Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim

• Decision Date: 08 October 1913
• Citation: 135 P. 658,75 Wash. 641
• Parties: TIETON HOTEL CO. v. MANHEIM et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

135 P. 658

75 Wash. 641

TIETON HOTEL CO. v. MANHEIM et al.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

October 8, 1913

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; E. B. Prebee, Judge.

Action by the Tieton Hotel Company against William Manheim and others, to quiet title. Decree for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Lee C Delle, of North Yakima, for appellants.

Parker & Richards and Fred Fontaine, all of North Yakima, for respondent.

MOUNT J.

On November 9, 1905, Priscilla Lee, the owner of certain lots in North Yakima, entered into a contract for the sale of the lots to William Manheim for $7,500. The contract provided for the payment of $500 in cash, and the remaining $7,000 was to be paid on or before May 9, 1906, when a deed would be given. The contract is in the usual form of executory contracts for the sale and purchase of land. It provided that time was of the essence, and that on default of the vendee, the vendor might declare a forfeiture. This contract was executed by Priscilla Lee and William Manheim. It was afterwards duly recorded in the records of Yakima county. William Manheim was a married man at the time he entered into this contract, and remained so up to the 1st day of February 1906, when his wife died, leaving four adult and two minor heirs. On May 9, 1906, the time fixed in the contract for its payment, William Manheim failed to pay the balance due; and on the next day the vendor served upon him notice of forfeiture, which was accepted by Manheim. He acknowledged the notice of forfeiture in words as follows: 'And I do hereby acknowledge that said contract is at an end, and that all rights thereunder have been forfeited.' This notice of forfeiture, with the acknowledgment of William Manheim was on the same day filed for record. Priscilla Lee had at all times been in the possession of the property. Thereafter on the same day, she conveyed the lots to J. D. Medill, and by successive subsequent conveyances title passed to the plaintiff. During the ownership of Elliott Bros., Incorporated, an intervening owner, the property was improved by the erection thereon of a three-story brick building at a cost of $40,000; and it is agreed that the property is now of the value of $70,000. The plaintiff brought this action, to free the property from a claim of interest by the defendants, and to quiet the title as against them. A decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff in the court below. The defendants have appealed.

The main contention of the appellants is that under the contract, the community consisting of William Manheim and wife acquired a community interest in the lots, and that on the death of Mrs. Manheim, her community interest passed immediately to her children, and that the forfeiture of the contract was not binding upon the children of William Manheim and wife, and therefore the children at this date have the right to specifically enforce the contract. It is a settled rule in this state that executory contracts for the sale and purchase of land do not convey title, either legal or equitable. Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178, 38 P. 1003, 45 Am. St. Rep. 781; Pease v. Baxter, 12 Wash. 567, 41 P. 899; Churchill v. Ackerman, 22 Wash. 227, 60 P. 406; Johnson v. Sekor, 53 Wash. 205, 101 P. 829; Younkman v. Hillman, 53 Wash. 661, 102 P. 773.

In Churchill v. Ackerman, supra, 22 Wash. at page 231, 60 P. at page 408, we said: '* * * Such a contract as this is executory, and conveyed no element of title, but could be forfeited upon violations of its conditions.'

In Johnson v. Sekor, supra, 53 Wash. at page 207, 101 P. at page 830, in referring to a contract similar to the one in this case, we said: 'It is plain under these facts, which are undisputed, that the appellant has no interest in the property. The title never was conveyed to Cory. He did not have possession. He had a contract for purchase merely. This contract provided that time was of the essence of it, and, if payments were not made as agreed, it might be forfeited without notice. It was forfeited after notice for failure to perform by Cory. At the time of its forfeiture, Cory was notified and declined to finish the payments. The interest of the judgment creditor was no greater than that of the judgment debtor. * * * Even if the rule is as contended for by appellant--that a judgment creditor has a lien on the equitable estate of the judgment debtor--such lien would cease when the equity ceased. In this case the equitable estate of Cory in these lots depended on the life of the contract of purchase. It was liable to forfeiture upon nonperformance. The forfeiture as to him meant a forfeiture as to all claiming through him. Otherwise the contract would be of no avail to the seller for whose benefit this clause was inserted.'

And in Younkman v. Hillman, supra, we said: 'The whole tenor and effect of the contract is clearly in contemplation of a future and not a present sale. Such contracts have invariably been held to be contracts for title or agreements to convey not ripening into even an equitable title until the vendee has placed himself in such a position by performance that he can compel a conveyance. Chappell v. McKnight, 108 Ill. 570; Nunngesser v. Hart, 122 Iowa, [75 Wash. 644] 647, 98 N.W. 505; Stewart v. Fowler, 37 Kan. 677, 15 P. 918. The obligation of the vendor in these contracts is similar to that of the obligor in a bond for a deed, and it is held that 'a bond to convey land is not a title, but simply a contract to convey title.' Martin v. Wright, 21 Ga. 504; Dahl v. Pross, 6 Minn. 89 [Gil. 38]. We cannot regard respondents as purchasers, there being no investment of any title in them; nor, under the contract, any passing of title until a compliance with its terms. A purchaser means one who has acquired the title, not one who holds under a bond for a conveyance. Gilpin v....