Tidwell v. Collins

• Citation: 522 S.W.2d 674
• Parties: George M. TIDWELL, Commissioner of Revenue, Appellant, v. Hyman L. COLLINS, etc., et al., Appellees.
• Decision Date: 14 April 1975
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

Page 674

522 S.W.2d 674

George M. TIDWELL, Commissioner of Revenue, Appellant, v. Hyman L. COLLINS, etc., et al., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April 14, 1975.

R. A. Ashley, Jr., Atty. Gen., William J. Haynes, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.

Dale C. Workman, Norbert J. Slovis, Lockett, Slovis & Weaver, Knoxville, for appellees.

OPINION

HENRY, Justice.

This suit in chancery seeks a refund of state inheritance taxes paid under protest. The Chancery Court at Knoxville held in favor of taxpayers and the Commissioner of Revenue has perfected an appeal.

I.

Plaintiffs, co-executors of the estate of Milton Collins, brought suit against George M. Tidwell, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Tennessee.

In the preparation and submission of the State inheritance tax return, they valued the life estate of a seventy-seven year old female beneficiary at a figure which was substantially increased by the Commissioner. The resulting increase in the tax liability was paid under protest and this suit was instituted.

At issue is the proper application and construction of Sec. 30--1613, T.C.A., which reads in pertinent part as follows:

The value of every future, contingent or limited estate, income, interest or annuity for any life or lives in being shall, So far as possible, be determined by the rule, method and standard of mortality and the value set forth in The actuaries combined experience tables (sic) of mortality . . . (Emphasis added)

It should be emphasized that the phrase 'the actuaries combined experience tables' not only appears in lowercase but in the plural.

It is the contention of appellees that since this is not capitalized and is in the plural the statute does not have reference to the Actuaries Combined Experience Table of Mortality appearing on page 1148 of Volume 1, T.C.A., nor to the Annuity Valuation Tables ensuing at page 1154. They insist that the statute refers to no particular table and attempt to validate their insistence by showing that this particular table is one hundred thirty-one (131) years old, is out of date and its application is unfair and prejudicial. They urge the use of the 1937 Standard Annuity Table.

It is the contention of the Commissioner that the tax liability is to be determined pursuant to Sec. 30--1613, T.C.A. with the use of the Actuaries Combined Experience Table of Mortality in accordance with the long standing policy and practice of the Department of Revenue.

The Chancellor, quite correctly, took judicial notice of the fact that there has been a substantial increase in life expectancy. He held that the phraseology of the statute did not indicate or specify a particular table; that the Actuaries Combined Experience Table was out of date and that it was more sensible and appropriate to use the 1937 Standard Annuity Table. The Chancellor commented upon, but did not attempt to construe the meaning of the phrase 'so far as possible.' Accordingly, judgment was entered for plaintiffs.

II.

Section 30--1613, T.C.A. had its origin in Chapter 29, of the Public Acts of the Extraordinary Session of the 1929 General Assembly. It was carried forward into the official code of 1932 as Sec. 1270. It also appears in Michie's Codes of 1932, 1934, and 1938, under the same number. At no time has the title of the mortality table appeared in capital letters, nor has it ever come before this Court in any reported decision.

At the very outset we dispose of the contention with respect to the failure to capitalize the mortality table by holding that the statute refers to and designates the Actuaries Combined Experience Table of Mortality.

The premier rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 35 Tenn.App. 648, 250 S.W.2d 781 (1952). In doing this we look to the general purpose to be accomplished. State v. Yoakum, 201 Tenn. 180, 297 S.W.2d 635 (1956).

It was the obvious intent for the Legislature in the adoption of this statute to provide a fair method for the evaluation of future interests for purposes of taxation.

It is a fundamental rule of construction that statutes are not to be construed by strict and critical adherence to technical grammatical rules. The statute is intelligible and conveys a reasonable certainty of meaning, in its present form, insofar as the use of lowercases to designate the mortality tests is concerned. Were we to construe this statute so as to impute a legislative intent to refer to unidentified and unidentifiable mortality tables, the result would be an absurdity and a repugnance which would defeat the purpose of the statute. Such a construction would be impermissible. Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 95 S.W. 1012 (1906).

It is unfortunate that the Legislature selected a table of mortality which was outmoded at the time of its selection; however, this is a matter which addressed itself to its judgment and discretion. We have neither the jurisdiction nor the disposition to revise and update the statute by substituting a current mortality table for one characterized by its patent antiquity. Moreover, any specified table will itself ultimately become obsolete.

The effect of the obsolescence of the specified table, however, is not fatal to a fair, reasonable and just application of the statute. Nothing contained therein accords any exclusivity to the Actuaries Combined Experience Table. The statute provides that the value of a life estate 'shall, So far as possible, be determined' by the table. It was the evident intent of the Legislature, by the use of this language, to recognize that many factors enter into life expectancy, and to point to this particular mortality table as a guide in the determination of the value of any future interest.

If not so construed, this phraseology renders the statute ambiguous, inconsistent and repugnant, and its application would result in injustice and hardship. It is the duty of the Court to reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions; ¹ to place a construction thereon which will not be prejudicial to the public interest; ² to construe a statute so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant, and the one section will not destroy another; ³ and further to give effect to every word, phrase, clause and sentence of the act in order to carry out the legislative intent. ⁴

We have followed these recognized rules of construction. We are particularly concerned that this statute not be construed or applied in a prejudicial or oppressive manner. We are impressed with the manifest regard for justice which characterized the Chancellor's approach to this problem. We are also impressed with the commendable candor of the presentation made by the Assistant Attorney General in oral argument at the Bar of this Court. These approaches are in the highest tradition of the Bench and Bar.

The Chancellor noted the increase in life expectancy. We have delved into the matter, with interesting results.

From Volume 13, Encyclopedia Britannica, Life Expectancy, page 1091, et seq., we find that the Neanderthal man had an average life expectancy of twenty years....