Tiddy v. Graves

Decision Date22 May 1900
Citation126 N.C. 620,36 S.E. 127
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesTIDDY. v. GRAVES.

tax SALES—REDEMPTION—CURTESY—PLEADINGS—ADMISSIONS—EXECUTORS.

1. The two years given a remainder-man in which to redeem applies only to sales for nonpayment of state or county taxes, and not in case of sales for city taxes.

2. Under Const. art. 10, § 6, providing that the property of a female shall be and remain her sole and separate estate and property, and shall not be liable for her husband's debts, "and may be devised and bequeathed, and with the written assent of her husband conveyed by her as if she were unmarried, " the husband has no right of curtesy in land devised by her.

3. Admission by an answer of the paragraph of the complaint that "J., the husband of the said A., at her death became entitled to an estate by the curtesy in the said land, and he is still surviving, " is an admission only of the fact that J. still survives, and not of the conclusion of law that J. became entitled to curtesy in land devised, as alleged in the complaint, by his wife.

4. One qualifying as executor of a will cannot claim a life estate in land contrary to a devise in the will.

Appeal from superior court, Guilford county; Brown, Judge.

Action by T. C. Tiddy against G. C. Graves. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

L. M. Scott and A. M. Scales, for appellant.

Osborne, Maxwell & Keerans, for appellee.

CLARK, J. The plaintiff alleges that he is the owner in fee of the premises, by virtue of his mother's will, by which it is devised to him in fee simple. She died in 1890. On May 6, 1895, the property was sold for nonpayment of taxes, both by the city, under the provisions of its charter, and by the sheriff, under the general statute, and purchased by the defendant at both sales. Over a year thereafter, no one having come forward to redeem the premises, deeds therefor were made to the defendant both by the sheriff and by the city. There is no impeachment of the regularity of these proceedings. The plaintiff made no offer to redeem till the 29th of April, 1897. The plaintiff contends, however, that his stepfather, Reed, who was in possession, was entitled to a life tenancy in the premises as tenant by the curtesy, and therefore that he (the plaintiff) had two years in which to redeem, instead of one, and therefore was in time, and that the defendant is estopped by an admission in the answer to deny that the stepfather was tenant by the curtesy. To this it is sufficient to say: (1) The two years given one who is remainderman after a life estate, in which to redeem, applies only to sales for nonpayment of state and county taxes; and, therefore, if the contention that the stepfather was tenant by the curtesy were valid, the defendant's title under the deed from the city is unimpeachable. (2) It is clear that under the present constitution there is no curtesy, after the death of the wife, in property which she has devised. In Walker v. Long, 109 N. C. 510, 14 S. E. 299, Merrimon, C. J., in a well-considered opinion, says: "But that constitution [1868, art, 10, § 6] has wrought very material and far-reaching changes as to the rights, respectively, of husband and wife in respect to her property, both real and personal, and enlarged her personality and her power in respect to and control over her property. It provides that 'the real and personal property of any female in this state acquired before marriage, and all property real and personal to which she may after marriage become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any debts, liabilities or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed, and withthe written assent of her husband conveyed by her as if she were unmarried.' This provision is very broad, comprehensive, and thorough in its terms, meaning, and purpose, and plainly gives and secures to the wife the complete ownership and control of her property as if she were unmarried, except in the single instance of conveying it. She must convey with the assent of the husband. It clearly excludes the ownership of the husband as such, and sweeps away the common-law right or estate he might at...

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24 cases
  • Jackson v. Beard
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 23, 1913
    ...in an action by the wife to assert her right to the property, he must be made defendant." Pell's Revisal and note to section 2102. In Tiddy v. Graves, supra, there are some expressions in the opinion which seem to defendant's position, but the decision properly rests upon the express provis......
  • In re Petersen's Estate
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • August 7, 1939
    ...as if she were sole, at least as against her husband. Constitution of 1901, § 209; Williams v. Massie, 212 Ala. 389, 102 So. 611." In Tiddy v. Graves, supra, the claimed the husband's right of curtesy, rather than homestead, against the defendant who relied on a married woman's right to dev......
  • Freeman v. Lide
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1918
    ... ... 193, § 31, provided that a married woman ... should have the power to devise and bequeath her property as ... if she were a feme sole. Tiddy v. Graves, 126 N.C ... 620, 36 S.E. 127. Revisal, § 3140, provides that a person may ... by will dispose of-- ...          "all ... ...
  • Hallyburton v. Slagle
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 11, 1903
    ...the death of his wife, provided she had died intestate, or had not disposed of the property by her will to some one else. Tiddy v. Graves, 126 N.C. 620, 36 S.E. 127. appears in this case that Mrs. Slagle died, leaving a will, in which she devised the said property to the plaintiff. When a m......
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