Tiegs v. Robertson
| Decision Date | 09 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 35921 |
| Citation | 2010 Opinion No. 46 |
| Parties | BRUCE TIEGS, individually, and as co-personal representative of the Estate ofKenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIEGS and SUSAN HUTER, individually, and as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Kenneth Tiegs, and K.P. INC., an Idaho corporation,Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,Defendant-Appellant, andDUSTIN M. KUKLA,Defendant. KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., assubrogee of UNIGARD INSURANCE,Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,Defendant-Appellant, and DUSTIN M. KUKLA,Defendant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Saetrum Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Ryan B. Peck argued.
Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for respondent. Chad M. Nicholson argued.
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Gordon W. Petrie, District Judge.
Orders denying motion for summary judgment and granting motion for new trial, affirmed.
Darrell L. Robertson appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment and grant of Bruce Tiegs' motion for a new trial. We affirm.
In July 2003, Robertson allowed Dustin M. Kukla to borrow a tractor and hay baler to complete a job baling straw for which Kukla had been hired by another party. Robertson was aware that the rear lights on the baler were not operational. Before loaning Kukla the equipment for free, Robertson had him demonstrate that he could operate it properly by completing a portion of Robertson's own field. During daylight hours, Kukla removed the equipment from Robertson's property, with Robertson following behind using his pickup truck as a pilot vehicle. However, on July 30, Kukla drove the tractor and baler on Highway 45 at approximately 10:30 p.m.--without rear lights in order to effect a repair of the baler at another location. A vehicle being driven by Kenneth Tiegs collided into the back of the baler and as a result, Tiegs was killed.
Several of Tiegs' family members, acting individually and as personal representatives of Tiegs' estate, as well as the corporation who owned the vehicle Tiegs was operating at the time of the collision, brought suit against Kukla and Robertson for negligence, negligent entrustment, negligence per se, 1 and imputed liability. Kukla failed to respond to the complaint and a default judgment was entered against him.
Robertson filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court denied. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, Robertson filed a "Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" and the district court again denied the summary judgment motion. A.second jury trial commenced and at its conclusion the jury rendered a special verdict, finding that Robertson was only negligent in loaning the equipment to Kukla, but that this negligence was not a proximate cause of Tiegs' death and injuries, that Kukla was negligent and his negligence was a proximate cause of Tiegs' death and injuries, and that Tiegs had been negligent in operating his vehicle, but his negligence was not a proximate cause of his death. Despite these findings, the jury apportioned "fault" as 15% to Robertson, 80% to Kukla, and 5% to Tiegs and awarded each of the three plaintiffs damages of $2,500 each.
Tiegs filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the answers to the special interrogatories were inconsistent with each other and with the special verdict and thus against the law. After oral argument, the district court granted the motion on the ground that the answers to the special interrogatories and verdict were irreconcilably inconsistent. Robertson now appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment and the court's grant of Tiegs' motion for a new trial.
Robertson contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) because Idaho Code § 49-2417(1) cannot be read to apply to implements of husbandry; (2) that Robertson did not knowingly permit Kukla to operate the vehicle at night with non-operating rear lights in violation of I.C. §§ 49-902,-903, and-916; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to establish the elements of negligent entrustment. In response, Tiegs argues that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order. In the alternative, Tiegs contends that the district court did not err in denying the motion on the merits. We first address Tiegs' argument that the denial of Robertson's summary judgment motion is not subject to appellate review.
It is well settled in Idaho that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself, nor is it reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 542, 164 P.3d 819, 822 (2007); Hunter v. Dep't of Corrs., Div. of Prob. & Parole, 138 Idaho 44, 47, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002). In Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743, 9 P.3d 1204, 1209 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
Cogeneration asks this Court to determine whether the district court erroneously denied its motion for partial summary judgment. However, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final order and a direct appeal.cannot be taken from it. Moreover, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not to be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. See Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999);Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hospitals, 111 Idaho 44, 46, 720 P.2d 632, 634 (1986); Evans v. Jensen, 103 Idaho 937, 941, 655 P.2d 454, 458 (Ct. App. 1982). The final judgment in a case can therefore be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record made at the time summary judgment was denied. See Evans, 103 Idaho at 942, 655 P.2d at 459.
In his reply brief, Robertson argues that this Court's review of the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment "is appropriate because it effectively granted to Respondent [a] partial summary judgment finding that I.C. § 49-2417 applies to implements of husbandry and that I.C. § 49-916 and I.C. § 49-903 require owners of implements of husbandry to have operational lighting systems at all times." Robertson's attempt to circumvent Idaho law that precludes us from reviewing a denial of summary judgment by attempting to characterize the district court's ruling as a partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Tiegs is not well taken. The district court did not grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs on any cause of action, or even on the issue of liability on any cause of action. All of the plaintiffs' claims went to trial except the negligence per se claim, which was withdrawn.2
In Garcia, our Supreme Court specifically rejected the appellant's invitation to carve out an exception to the general rule to allow for appellate review of denials of summary judgment made strictly on a point of law, despite an argument that the ruling precluded the losing party thereafter from offering evidence or urging the point at the time of trial. Id. at 542, 164 P.3d at 822. In declining to adopt such an exception, the court noted:
[I]t would violate the policy behind treating orders denying summary judgment as interlocutory. We have recognized the rationale for the rule that an order denying summary judgment not be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment as follows:
[B]y entering an order denying summary judgment, the trial court merely indicates that the matter should proceed to trial on its merits. The final judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record made at the time summary judgment was denied. Any legal rulings made by the trial court affecting that final judgment can be reviewed at that time in light of the full.record. This will prevent a litigant who loses a case, after a full and fair trial, from having an appellate court go back to the time when the litigant had moved for summary judgment to view the relative strengths and weaknesses of the litigants at that earlier stage. Were we to hold otherwise, one who had sustained his position after a fair hearing of the whole case might nevertheless lose, because he had failed to prove his case fully on the interlocutory motion.
Miller v. Estate of Prater, 141 Idaho 208, 211, 108 P.3d 355, 358 (2005) (quoting Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 26, 105 P.3d 676, 686 (2005) (quoting Keeler v. Keeler, 124 Idaho 407, 410, 860 P.2d 23, 26 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added).))
It is clear that our Supreme Court intends the rule against review of denial of summary judgment motions to be interpreted strictly, and thus we do so here.3 Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Robertson's arguments that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment.4
Robertson also contends that the district court erred in granting Tiegs' motion for a new trial because the jury's answers to the special interrogatories should be read to be consistent.
In its order granting the motion for a new trial, the district court summed up the jury's answers on the special verdict form thusly:
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