Tighe v. Berlin
Decision Date | 22 January 2002 |
Docket Number | (SC 16439) |
Citation | 788 A.2d 40,259 Conn. 83 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | JAMES TIGHE ET AL. v. TOWN OF BERLIN ET AL. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js. Joseph A. O'Brien, for the appellants (named plaintiff et al.).
E. Timothy Sullivan, Jr., for the appellee (named defendant).
The sole issue in this appeal1 is whether the trial court improperly denied the request for an injunction by the named plaintiff, James Tighe, and the plaintiff, Joyce Tighe, to require the removal of a traffic gate erected to control access to and from an abandoned roadway. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their request for an injunction against the named defendant, the town of Berlin.2 The plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly interpreted the scope of General Statutes § 13a-55.3 The plaintiffs further argue that the trial court improperly concluded that the continued gating of the abandoned road did not cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. The plaintiffs own developed and undeveloped property in Middletown. The plaintiffs' property abuts Stantack Road, which runs in a north-south direction, with the northern portion in Berlin, and the southern portion in Middletown. The northern portion of Stantack Road ends at an intersection with Spruce Brook Road, and the southern portion ends at an intersection with Footit Road. Stantack Road is an undeveloped roadway and generally requires the use of a four-wheel drive vehicle. On or about March 24, 1995, the defendant formally abandoned, as a public roadway, the entire length of Stantack Road that existed within that town.
In the mid-1990s, a residential subdivision was built on the property bordering the western edge of Stantack Road and the southern edge of Spruce Brook Road in Berlin. The developers, Louis Valentine and Louise Valentine (Valentine), constructed a new roadway that runs through the middle of the subdivision. The new road, Lamentation Drive, provides access to homes in the development from Spruce Brook Road. Lamentation Drive was constructed so that a portion of it intersects and runs on top of the abandoned Stantack Road. At some point during the construction of the development, the Berlin planning and zoning commission requested that Valentine erect a gate near the intersection of Lamentation Drive and Stantack Road to prevent motor vehicles from entering Lamentation Drive. The gate was installed after residents in the subdivision complained about excessive noise and the use of motorized, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles and other four-wheel drive vehicles in the area, which often involved speeding and other reckless driving. Residents also complained about the use of the land off of Stantack Road for parties. Moreover, residents in the Valentine subdivision complained to the Berlin police that, on one occasion, they had confronted several intoxicated men who were attempting to ride their motorcycles in the area.
A gate was installed by the developer, but eventually was knocked down, and, in 1998, because of continued complaints from residents, the defendant erected a stronger gate. The gate was erected within the rightof-way of Lamentation Drive. It was equipped with a lock and keys were made available to all the owners of abutting property to Stantack Road, including the plaintiffs. While the Stantack Road property owners have unimpeded access to their properties from the south, via Footit Road, access from the north can be obtained only by unlocking the gate.
The plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to enjoin the defendant from maintaining this gate.4 More specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to order the removal of the gate so that access from Lamentation Drive onto Stantack Road, and vice versa, would not be impeded. A bench trial was held on March 23, 2000, and on August 1, 2000.5 On August 9, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment denying the plaintiffs' request for an injunction to require the defendant to remove the gate. The court, however, did order the defendant to expand the distribution of keys to the gate to include family members of the property owners of land abutting Stantack Road, as well as any legitimate guests accompanied by one of these property owners. The plaintiffs appeal from this judgment.
We begin with (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc., v. Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 566, 775 A.2d 284 (2001). We note also that, "[i]n exercising its discretion, the court, in a proper case, may consider and balance the injury complained of with that which will result from interference by injunction." Moore v. Serafin, 163 Conn. 1, 6, 301 A.2d 238 (1972).
We first consider the plaintiffs' argument that pursuant to § 13a-55, they have more than a mere right of passage as abutting landowners to an abandoned highway. The plaintiffs contend that under § 13a-55, an abandoned road is the private equivalent to a public highway and, therefore, the defendant is interfering with the rights of the abutting landowners to have Stantack Road remain ungated and open for use by members of the public who are not abutting owners to the abandoned Stantack Road. The defendant contends that it is exercising municipal powers granted to it by the legislature and is not impermissibly interfering with the rights granted to property owners under § 13a-55. We agree with the defendant.
We previously have stated that (Citations omitted.) Luf v. Southbury, 188 Conn. 336, 344, 449 A.2d 1001 (1982). Therefore, when the portion of Stantack Road that existed in Berlin was abandoned by the defendant, property owners such as the plaintiffs who own land abutting Stantack Road continued to have a private right of access over the abandoned portion of Stantack Road. The public right of travel over the abandoned portion of Stantack Road terminated when the defendant formally abandoned that segment of the roadway. Section 13a-55 does not purport to reinstate that right of public access.
The plaintiffs argue, however, that a 1990 amendment to § 13a-55 suggests that the legislature intended that "abutting property owners [would now] have a right to maintain a discontinued highway as the private equivalent of a public highway." In 1990, the legislature amended § 13a-55 so that the right-of-way provided to abutting owners would be "for all purposes for which a public highway may be now or hereafter used...." Public Acts 1990, No. 90-142, § 1. The plaintiffs suggest that by this amendment, the legislature conferred a continuing right of public travel over abandoned stretches of road. We disagree.
We are guided in our understanding of the meaning of the 1990 amendment by familiar principles of statutory construction. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gartrell v. Dept. of Correction, 259 Conn. 29, 39, 787 A.2d 541 (2002). The actual language of the statute, as amended by the legislature in 1990, does not illuminate our inquiry. We examine, therefore, the relevant legislative history concerning the 1990 amendment. A review of this legislative history leads us to conclude that the 1990 amendment was intended to provide property owners, such as the plaintiffs, with the ability to use the private right-of-way along the abandoned stretch of road in order to carry utility services. The amendment was not intended to reintroduce public travel along a road that a town previously has abandoned.6 Before this language was added to § 13a-55,...
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