Tilyou v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 28 February 1888
• Citation: 15 N.E. 534,108 N.Y. 558
• Parties: TILYOU v. REYNOLDS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

108 N.Y. 558

15 N.E. 534

TILYOU

v.REYNOLDS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

February 28, 1888.

Appeal from general term, city court of Brooklyn.

Geo. P. Avery, for appellant.

Wm. Sullivan, for respondent.

DANFORTH, J.

This action is for rent alleged to be due from the defendant, an under-lessee, to the plaintiff, whose title as landlord was derived from the town of Gravesend, through a lease executed to him by its commissioners of common lands. The original lease by its terms, ended on the 1st of May, 1883, but on the 27th of January, 1879, the commissioners, by an indorsement under their hands and seals, extended the same for the term of 10 years. The plaintiff, at the execution of the original lease, took possession of the whole of the demised premises, and continued in possession thereof until the 27th day of February, 1883, when, by indenture of that date, executed by himself, and also by the defendant, he demised to the defendant a portion of the premises for the term of 10 years thereafter, at the annual rent of $150, which the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff each year in advance. He paid the first year's rent at the execution of the lease, went into possession of the premises, and has had peaceable and undisturbed possession ever since, without let or hinderance from any quarter. The rent claimed in this action is for the year beginning February 27, 1874. The lease from the plaintiff recited that it was ‘understood and agreed on the part of the party of the second part (defendant) that the party of the first part (plaintiff)’ only demised and granted ‘such right, title, and interest in and to the right of occupancy of said lands, and only for such term and time as the first part has, under the lease, executed to him by the commissioners of common lands, dated January 28, 1873, and the renewal of said lease, dated January 27, 1879.’

The defendant by answer alleged that the plaintiff's leasehold, right, and title to the premises ceased on the 1st day of May, 1883; that when he paid the first year's rent in advance he supposed the plaintiff's interest had been renewed, and had 10 years to run from said 1st of May, whereas the renewal, as the defendant alleges, was invalid, and he therefore not only denies his liability to pay the rent demanded, but asks an affirmative judgment requiring the plaintiff to repay to him so much of the rent as purported to accrue after the 1st of May, 1883, to the 27th of February, 1884. This claim is put upon the ground that the extension on the 27th of January, 1879, was void because, in excess of the powers of the commissioners, it was executed more than a year prior to the expiration of the then-existing lease. It was so held in Tilyou v. Town of Gravesend, 104 N. Y. 356, 10 N. E. Rep. 542. The material question upon this appeal is whether this defect in the plaintiff's title is available as a defense to this action. It is obvious that the extent and nature of that title was exhibited to the defendant when he took upon himself the relation of tenant, and that he entered upon the premises, and has since enjoyed the use bargained for without interruption. Under these circumstances, it would seem but just and reasonable that, having had the consideration of his promise, he should be precluded from refusing to perform it. By the terms of his own lease he had not only constructive, but direct, notice of the provisions of the plaintiff's lease, an opportunity to ascertain the powers of the commissioners who granted it, and neither concealment nor fraud is alleged against the plaintiff. It has been laid down as a rule that a purchaser must be wise in time; that a lessee is a purchaser within the rule and is equally bound to look into the facts connected with the subject of the lease, as a purchaser is to look into the matters connected with his purchase. Cosser v. Collinge, 3 Mylne & K. 283; Besley v. Besley, 9 Ch. Div. 109. Moreover, he is within the general rule that a tenant may not dispute his landlord's title, for, as it is said, he is estopped from changing by his own act the character and effect of his tenure. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the defendant that if the plaintiff had no interest in the premises when the lease was executed and delivered, and it had been silent as to the title of the lessor, the lessee would have been estopped from controverting his title, but the claim is that as the lessor had an interest in the premises under the original lease, although for a period of less than one year from the time of giving the lease to the defendant, and as the lease was not silent in relation thereto, a different result follows. In other words, the plaintiff is said to be in a worse condition than he would have been had he concealed the truth, and had no title at all. It would seem, however, that this circumstance takes away all equity from the defense, and that in view of the mutual understanding of the real interest of the plaintiff as it existed at the time of the creation of the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, the nature and extent of the plaintiff's legal estate is unimportant. The agreement was made with that in mind, and it is impossible to find any equity in favor of defendant's claim to enjoy, without compensation, premises which he obtained from the plaintiff as landlord upon a promise to pay rent as tenant.

There are cases in which the lessee is not estopped from denying his landlord's title, as in the case of eviction by superior title; but it is well settled that, if a party enters as lessee of another, and the right of the lessor is in no way altered, the lessee is estopped from denying that relation, or that the legal estate and reversion is in the lessor. The title he then acknowledges and accepts he must abide by while the relation lasts. The result is the same although on the face of the lease it should appear that the landlord had no legal estate. If the parties agree that the relation of landlord and tenant shall be created, and this agreement is carried out by one being let into possession, then, as between them, the relation of landlord and tenant is created, and they are just as much estopped as if there had been no such statement. The foundation of the estoppel is the fact of the one obtaining possession and enjoying possession by the permission of the other. And so long as one has this enjoyment, he is prevented by this rule of law from turning round and saying his landlord has no right or title to keep him in possession. Nellis v. Lathrop, 22 Wend. 121;Morton v. Woods, L. R. 3 Q. B. 667, same case in Exch. Cham. L. R. 4 Q. B. 293. In the case before us the state of facts upon which the possession was given, and the agreement to pay rent was made, continues the same as when the lease was made, and nothing has occurred to change the relation of the parties. The fact, therefore, that the lease contains the truth as to the real title of the lessor, should be no objection to the plaintiff's recovery, and,...