Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Authority

Decision Date19 November 1993
Docket NumberFULTON-D,No. A93A0988,A93A0988
Citation438 S.E.2d 149,211 Ga.App. 34
PartiesTIME INSURANCE COMPANY v.eKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Fortson & White, Harvey S. Gray and Michael D. St. Amand, Atlanta, for appellant.

Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Bryan A. Vroon and Jane F. Thorpe, Atlanta, for appellee.

BEASLEY, Presiding Judge.

Time Insurance Company appeals from the dismissal of its suit against Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority, d/b/a Grady Hospital ("Grady"), to recover $184,198.94 in insurance benefits allegedly disbursed to Grady in error.

The complaint alleged that co-defendant Taylor applied for health insurance benefits under a group policy issued by Time to Taylor's employer. Coverage was provided by Time based on Taylor's representation that he was employed full-time by the policyholder. Taylor submitted claims to Time under the group policy for medical treatment necessitated by injuries sustained in a fire, and he assigned certain benefits under the group policy to Grady for treatment rendered. The complaint acknowledges that Time paid Grady $184,198.94 "for medical expenses incurred by Taylor at Grady." Time later determined that Taylor was convicted of arson for deliberately setting the fire in which he was injured. The group policy excluded coverage for charges resulting from an intentionally self-inflicted injury and those resulting from the commission of a felony. Time claims to have paid Grady based on a mistake of fact. It seeks a refund based on the theory of money had and received resulting in unjust enrichment. 1

Grady moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or alternatively for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that as a third-party creditor of Taylor's it was not unjustly enriched and cannot be required to reimburse Time for monies mistakenly paid. The motion was granted and certified as final under OCGA § 9-11-54.

1. Time asserts that its right to reimbursement under the theory of money had and received should be determined by the trier of fact.

" ' "When the sufficiency of the complaint is questioned by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, 'the ... rules require that it be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts resolved in his favor even though unfavorable constructions are possible. Not unless the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts should the complaint be dismissed.' (Cits.)" (Cit.)' [Cit.]" Morgan v. Ga. Vitrified Brick, etc., Co., 196 Ga.App. 779, 780(1), 397 S.E.2d 49 (1990). See OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6).

"An action for money had and received ... although legal in form, ... is founded on the equitable principle that no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, and is a substitute for a suit in equity. [Cits.]" Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 256 Ga. 400, 402, 349 S.E.2d 368 (1986). 2 " 'Thus, recovery is authorized against one who holds the money of another which he ought in equity and good conscience to refund. (Cits.)' [Cits.]" Piedmont Engineering, etc., Corp. v. Balcor Partners-84 II, 196 Ga.App. 486, 489(1), 396 S.E.2d 279 (1990). "Under this cause of action, the fact that the money was received from a third person will not affect the liability of the defendant, ' "if, in equity and good conscience, he is not entitled to hold it against the true owner." ' (Emphasis supplied.) [Cit.]" Dept. of Med. Assistance v. Hallman, 203 Ga.App. 615, 616(1), 417 S.E.2d 218 (1992). The same rule applies when money is paid under a mistake of fact; "it can not be recovered unless the circumstances are such that the person to whom it was paid can not in good conscience retain it." Dunlap, supra at 248(2), 17 S.E.2d 703.

The issue is whether Time is entitled to relief under any state of provable facts under the theory advanced.

Time relies on Folsom, supra, to establish that a jury question remains as to its right to reimbursement. Folsom received an overpayment of the cash surrender value of his life insurance policy due to the insurer's mistake of fact. The insurer sued in federal court for money had and received, and summary judgment was granted to Folsom on the basis that the overpayment was voluntary and not recoverable under OCGA § 13-1-13. In response to a question certified by the federal court of appeals concerning an apparent conflict between OCGA § 13-1-13 and OCGA § 23-2-32(b), the latter of which authorizes recovery of payments attributable to negligence in the absence of prejudice to the other party, the Georgia Supreme Court answered: "In an action for money had and received, the plaintiff generally can recover a payment mistakenly made when that mistake was caused by his lack of diligence or his negligence in ascertaining the true facts and the other party would not be prejudiced by refunding the payment--subject to a weighing of the equities between the parties by the trier of fact." Folsom, supra at 406, 349 S.E.2d 368. In the evidentiary posture of summary judgment, issues of fact remained for jury resolution.

Unlike Folsom, who received a gratuitous overpayment and "would not be prejudiced by refunding [it]," id. at 406, 349 S.E.2d 368, Time acknowledges that the mistaken payment to Grady was in compensation for services valued at $184,198.94. It is clear that Grady would be prejudiced by refunding the payment and that it in good conscience may retain payment for medical services rendered. Jury issues remained in Folsom concerning plaintiff's negligence, whether defendant in good conscience ought to be able to retain the funds and whether there was an accord and satisfaction between the parties. Folsom does not mandate that every claim for money had and received must be presented to a jury, and this is not one of them.

2. Time also asserts that dismissal of the complaint cannot be grounded on the mere fact that Grady provided medical services to Taylor. It cites authority that a claim for money had and received lies even where the recipient of funds paid in error provided services in return for payment.

The cases cited by...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Matter of Vacuum Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • November 26, 1997
    ...requirement that any such mistake of fact has been relied upon to the creditor's detriment. See, Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga.App. 34, 438 S.E.2d 149 (1993) (noting that the payor must act "under a mistake of fact"); see also Citizens' Bank of Fitzgerald v. Rudisill, 4......
  • Credit Lyonnais New York Branch v. Koval, 97-CT-00589-SCT.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • August 5, 1999
    ...Methodist Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc., 748 F.Supp. 459, 464-65 (S.D.Miss.1990). See also Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga.App. 34, 438 S.E.2d 149, 152 (1993); St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Farm Bureau Family Life Ins. Co., 624 N.E.2d 939 (Ind.Ct.App.1993); Lin......
  • Little v. Fleet Finance
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 5, 1997
    ...be entitled to relief on her claim of fraud under any fair reading of the facts alleged therein. See Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga.App. 34, 438 S.E.2d 149 (1993). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's fraud claim p......
  • United States v. Adams
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • March 8, 2019
    ...circumstances are such that the person to whom it was paid can not in good conscience return it." Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga. App. 34, 35, 438 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Insurance - Maximilian A. Pock
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 46-1, September 1994
    • Invalid date
    ...by bills in equity seeking traditional equitable relief, such as specific restitution or cancellation to prevent unjust enrichment. 324. 211 Ga. App. 34, 438 S.E.2d 149 (1993). 325. Id. at 36, 438 S.E.2d at 152. 326. Id. at 37, 438 S.E.2d at 152. 327. Id. at 36, 438 S.E.2d at 151 (emphasis ......
  • Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 46-1, September 1994
    • Invalid date
    ...sovereign, and assertion or waiver of that defense is the original prerogative of the sovereign, and not the individual." Id. 291. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 149. The court thus affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendant. Id. at 80, 438 S.E.2d at 149. 292. 211 Ga. App. 502, 439 S.E.2d 732 (199......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT