Tidwell v. State
| Decision Date | 16 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 15S00-9207-CR-0535,15S00-9207-CR-0535 |
| Citation | 644 N.E.2d 557 |
| Parties | Loren Wayne TIDWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Suzann Weber Lupton, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
A jury trial resulted in the conviction of appellant of Murder, and of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, a class A felony, as well as a finding that he is a habitual offender. He was sentenced to forty (40) years on the murder count, enhanced by thirty (30) years for the habitual offender status, and to thirty (30) years on the conspiracy count, to be served consecutively for a total executed sentence of one hundred (100) years.
The facts are: On Saturday, August 3, 1991, appellant spent the evening with friends, bar-hopping, shooting pool, drinking, and indulging in a running altercation with Matt Lightfield, the victim in this case, over which man would get to spend the night with Sharon Reed, a young lady of the previous night's acquaintance. During the course of the night appellant was chauffered about by one Sharon Siefert, shuttling between the Flicker-Inn, Smitty's, and Sgt. Pepper's, all drinking establishments in the Lawrenceburg area, and the residences of several drinking companions, including Rhonda Cook and Jeff Hill, John "Weasel" Redding, and Donna Poynter, who tendered to Tidwell possession of "Junior," her small-frame .25-caliber Raven semiautomatic handgun.
At closing time at Sgt. Pepper's, appellant and Lightfield engaged in a scuffle outside the bar in order to determine who would get to escort Sharon Reed for the remainder of the evening. The appearance of a police car ended the fistfight, and Reed left with Lightfield to spend the night at the apartment of Cook and Hill, but not before appellant promised Lightfield, "I'll kill you." Siefert then drove appellant to the home of Eddie Dunn, all the while listening to his grief over losing to Lightfield the companionship of Reed. Upon arriving at Dunn's mobile home, appellant, appearing overanxious and fidgety, recounted to him the events of that evening and enlisted his assistance (and the use of Siefert's car) in returning to Lawrenceburg. As Dunn watched, appellant disassembled, cleaned and reassembled "Junior," and instructed Dunn to keep an eye on the other occupants of Cook and Hill's apartment while he dealt with Lightfield.
Upon arriving, they were able to enter because the door's lock was broken. Appellant crept past Cook and Hill, asleep on the couch, and into the bedroom where Reed and Lightfield were also sleeping. Appellant fired one round into Lightfield's head, muffling the report with a couch cushion held over the muzzle, and then bounded out of the bedroom and out of the apartment, assuring Dunn that had the gun not jammed, "the bitch would be dead, too." The duo returned to Dunn's home, where they placed the pistol in a potato chip bag and buried it in a ravine behind the mobile home.
Meanwhile, as their intoxication faded, the occupants of Hill and Cook's apartment were awakened by the moans of Matt Lightfield, who thought he was suffering a heart attack and asked Reed, who had awakened covered with his blood, to summon help. Before passing out, Reed roused Hill and Cook, who went next door and telephoned emergency personnel. They arrived to find Lightfield on the living room floor, bleeding profusely and explaining he had been beaten up. He was transported to the hospital, where examination revealed he had been shot in the head with a small caliber gun. Several days after being admitted, Lightfield died of complications (an embolism of the carotid artery) from his wound, whereupon Eddie Dunn came forward and told authorities all about the shooting.
Appellant advances two arguments to support his contention the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He first maintains his conspiracy conviction is erroneous because there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove that Eddie Dunn, his alleged co-conspirator, ever intelligently and deliberately agreed with him to shoot and kill Lightfield. He cites Ind.Code § 35-41-5-2 for the three elements of the crime of conspiracy: 1) the defendant intended to commit the felony; 2) the defendant agreed with another person to commit the felony; and 3) either the defendant or the other person performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Appellant goes on to cite uncontradicted evidence that Dunn drove him to Lawrenceburg only to get him out of his trailer, that he thought appellant was just "blowing smoke" about shooting Lightfield, and that he believed nothing more than a fistfight would transpire.
Appellant acknowledges that this Court has held that our present statute embodies the unilateral theory of conspiracy such that proof that the co-conspirator intended to carry out the conspiracy is not required. Christopher v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 480; Garcia v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 510, 394 N.E.2d 106. Nevertheless, he contends this case is controlled by our result in Woods v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 624, 413 N.E.2d 572, wherein this Court reversed the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit battery with a deadly weapon, finding there had existed an agreement only to engage in a brawl, and there had been no agreement concerning the use of weapons such as materialized during the poolroom melee.
As the State points out, however, Woods is not precisely apposite here, where appellant's intention not only to involve "Junior," but to use the gun to kill Lightfield, is evident from the beginning. Under the unilateral theory, Dunn's subjective belief as to appellant's intent to carry through on the murder plan is irrelevant to appellant's guilt. It is clear the plan itself, as charged, involved killing Lightfield with the pistol, and that appellant agreed to carry out that plan; thus we find no lack of evidence sufficient to prove the agreement element of the conspiracy to murder Lightfield.
Appellant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions due to the nature of the testimony supporting the State's case. In his own words, appellant insists: Appellant goes on to recite a plethora of apparent inconsistencies, both internal and external, regarding the State's testimony, and concludes this case is one in which the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it and thus should be reversed,...
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