Timken Co. v. US, Court No. 90-06-00307.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1991
• Docket Number: Court No. 90-06-00307.
• Citation: 758 F. Supp. 1518
• Parties: The TIMKEN COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, Magyar Gordulocsapagy Muvek, Defendant-Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. Court of International Trade

758 F. Supp. 1518

The TIMKEN COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant Magyar Gordulocsapagy Muvek, Defendant-Intervenor.

Court No. 90-06-00307.

United States Court of International Trade.

March 7, 1991.

Stewart and Stewart (Eugene L. Stewart, Terence P. Stewart, James R. Cannon, Jr. and Charles A. St. Charles), Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civ. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, A. David Lafer (Robert J. Heilferty, Atty.-Advisor, Office of Chief Counsel for Import Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, of counsel), Washington, D.C., for defendant.

Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, Peter D. Ehrenhaft and Johanna M. Klema, Washington, D.C., for defendant-intervenor.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TSOUCALAS, Judge:

Plaintiff, The Timken Company ("Timken"), and defendant, United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration ("Commerce" or "ITA"), jointly move to strike the cross-claims asserted by the defendant-intervenor, Magyar Gordulocsapagy Muvek ("intervenor" or "MGM"), in its answer. The moving parties maintain that MGM's crossclaims seek to address issues not arising out of the original action and must therefore possess an independent jurisdictional basis. Since the crossclaims were not filed within thirty days of publication of Commerce's determination in the Federal Register, they are jurisdictionally deficient and must be stricken.

On the other hand, intervenor argues that its crossclaims should stand because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which this court's rules are predicated, should be interpreted liberally so as to enable the court to adjudicate all related issues simultaneously. MGM further argues that an interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1988) which requires cross-claims to abide by the same jurisdictional standards as original actions is unduly stringent and not in harmony with the modern rules governing intervention.

Background

While a more complete history of the nature of this action can be found in Magyar Gordulocsapagy Muvek v. United States, 756 F.Supp. 576 (CIT 1991), the substantive facts are reiterated herein for convenience. In 1989, Timken petitioned Commerce to effect an administrative review of an outstanding dumping order encompassing tapered roller bearings imported from Hungary. The final results of Commerce's review were published on May 22, 1990. Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the Republic of Hungary, 55 Fed.Reg. 21,066. During the disclosure conference held shortly after publication of the final results, plaintiff, as well as MGM (the only respondent involved in the review), submitted written comments alleging various clerical errors and requesting that they be corrected.

In light of the ITA's failure to effect the requested corrections, Timken timely filed the instant action challenging the final results of the administrative review on June 21, 1990. Unlike Timken, MGM did not commence suit against Commerce within the thirty day period prescribed by law.¹ Instead, MGM moved for and was granted leave to intervene in Timken's action by order of this Court on September 19, 1990. MGM included in its answer several crossclaims alleging errors completely unrelated to those advanced by the plaintiff.

Discussion

Plaintiff and defendant now move to strike MGM's crossclaims for lack of independent jurisdictional basis. "In evaluating the motions to strike, the Court must adhere to the strict standards which govern its jurisdiction." National Ass'n of Mirror Mfrs. v. United States, 11 CIT 648, 651, 670 F.Supp. 1013, 1014 (1987). While there is no question that "intervention in a suit before this court challenging an antidumping investigation is governed by 28 U.S.C. 2631(j)(1)(B), and Rule 24 of the Rules of this Court," Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT 263, 266-67, 633 F.Supp. 1376, 1380 (1986), it is equally irrefutable that neither of these sources can be interpreted to confer jurisdiction where none exists.

Thus, while the jurisdictional basis for Timken's claims is clearly provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2), intervenor's crossclaims must also establish a proper jurisdictional basis. Intervenor attempts to satisfy this condition by suggesting that since the court already has jurisdiction over the main action, that jurisdiction attaches to any claims it introduces as an intervenor of right. Intervenor's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions to Strike Intervenor's Crossclaims 10.

In Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 2 CIT 170, 1981 WL 2473 (1981), however, where, as in the instant action, an intervenor sought to introduce as a crossclaim what was in effect a separate challenge to Commerce's determination after the statutory time period had lapsed, this court held that an "intervenor cannot circumvent the explicit statutory time limitation for contesting an antidumping duty determination by simply making a cross-claim when the time for commencing an action has expired." Id. at 172.

The Nakajima court's rationale, i.e., that crossclaims introduced by an intervenor must establish independent jurisdictional grounds, has been followed in a number of cases before this court. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 14 CIT ___, 731 F.Supp. 1073 (1990); National Ass'n of Mirror Mfrs., 11 CIT at 651, 670 F.Supp. at 1015; Washington Red Raspberry Comm'n v. United States, 11 CIT 173, 657 F.Supp. 537 (1987); East Chilliwack Fruit Growers Cooperative v. United States, 11 CIT 104, 109, 655 F.Supp. 499, 504 (1987); Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 10 CIT 263, 633 F.Supp. 1376 (1986); cf. Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT 1, 600 F.Supp. 852 (1985); Fuji Elec. Co. v. United States, 7 CIT 247, 595 F.Supp. 1152 (1984). Indeed, the court has "consistently held that it lacks jurisdiction over a challenge to a Commerce determination made by an intervenor when the challenge is made subsequent to the thirty day deadline under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) for instituting an action." Alhambra Foundry Co. v. United States, 13 CIT ___, ___, 685 F.Supp. 1252, 1263 (1988) (citations omitted).

Intervenor thus finds itself in the unenviable position of having to discredit a number of authoritative decisions by this court in order to succeed. To that end, intervenor proposes that these cases should be re-examined because, in those instances, the court based its decisions on the language contained in Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53, 56 S.Ct. 6, 80 L.Ed. 39 (1935), a case which intervenor deems no longer applicable caselaw because it has been superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In the first instance, the Court is not as convinced as is intervenor, that adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure served to effectively overrule Chandler. If that were the case, certainly the Supreme Court has had ample opportunity since 1937 to so decree. Conversely, the Court has since noted that an intervenor is limited "to the field of litigation open to the original parties." Columbia Gas Co. v. American Fuel & Power Co., 322 U.S. 379, 383, 64 S.Ct. 1068, 1071, 88 L.Ed. 1337 (1944). Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has acknowledged a liberalization of the practice of intervention, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 87 S.Ct. 932, 17 L.Ed.2d 814 (1967), it has refrained from enlarging the scope of litigation open to intervenors.

Moreover, neither is the Court persuaded that Nakajima, Fuji, and their progeny relied solely on Chandler. To the contrary, it is evident from the most cursory reading of...