Tillman v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 25 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:12-CV-2266-SLB |
| Parties | JEFFREY TILLMAN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff Jeffrey Tillman brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),1 seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying his application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits ["DIB"], and supplemental security income ["SSI"]. He has filed a Motion to Remand Pursuant to Sentence 6 and attached a decision, dated May 10, 2012, awarding him SSI2 for disability beginning October 8, 2010. (Doc. 9; doc. 9-1.)3 Upon review of the record and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that Mr. Tillman's Motion to Remand Pursuant to Sentence 6, (doc. 9), is due to be denied and the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
Mr. Tillman initially filed an application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on September 22, 2008. (Doc. 6-3 at 39.) His claims were denied initially. (Doc. 6-5 at 3, 9.) Thereafter, he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ["ALJ"], which was held on April 9, 2010. (Id. at 17; doc. 6-3 at 84.) After the hearing, the ALJ found that, while Mr. Tillman was unable to perform any past relevant work, he was capable of making a vocational adjustment to other work, such as that of a hotel housekeeper, cloth folder, and sorter, which are jobs that exist in significant numbers in Alabama and in the national economy. (Doc. 6-3 at 49-50.) In light these findings, the ALJ denied Mr. Tillman's request for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on July 1, 2010. (Id. at 50-51.)
Mr. Tillman then requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. (Doc. 6-5 at 19.) He submitted additional evidence to the Appeals Council. (See doc. 6-11 at 25-69; doc. 6-12; doc. 6-13.) The Appeals Council found no reason under its rules to review the ALJ's decision, and it denied Mr. Tillman's request for review. (Doc. 6-3 at 2.) Therefore, the ALJ's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.)
Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, Mr. Tillman filed an appeal in this court. (Doc. 1.) After filing his appeal, Mr. Tillman filed a Motion to Remand Pursuant to Sentence 6 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 9.)
"Section 405(g) permits a district court to remand an application for benefits to the Commissioner . . . by two methods, which are commonly denominated 'sentence four remands' and 'sentence six remands,' each of which remedies a separate problem." Ingram v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). "The fourth sentence of section 405(g) provides the federal court 'power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Id. at 1261 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
A sentence four remand is appropriate when the claimant submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council did not adequately consider in denying the claimant's request for review. To obtain a sentence four remand, the claimant must show that, in light of the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, the ALJ's decision to deny benefits is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
Timmons v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 12-16166, 2013 WL 3388234, *4 (11th Cir. July 9, 2013)(citing Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1266-67, 1268).4
"The sixth sentence of section 405(g) provides a federal court the power to remand the application for benefits to the Commissioner for the taking of additional evidence upona showing 'that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). "[A] sentence six remand is appropriate only when the claimant submits evidence for the first time to the district court that might have changed the outcome of the administrative proceeding. Timmons, 2013 WL 3388234 at *5 (citing Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1267-68). "New evidence is material, and thus warrants a remand, if 'there is a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would change the administrative outcome.'" Id. (citing Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Mr. Tillman's Motion to Remand Pursuant to Sentence 6 is based on a subsequent decision of the Commissioner to award him SSI. (See generally doc. 9; doc. 9-1.)
In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court's role is a narrow one: "Our review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner], rather [it] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable andsupported by substantial evidence." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cor. 1990)(quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983))(internal quotations and other citation omitted). "The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted)
Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145. "No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner's] conclusions of law." Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).
The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability, DIB, and/or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1)-(2); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). "[A]n individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of [determining eligibility for DIB and SSI benefits] if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expectedto last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The specific steps in the evaluation process are as follows:
1. Substantial Gainful Employment
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). The regulations define "substantial gainful activity" as "work activity that is both substantial and gainful."5 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572; 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. If the claimant is working and that work is substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant's medical condition or his age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). "Under the first step, the claimant has theburden to show that [he] is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity." Reynolds-Buckley v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 457 Fed. Appx. 862, 863 (2012).
The ALJ found that Tillman had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 8, 2008, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 6-3 at 41.)
2. Severe Impairments
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). "[A] 'physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D). The regulations provide: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). "An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience." Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a); 20C.F.R. § 416.921(a). A complainant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments even though none of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Brown, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 20...
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