Tibbs v. City of Atlanta
| Decision Date | 22 March 1906 |
| Citation | 53 S.E. 811,125 Ga. 18 |
| Parties | TIBBS v. CITY OF ATLANTA. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
A judgment of a board of police commissioners, discharging a policeman, after a trial in the manner prescribed by the law creating the board, is subject to review on certiorari.
Where the charter of a city vests the authority in such a board to select, control, and discipline the police force of the city and no provision is made for disqualifying a member from acting in a case where he may be biased or prejudiced against the policeman on trial, an objection cannot be properly made to a member of a board participating in the trial on this ground.
Where the membership of the board is increased by a statute enacted pending a trial, the new member added under the authority of such a statute has no right to participate in the trial; and this is true, although the person who has become a member was present at all the sittings of the board, and heard all the evidence adduced on the trial.
A board of police commissioners may discharge a policeman for conduct prior to his employment, when it subsequently appears that such conduct would disqualify the person from efficient service, or the retention of such person is not calculated to improve the discipline or efficiency of the force. Especially is this true where the conduct consists of acts done during a previous term of service as a policeman.
The result of a trial before such a board, as expressed in its findings, like a verdict in an ordinary case, is to have a reasonable intendment, and a reasonable construction, and is not to be set aside except for necessity.
The finding of the board in the present case was in effect that the policeman was guilty as charged, and as such was authorized by the evidence.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. L. Pendleton, Judge.
Certiorari by S. T. Tibbs against the city of Atlanta. From an order overruling the certiorari, Tibbs brings error. Affirmed.
A judgment of a board of police commissioners discharging a policeman after a trial in the manner prescribed by the law creating the board is subject to review by certiorari.
Tibbs a patrolman in the police department of the city of Atlanta was tried before the board of police commissioners upon certain charges, specification No. 2 being in the following language: "Circulating false reports against an officer knowing them to be false when so circulated." This was afterwards amplified so as to read as follows: A hearing was had at which Tibbs was present, represented by counsel. Witnesses for both sides were sworn and examined. Tibbs was acquitted of all the charges save specification No. 2, the finding of the board on that charge being as follows: "that he (Tibbs) be found guilty of charge and specification No. 2, in that he made an affidavit that Capt. Moon had used certain language, in speaking about Paul Hubbard and the commissioners, which had not been proven true."
A motion was then adopted "that he (Tibbs) be discharged from the force." Tibbs applied to the superior court of Fulton county for a writ of certiorari, and, in his petition, assigned error upon the finding of the board of commissioners, for the following reasons: (1) That over the objection of Tibbs a designated member of the board was permitted to participate in the trial, who had used expressions, prior to the hearing, showing bias and prejudice against him. (2) That the board of commissioners refused to permit the chairman of the police committee of the city council of Atlanta to participate in the trial, an amendment to the charter of the city of Atlanta having been passed, pending the trial, making the chairman of that committee, ex officio, a member of the board of police commissioners. (3) That the board of commissioners refused, upon motion made by a member, to reconsider their action. (4) That the verdict was contrary to the evidence. Errors were also assigned upon the form of the judgment. The writ was sanctioned, the board of commissioners answered, and, after a hearing, the certiorari was overruled. To this ruling Tibbs excepted.
Walter McElreath, for plaintiff in error.
J. L. Mayson and W. P. Hill, for defendant in error.
COBB, P.J. (after stating the foregoing facts).
The proceeding before the board of police commissioners was quasi-judicial in its nature, and the judgment of the board is subject to review like that of any other tribunal exercising judicial functions. See Carr v. Augusta, 124 Ga. 116, 52 S.E. 300; Gill v. Brunswick, 118 Ga. 85, 44 S.E. 830, and cit.
2. The board, as organized for the purpose of trial, if not technically a court, was certainly about to proceed in the exercise of judicial functions. Its members partook both of the nature of judges and jurors. They were to decide both the law and the facts of the case under consideration. While they had imposed upon them the duties usually required of jurors they acted more in the nature of judges than jurors; that is, they were judges authorized by law to pass upon questions of fact. They are to be dealt with, therefore, under the rules controlling the powers, duties, and conduct of judges. The accused, at the inception of the trial, objected to one of the members of the board presiding in the case, the ground of objection being that he had, prior to the trial of the case, used expressions indicating bias or prejudice against the accused. The board overruled this objection, and the trial proceeded, with the alleged disqualified member participating so far as the hearing of evidence and argument, and consultation, were concerned. It appears from the record that he did not vote upon the question of guilt or innocence, nor on the question of punishment to be imposed. It is claimed that his presence on the board during the progress of the case vitiated the trial. It is an ancient rule that a man cannot be a judge in his own case. The maxim which lays down this rule is founded upon common justice and common decency. It was said in one case that even an act of Parliament could not make a man a judge in his own case. Day v. Savage, Hob. 87. There are rulings in this country to the effect that it is beyond the scope of legislative authority to confer power upon a person to act as a judge in his own case. 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 733. At common law, when the...
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