Tietema v. State
| Decision Date | 15 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-271,95-271 |
| Citation | 926 P.2d 952 |
| Parties | John E. TIETEMA, Jr., Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Kenneth M. Koski, Deputy Public Defender; and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and John D. Harjehausen, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, for appellee.
Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, * and LEHMAN, JJ.
In this case we are asked to answer the certified question of "[w]hether 'possession' We answer the question in the negative.
under WYO.STAT. § 12-6-101(b) (Supp.1995) must occur on 'any street or highway or in any public place'? In other words, whether 'on any street or highway or in any public place' is an element of the offense of possession of alcoholic or malt beverages."
On December 17, 1994, officers from the Park County Sheriff's Department responded to a report at a private residence where a party was being held. Outside the residence, an officer observed beer bottles and several plastic red cups on the ground by the garage. Inside the garage, officers observed several cups on the floor, a beer keg and an opened bottle of whiskey approximately half full. During questioning, appellant John E. Tietema, Jr. admitted to drinking beer, and alcohol smelled on his breath. An individual living at the residence admitted that he was having a "party" in the garage.
Tietema was issued a citation for underage possession of alcohol and being under the influence of alcohol in violation of W.S. 12-6-101(b). The county court dismissed the under-the-influence count, and a trial was held regarding the count charging Tietema with possession of alcohol. On March 20, 1995, the county court issued its order concluding that, as a matter of law, possession under W.S. 12-6-101(b) could occur on private property and that "on any street or highway or in any public place" was not an element of the offense of possession of alcoholic or malt beverages.
After sentencing on March 27, 1995, Tietema appealed the judgment and sentence to the district court. Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11, the district court certified to this court the question of whether "possession" under W.S. 12-6-101(b) must occur on "any street or highway or in any public place." The district court reserved to itself the issues raised by Tietema concerning constructive possession of alcohol and sufficiency of the evidence.
Section 12-6-101(b) provides:
(b) Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years who has any alcoholic or malt beverage in his possession or who is drunk or under the influence of alcoholic liquor, malt beverages or a controlled substance on any street or highway or in any public place is guilty of a misdemeanor. This subsection does not apply to possession of alcoholic or malt beverages by a person under the age of twenty-one (21) years:
(i) When making a delivery of alcoholic or malt beverages pursuant to his employment;
(ii) Who is in the physical presence of his parent or legal guardian;
(iii) When dispensing or serving alcoholic or malt beverages or otherwise working in a dispensing room pursuant to his employment, if the person was at least nineteen (19) years of age on the effective date of this act. This paragraph does not apply to persons otherwise authorized to serve alcoholic or malt beverages under paragraph (v) of this subsection;
(iv) Who is a licensee under this title; or
(v) When serving alcoholic or malt beverages pursuant to his employment in a restaurant which holds a license to serve alcoholic or malt beverages, if the person is at least eighteen (18) years of age.
Tietema contends that the plain meaning of the language in the statute requires "possession" to occur on any street or highway or in any public place, i.e., "possession" cannot occur on private land. The State, on the other hand, asserts that possession of alcoholic or malt beverages by anyone under the age of twenty-one is prohibited regardless of location, public or private, except in those instances specifically exempted in subsections (i) through (v).
This court's primary focus when interpreting a statute is the determination of the legislature's intent upon enactment. In re Honeycutt, 908 P.2d 976, 978 (Wyo.1995); Coones v. F.D.I.C., 894 P.2d 613, 616 (Wyo.1995); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo.1995). We construe a statute as a whole with ordinary and obvious meaning applied to words as they are arranged in In construing the language
paragraphs, sentences, clauses and phrases to express the intent of the legislature. In re Honeycutt, at 978; Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 197 (Wyo.1994). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and will not resort to rules of statutory construction. In re Honeycutt, at 978; Lancto v. City of Rawlins, 892 P.2d 800, 802 (Wyo.1995). We will resort to extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent only if we find the statute to be ambiguous. In re Honeycutt, at 978; Lancto, at 803.
[a]ny person under the age of twenty-one (21) years who has any alcoholic or malt beverage in his possession or who is drunk or under the influence of alcoholic liquor, malt beverages or a controlled substance on any street or highway or in any public place is guilty of a misdemeanor[,]
we find that two independent misdemeanor offenses are included: 1) any person under twenty-one years of age is prohibited from possessing alcoholic or malt beverages, regardless of location; and 2) any person under twenty-one years of age is prohibited from being drunk or under the influence of alcoholic liquor, malt beverages or a controlled substance on any street or highway or in any public place.
The bases for this conclusion are three-fold. First, the prohibition against possession of alcoholic or malt beverages is set apart from the prohibition against being drunk or under the influence of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dinerstein v. Evanston Athletic Clubs, Inc.
...alternatives and requires separate treatment of those alternatives * * *." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (quoting Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo.1996) )).¶ 46 The parties are not particularly helpful in distinguishing between these three concepts. The Restatement and case la......
-
Trust Co. of Ill. v. Kenny
...treatment of those alternatives.’ " In re E.B. , 231 Ill. 2d 459, 468, 326 Ill.Dec. 1, 899 N.E.2d 218 (2008) (quoting Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1996) ). ¶ 37 The Conveyances Act does not define "grantor/grantee" and "vendor/vendee." Thus, we may look to the dictionary meanin......
-
Almada v. State
...This Court's primary focus when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent upon enactment. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 953 (Wyo.1996). "The initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation . . . is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the wo......
-
Baker v. State
... ... Id. Our evaluation of those same considerations, and others, leads us to conclude that the legislature had a different intent when it enacted § 35-7-1042 ... This court's primary focus when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent upon enactment. Tietema ... 223 P.3d 553 ... v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 953 (Wyo.1996). "The initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation * * * is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed, according to their arrangement and connection." Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish ... ...