in its proper context, it is clear that such statement was only explanatory. The trial court evidently found the evidence of plaintiffs' damage to be so persuasive that if uncontradicted by the defendants it could not justify the verdict reached by the jury. We cannot say that the trial court unwisely exercised its discretion in granting a new trial for the above reason. ¹ Defendants' appraiser was the only witness who stated that plaintiffs' property had suffered no loss in value as a result of the expansion of the airport. Since he had not done an actual appraisal of the property, the trial court was entitled to conclude that "said testimony should have carried very little weight with the jury." The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

Since this matter will be...