Tierney v. Riggs

• Decision Date: 31 December 1926
• Docket Number: 20157.
• Parties: TIERNEY v. RIGGS et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

252 P. 163

141 Wash. 437

TIERNEY v. RIGGS et al.

No. 20157.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 31, 1926

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Griffiths, Judge.

Action by Joseph Tierney against I. L. Riggs and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Howe &amp Graham, of Seattle, for appellants.

S. A Keenan, of Seattle, for respondent.

MACKINTOSH J.

At 7 o'clock on a dark December night, the appellant parked his unlighted automobile on the north side of Madison street in the city of Seattle, in violation of a city ordinance, and left it there until 8 o'clock the following morning. Some time between midnight and 1 o'clock, the plaintiff driving his automobile westerly on Madison street, which at that point slopes sharply to the west, ran into the appellant's automobile. This action, prosecuted for the purpose of recovering the resulting damages, was tried to the court without a jury, and a judgment was entered in favor of the respondent.

Appellant's appeal is predicated upon the contention that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence, which defeats his right of recovery. The appellant's negligence is self-evident. He parked his car in a place where, by ordinance, he was forbidden to park it, he left it without lights, and, although no ordinance was introduced making it unlawful to park unlighted cars, yet his act, in the absence of such an ordinance, was negligence, as his automobile constituted an obstruction in the street; and to leave such an obstruction, unlighted, on a much frequented street, and at a place where, from the evidence, it appears that the surroundings were particularly dark by reason of shade trees, was unquestionably not the act of a reasonably prudent man.

The only question, therefore, is whether the respondent himself was guilty of contributory negligence. The testimony shows that respondent's car was properly equipped with lights and brakes, that he was driving it down Madison street from the east at a reasonable rate of speed, that as he neared the appellant's car there was approaching a car from the west, and, in order to give that car proper passageway, he shifted from his position in the street towards the right, which resulted in the collision. The theory upon which appellant predicates his claim of contributory negligence is that the respondent should have been driving his car within the radius of his...