Tidwell v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-00024-COA-R3-CV (TN 12/28/2004)
| Decision Date | 28 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. W2004-00024-COA-R3-CV.,W2004-00024-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | ROY L. TIDWELL, ET AL. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Sam L. Crain, Jr., Memphis, TN, for Appellant
Timothy Taylor, Memphis, TN, for Appellee Roy L. Tidwell
Mark Allen, Memphis, TN, for Appellees Richard Coggins, et al.
Alan E. Highers, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. Frank Crawford, P.J., W.S., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.
The City of Memphis promulgated an On-the-Job Injury Program to handle claims filed by city employees seeking benefits for on-the-job injuries. Thirteen firefighters and one police officer filed applications for benefits with the city. When the city denied the applications, the employees filed appeals to the On-the-Job Injury Appeals Panel which affirmed the city's denial of benefits. Each employee appealed the panel's determination to the Chancery Court of Shelby County by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review under a statutory writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a common law writ of certiorari. The chancellor reversed the panel's decision and held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, proceedings before the panel are subject to the contested case procedures set forth in the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. In addition, the chancellor held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, judicial review of the panel's decision is neither by common law or statutory writ, but review must be conducted in accordance with section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code. The city appealed the chancery court's ruling to this Court arguing that the chancellor erred in applying section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to the panel. We reverse the chancery court's ruling.
The Appellees (hereinafter "the Appellees" or "the Employees") consist of thirteen firefighters currently or previously employed with the City of Memphis Fire Services Division and one police officer employed with the City of Memphis Police Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the City"). During the course of their employment with the City, each Employee was diagnosed with an illness or disease each Employee claimed was caused by his or her employment with the City. The City has elected to not be subject to the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law pursuant to section 50-6-106(5) of the Tennessee Code.1 Instead, the City, pursuant to its personnel manual, established an On the Job Injury ("OJI") Program setting forth the policies and procedures governing application for OJI b(enefits, an employee's entitlement to OJI benefits, and appeals of the City's denial of OJI benefits.
Each Employee at issue filed an application for OJI benefits with the City.2 All of the claims but two were filed pursuant to section 7-51-201 of the Tennessee Code, known as the Tennessee Heart and Lung Act.3 The City has adopted a special procedure for dealing with OJI claims for benefits filed by law enforcement officers and firefighters under this statute. Pursuant to the City's OJI policy, the City's Risk Manager, upon receiving an employee's application for benefits, is tasked with the responsibility of compiling the employee's medical history for a period of ten years preceding the application date, results of the pre-employment physical examination, and a copy of the official job description for the employee's position. These records are then forwarded to a panel consisting of three physicians, one of whom performs a physical examination of the employee. The panel of physicians seeks "to determine within a reasonable degree of medical certainty the primary cause of the Employee's illness." The panel submits its written findings to the City's Risk Manager who either approves or denies the employee's application for OJI benefits. In the instant case, the City denied each Employee's application for OJI benefits.
Pursuant to the City's OJI Program policy, each Employee filed an appeal to the OJI Appeals Panel to contest the City's denial of benefits. The OJI Appeals Panel consists of the City's Risk Manager, the City's Director of Finance or designee, and the City's Attorney or designee. The Employees were permitted to have their union representative present at the hearing before the OJI Appeals Panel, but OJI Program policy did not permit the Employees to have legal counsel represent them at the hearings. The OJI Appeals Panel affirmed the City's denial of OJI benefits to each of the Employees.
The Employees subsequently filed individual Petitions for Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking a review of the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel in their respective cases.4. In each case, the Employees sought review of the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel under a statutory writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a common law writ of certiorari. The chancery court issued a writ in each case ordering that the administrative record be produced for review. The City filed an answer to each petition contesting that the proper method of review in the chancery court was by statutory writ of certiorari. The City also filed a motion in response to each petition seeking partial dismissal of the petitions to the extent they sought review under a statutory writ of certiorari. For purposes of the City's motions, the chancery court consolidated the Employees' petitions and held a hearing on September 18, 2003. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancellor ordered the parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for review. The chancellor subsequently granted the City's motions excluding review under the statutory writ of certiorari.
On December 11, 2003, the chancellor entered judgments in favor of the firefighters incorporating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the firefighters. Likewise, on December 12, 2003, the chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the sole police officer incorporating his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law into the judgment. The chancery court, by incorporating the findings proposed by the Employees, made the following conclusions of law: (1) Section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, governing review of the rulings of boards and commissions, applies to the decisions of the City's OJI Appeals Panel; (2) The proper method of review of the OJI Appeals Panel decisions, therefore, is neither by common law or statutory writ of certiorari, but review must be conducted in conformity with section 4-5-322 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"); and (3) Proceedings before the OJI Appeals Panel must be conducted in accordance with the contested case procedures set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, section 4-5-301 et seq. of the Tennessee Code. Since the OJI Appeals Panel did not conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedures outlined in the UAPA, the chancery court reversed the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel in each case and ordered the City to grant each Employee OJI benefits associated with their respective claims.
The City subsequently filed timely notices of appeal in each case to this Court. Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court granted the Joint Motion for Consolidation of Appeals filed by the parties after finding that the individual appeals presented common issues of law. (Order, Jan. 21, 2004). Accordingly, we are presented, by all parties to the present appeal, with the following issues for review:
I. Whether the chancery court erred in ruling that section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code applies to the OJI Appeals Panel of the City of Memphis, specifically:
A. Whether the OJI Appeals Panel is a Civil Service Board, and
B. Whether the OJI Appeals Panel sits as a Civil Service Board because its decisions affect "employment status"; and
II. Should this Court find that the contested case procedures of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act do apply to the OJI Appeals Panel, whether the chancery court erred in entering judgment for the Employees rather than remanding for hearings conducted in accordance with the applicable procedural standards.
For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the decision of the chancery court.
On appeal, the facts in these consolidated cases are not in dispute since both the City and Employees agree that the procedures used by the OJI Appeals Panel did not comply with the contested case procedures found in the UAPA. This Court is confronted in this case with issues involving the interpretation of statutory language. "Construction of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo, with no presumption of correctness." Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)); see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Estate of Adkins v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)); ATS, Inc. v. Kent, 27 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
In construing statutory language, we are mindful of the following standards adopted by the courts of this state which aid us in this task:
A "basic rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature." Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). In determining legislative intent and purpose, a court must not "unduly restrict[ ] or expand[ ] a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Worley v. Weigel's, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Owens v. State,...
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