Tiffany v. Tiffany, 74--296

• Decision Date: 10 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74--296,74--296
• Citation: 305 So.2d 798
• Parties: David A. TIFFANY, Appellant, v. Barbara A. TIFFANY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 798

305 So.2d 798

David A. TIFFANY, Appellant, v. Barbara A. TIFFANY, Appellee.

No. 74--296.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 10, 1975.

Joseph R. Moss, of Ferrell & Moss, Cocoa, for appellant, David A. tiffany.

Paul M. Goldman, of Goldman, Spielvogel, Goldman & Caruso, Merritt Island, for appellee, Barbara A. Tiffany.

ALDERMAN, James E., Associate Judge.

Final Judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered by the trial court below. Appellant-husband appeals alleging that the trial judge erred in requiring him to pay a part of his wife's attorney's fee and court costs. He also contends that the trial court erred in awarding to his wife, as special equity, his interest in the marital home, joint bank accounts and a coin collection.

ATTORNEY'S FEE

Appellant was ordered to make a contribution in the sum of $750.00 towards appellee's attorney's fee and to pay court costs of $55.50.

Florida Statutes (1973), Section 61.16 provides as follows:

'The court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the attorney's fees, suit money, and the costs to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this act, including enforcement and modification proceedings. The court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name.'

The undisputed testimony before the trial judge was that a reasonable fee for the services of appellee's attorney would be $1100.00. At the time of trial, appellee was earning between $50.00 and $60.00 a week, while the appellant was earning from $160.00 to $170.00 per week. Although appellee was not indigent and had other assets from which she might have paid her attorney's fee and court costs, after considering the financial resources of both parties, we believe that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in requiring appellant to contribute $750.00 towards appellee's attorney's fee, and pay court costs of $55.50.

THE COIN COLLECTION

The trial judge awarded ownership of a coin collection to appellee. Her testimony was that she started the collection prior to her marriage to appellant. During the marriage the collection was enlarged, but she contends that the collection remained her separate property. We find the evidence sufficient to support the trial judge's conclusion that the coin collection was owned by appellee.

JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS

Appellee was awarded a special equity in appellant's interest in all bank accounts in the joint ownership of the parties. However the record indicates that at the time of trial there were no joint accounts. When the parties returned to Brevard County in 1973, a joint account was opened in the First National Bank of Merritt Island. Part of the proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned home in Broward County was deposited in this account. Appellee testified that prior to their separation, appellant on various occasions withdrew from the account approximately $5,950.00. At the time of separation, appellee withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $5,400.00. The trial judge's award of a special equity to appellee in appellant's interest in all bank accounts in the joint ownership of the parties makes no reference to amounts. Since there was no joint account in existence between the parties at the time the Final Judgment was entered, it appears that the purpose and effect of this award was to confirm and approve the self-help withdrawal of the remaining balance made by appellee at the time of separation. After reviewing the testimony of the parties concerning the joint account, we conclude that no error was committed.

THE MARITAL HOME

Appellee was awarded a special equity in appellant's interest in the martial residence and appellant was ordered to execute and deliver an instrument sufficient to convey to appellee all of his interest in the former marital home.

Prior to their marriage in 1968, the parties by mutual agreement made arrangements to build a hourse in Broward County. The funds used for the initial construction and down payment came from life insurance benefits received by appellee as a result of...