Tiffany A. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 21 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. B193134.,B193134.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: TIFFANY A., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; People of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

59 Cal.Rptr.3d 363

150 Cal.App.4th 1344

TIFFANY A., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent People of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

No. B193134.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7.

May 21, 2007.

Janice Y. Fukai, Alternate Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Felicia Kahn Grant and Stephanie Bedi, Deputy Alternate Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

No appearance for the Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Lael Rubin and Patrick D. Moran, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

Manning & Marder Kass Ellrod, Ramirez and Steven J. Renick for Amicus Curiae Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department.

WOODS, J.

Tiffany A. seeks a writ of prohibition directing the lower court to set aside its order denying her motion to preclude the use of physical restraints upon all minors who appear in juvenile court proceedings in the Lancaster Juvenile Delinquency Court absent an individualized determination of need for the restraints. Petitioner complains the juvenile delinquency court's general policy requiring all minors to be shackled is contrary to the established law concerning the appropriate use of physical restraints during court proceedings. The Real Party in Interest, the People and Amicus Curiae, the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department assert, inter alia, the requisite showing of need for the use of restraints depends on the type of court proceeding. They claim that where the proceedings are before a judge rather than a jury, do not involve witnesses, and are brief and/or uncontested, the necessary showing of need is far less, and does not have to be particularized as to the individual. Thus, as the respondent court did in denying the motion below, they defend the general policy arguing the use of restraints in the Lancaster courtroom for all minors is warranted based on safety concerns arising from the design of the courthouse facility as well as the lack of sufficient numbers of security personnel available to monitor the courtroom. Finally, they defend the use of the policy claiming that the case law limiting the use of restraints in the courtroom arises only in the context of criminal proceedings involving adults, and thus this case law should not be applied in the context of juvenile delinquency proceedings. As we shall explain, the court's reasons for denying the petitioners motion, and the Real Party and the Sheriffs Department's reasons for defending the policy, are without merit. In our view, the use of physical restraints upon minors who appear in the Lancaster Juvenile Delinquency Court must be based on a showing that such restraints are necessary for each individual minor irrespective of the type of hearing or proceeding. Consequently, we issue the writ of prohibition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Policy for the Use of Ankle Restraints on Minors

Juvenile delinquency matters are heard in Department 285 in the Alfred J. McCourtney Juvenile Justice Center in Lancaster California. Though a total of six sheriffs deputies are assigned to the courthouse, only one deputy is assigned as a bailiff in Department 285.¹ Department 285 has four exit doors from the courtroom and a number of those doors lead to unsecured exits, public areas and/or to outside the building.

The juvenile court in Department 285 has a practice and policy to put ankle shackles on all detained minors who appear in the courtroom for all proceedings. This policy has been in place for at least two years.² The policy of shackling minors while in the courtroom was adopted because of the number of unlocked exits and unsecured hallways in the courtroom and because the lack of sheriffs personnel available to monitor the facility. According to the Sheriffs Sergeant in charge of the security and custody at the courthouse, the risk of minors escaping the courtroom is significant given the design of the courtroom and location of the courthouse. The Sheriffs Sergeant opined the use of shackles on all minors has prevented escape attempts and allowed order to be maintained in the courthouse. The Sheriffs Sergeant concluded the use of ankle restraints upon minors "is like having another deputy present.... Just as having a deputy at the minor's side causes him or her to think twice about any attempt to escape or to cause trouble, so to do ankle restraints, which every minor immediately realizes eliminates any possibility of making a serious escape attempt. If we had a different facility—with locked doors, secured hallways and courtrooms, sally ports, etc.—it might be possible to maintain security without the use of the ankle restraints. But in this facility, ankle restraints are the simplest, least intrusive[³] method of maintaining security."

The Case of Tiffany A.

Petitioner became the subject of a wardship petition brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged 16-year-old Tiffany A. committed the crime of unlawful taking of a vehicle (i.e., a car belonging to her mother) in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). On June 1, 2006, at an uncontested, pre-disposition hearing, Tiffany A. objected to the fact that she was shackled with leg chains during the proceedings.

Her counsel stated: `Tour honor, Tiffany is shackled with leg chains because she is in custody. We would object to her being shackled because of the fact that the court cannot use restraints without showing a manifest need, we're citing People v. Frier [sic] (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302. So at this point we would ask the court to remove the shackles."

The Court: "Okay. Your request is denied. The case you are citing does not apply to juveniles.... The main reason the minors that are in custody are shackled is because we do not have a secure egress and ingress to this court-room like we did in the old building. But your objection is noted and overruled...."

Thereafter on June 16, 2006, petitioner filed a motion to prohibit the use of shackles upon minors in the courtroom,⁴ asking the court to make an order prohibiting the Sheriff from using such physical restraints, unless the shackling had been ordered by the court based on an individualized evidentiary showing of "manifest need." Petitioner's counsel also attached her declaration stating that all of her clients are brought into the courtroom in leg shackles for all court appearances. She also stated she had been told the reason for the use of the restraints related to the inadequate security in the building housing the courthouse.

At the June 19, 2006, hearing on the motion, the court ruled as follows:

"[A]s I said before on this subject, there are no cases in California law dealing with minors on this issue.

"From what I am reading, that a lot of these cases started out dealing with the defendant being handcuffed, shackled in the presence of the jury. And that was ruled by the court, you can't do that, understandably so, you don't want the jury to be prejudiced. There is not jury in Juvenile. The court is the jury. They have even gone—some of these cases, they indicate that the defendant can't be shackled at arraignment or any post pre-trial hearing unless there is a showing that they need to be. And again, however, though nothing to address Juveniles.

"As I said before, in this courthouse, before the, minors even get to the courtroom,] once they are taken from the secure holding area that probation maintains, there are multiple avenues of escape that could be used by any minor who is in—being detained. And the court, because of that security issue, has always required that the minor come into court in a contained status, to remain shackled to prevent escape.

"So the court has reviewed your motion. And for the reasons I have stated, the court will deny it."

On August 16, 2006, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, requesting an order (1) directing the superior court to set-aside its June 19, 2006, order denying her motion to prohibit shackling minors by the Sheriffs Department absent an individualized showing of need for the restraints; and (2) directing the superior court to issue an order granting the motion.⁵ The People, designated as the Real Party in Interest, filed a return to the petition and this court permitted the Sheriffs Department to file an amicus brief in the matter.

On September 26, 2006, petitioner was released from custody.

DISCUSSION

In this court, petitioner asserts the Juvenile Delinquency Court in Lancaster erred in denying her request for an order prohibiting the use of physical restraints on all minors appearing before it without first making an individual determination for the need of the restraints. Before addressing this issue, however, we consider a few preliminary matters concerning whether this court should reach the merits. Specifically, the People and the Sheriffs Department assert this court should not consider the petition because it is moot as to the petitioner. The Sheriff's Department also requests that rather than ruling on the merits of the petition this court should order an evidentiary hearing so that the Sheriffs Department can appear as a party and present evidence concerning the court's policy. To these preliminary issues we now turn our attention.

I. Mootness.

Petitioner concedes she has been released from custody and may not be subject to the juvenile court's shackling policy again. Thus, she admits the relief sought in the petition is effectively moot as to her. Nonetheless petitioner requests this court exercise its inherent discretion to resolve the issue presented by the petition because it concerns a current and ongoing policy of the Juvenile Delinquency Court in Lancaster that requires all minors remain shackled throughout court proceedings. Consequently, she argues that the harm to minors will re-occur on a daily basis and yet may, given the nature of the...