Tierney v. Dodge

• Decision Date: 01 January 1863
• Citation: 9 Minn. 153
• Parties: JOHN TIERNEY et al. vs. H. M. DODGE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

9 Minn. 153

JOHN TIERNEY et al.vs.

H. M. DODGE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Error to district court, Ramsey County.

Points and authorities for plaintiffs in error: —

1. The reasoning of the judge below is plausible but fallacious, and, when followed out to its legitimate consequences, would enable the legislature to create the city justice or any other court, independent of the supreme court, and not amenable to it, and one whose decision would be final, and not subject to review at all; in short, another supreme court, either as to some subjects, or all subjects to a certain extent or to any amount. Constitution, art. 3, § 2; Comp. Stat. 630, § 47; Organic Act, § 9; Comp. Stat. 777, § 1; Minn. Stat. 526, § 199; Const art. 1, §§ 2, 8, 7, and 13; 8 Allen, 277; 3 Greene, 327; 4 Me. 141.

Points and authorities for defendant in error: —

1. The offense for which the plaintiffs were convicted before the city justice of the City of St. Paul, was committed within the corporate limits of the city, and was not an indictable offense; and the fine imposed by said justice was less than twenty-five dollars.

2. The charter of said city then in force, and under which said justice acted, gives said justice exclusive jurisdiction in prosecutions of this kind, committed within the corporate limits of the city, and expressly provides that "the appeal shall not be allowed when the judgment or fine imposed, exclusive of costs, is less than twenty-five dollars." City Charter, ch. 3, § 11.

3. Such limit of the right of appeal is general, and operates upon all suitors in such courts alike, and is in conflict with no provision of our state or federal constitutions. State Constitution, art. 6, § 5; id. § 8; Comp. Stat. 475, ch. 56, § 4; id. 478, ch. 57.

4. In the present case we insist that plaintiffs had not the right of appeal given them, and the justice, in refusing to grant them such appeal, committed no error.

Brisbin & Warner, for plaintiffs in error.

S. M. Flint and W. H. Grant, for defendant in error.

McMILLAN, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court, denying a peremptory mandamus to the city justice of St. Paul, requiring him to allow an appeal to the district court from a judgment, on conviction for an assault. The penalty imposed by the justice was less than twenty-five dollars.

The Compiled Statutes, defining the criminal jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and regulating its exercise, provides that, "The person charged with and convicted by any such justice of the peace, of any such offense, may appeal from the judgment of such justice of the peace to the district court. Provided, such person shall, within twenty-four hours, enter into a recognizance," etc. Comp. Stat. 526, § 199. The chapter providing for appeals, etc., in criminal cases, contains this further provision: "Every person convicted before a justice of the peace, of any offense, may appeal from the sentence to the district court then next to be held for the same county." Comp. Stat. 777, § 1. These were the provisions of law on this subject in force at the time of the passage of the act incorporating St. Paul, and the several amendments thereto. The act reducing the law incorporating the City of St. Paul, and the several acts amendatory thereof, into one act and amending the same, was approved March 20, 1858. Sec. 11, ch. 3, of this act defines the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace for the city, conferring both civil and criminal jurisdiction, and, among other offenses, of assaults; and provides, substantially, that the same proceedings shall be had, where not otherwise directed in said act, as in like cases before justices of the peace under the laws of the state, with a distinct proviso, as amended in 1860, that, among others, in cases of assault, "no appeal shall be allowed where the judgment or fine imposed, exclusive of costs, is less than twenty-five dollars," and, by the 25th sec. ch. 10 of the act, all acts inconsistent therewith are repealed.

There can be no doubt as to the intention of the legislature in this act; not only is the provision in regard to appeals directly inconsistent with the general law upon the same subject, but the repealing clause expressly includes all acts inconsistent with it. It is evident, therefore, that the general law on the subject of appeals, so far as it is inconsistent with the provision in the charter, if this legislation is sustained, is not applicable to cases before the city justice, or, if applicable, is repealed.

The conviction upon which the application is based is in the nature of a summary proceeding. In such cases, within the limits of the constitution, the subject of review is under the control of the legislature, and in the absence of statutory provision therefor, there is no appeal.

We are cited by the plaintiffs in error to the case of Paddock & Howes v. The St. Croix Boom Corporation, 8 Minn. [277], as an authority allowing an appeal in the absence of statutory provisions. We do not think the case sustains the position. Atwater, J., delivering the opinion of the court, after quoting the provision of the act relied on in that case to sustain the appeal, says: "It is true that the language does not, in express terms, authorize an appeal to the district court, nor provide the mode and form thereof. But, in our view, it clearly indicates the intention of the legislature that an appeal should be allowed, and in a case like the present it is the manifest duty of the court, in the administration of justice, to give effect to that intent, if in its power to do so." The court here clearly bases its decision upon the act of the legislature as the authority for the appeal, and in this we entirely concur. In this instance there is no room for doubt as to the intention of the legislature, and to that intention we must give effect, if the act is not otherwise void.

We discover no force in the objection that the act of incorporation, to the extent of this proviso, conflicts with the general law upon the same subject. Both acts emanate from the same source, have the same vitality, and are subject to modification, amendment, or repeal, by the legislative power of the state....