Timlin v. Standard Oil Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 02 June 1891
• Citation: 27 N.E. 786,126 N.Y. 514
• Parties: TIMLIN v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

126 N.Y. 514

27 N.E. 786

TIMLIN

v.STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 2, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.

Matthew Hale and Louis Marshall, for appellants.

E. Countryman, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages arising from the death of her husband, which occurred in the city of Albany in September, 1885, and for which she claimed the defendants were liable. She recovered a judgment at the circuit which has been affirmed at the general term, (7 N. Y. Supp. 158,) and from the judgment of affirmance all the defendants have appealed to this court.

The New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company owned the premises upon which the wall stood, the falling of which caused the death of the plaintiff's intestate. For a number of years past, a firm named Strain & Reynolds had leased these premises from the railroad company, and in December, 1876, they subleased a portion of them to defendants Murphy and Liscomb for one year from May 1, 1877, and those defendants occupied such portion up to 1884, as tenants of the firm by reason of yearly renewals of the lease, either orally or in writing. In 1884 the firm of Strain & Reynolds became the agents of the Standard Oil Company of New York. In July, 1884, the New York Central Railroad Company, still being the owner of the whole premises, leased them to the Acme Oil Company, one of the defendants, for five years from May 1, 1884. The firm of Strain & Reynolds, in or about May, 1884, as agents of the Standard Oil Company, renewed the lease for one year to defendants Murphy and Liscomb of that portion of the premises which they had theretofore leased to such defendants, and this lease was on the 1st of May, 1885, again renewed by Strain & Reynolds as such agents, and in writing, for one year from that date. The individual defendants occupied the portion of the premises leased to them, and the Standard Oil Company occupied the balance, and such relative occupation existed on the 12th day of September, 1885, when the plaintiff's intestate was killed. The lease from the railroad company to the oil company contained a provision for its termination at any time before the expiration of the 5 years, at the option of the railroad company, by giving 60 days' written notice to the oil company of its option to so terminate it. The lease from Strain & Reynolds to Murphy and Liscomb contained a similar clause providing for its termination in the same way. This option was in existence when the lease was renewed, May 1, 1885. There is no direct evidence of the transfer by the Acme Company of its interest or any portion thereof in the lease above described to the Standard Company, or any other corporation or person. The property thus leased from the railroad company is situated on the west side of, and immediately adjoining, lands belonging to the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, and the canal company thereon laid its tracks, which at this point run about north and south. On September 12, 1885, the property was separated from that of the Delaware & Hudson road by a brick wall about 11 feet high and 1 foot wide, running north and south for a distance of about 111 feet, the wall being laid wholly on the land of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, but within 2 inches of the line between the two companies. From the top of this wall there had been a shed roof running towards the west, which tipped in that direction, so that the water shed was a way from the lands of the Delaware & Hudson Company. The wall formed the eastern boundary of the property leased to the Acme Company, and the property thus leased, and consisting of not much more than a rough shed, was used as a sort of storage place for oil, and was but one story high. It was all one building at the time Strain & Reynolds leased it from the railroad company, and they leased the northern end to the individual defendants. There was never any dividing brick wall between the northerly portion occupied by them and the southerly portion occupied by the oil company. There was simply a fence or board partition running east and west, and nailed against posts, so as to distinguish the parts occupied by each respectively. No barrels of oil were ever put against this brick wall by any of the parties. The brick wall from the northerly to the southerly end was one continuous wall, with an angle, which was 68 or 70 feet from the northerly end, and in the part occupied by the individual defendants. The plaintiff's intestate was a laborer in the employ of the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, and on the 12th of September, 1885, he had gone to work to repair the tracks of that company opposite these premises. While working there the wall fell over and upon him and crushed him to death. The wall for about a distance of 60 feet fell over, the northern end of the fall being about 5 feet from the northern end of the wall. It is claimed that it was all on that portion of the premises which had been leased to the individual defendants. There was evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that the wall had been in a leaning condition, out of plumb, and dangerous for a number of years, and there was evidence from which a jury might infer knowledge by the oil companies of its condition, and that it was dangerous and liable to fall, at the time when the lease was renewed in the name of the Standard Oil Company to Murphy and Liscomb in May, 1885. There was also evidence from which the jury might have inferred negligence on the part of the oil company if its officers or agents were ignorant of this dangerous condition of the wall at that time.

The plaintiff claims to hold all the defendants on the ground that they were all guilty, either of letting premises with a nuisance upon them of a nature dangerous to the public or an adjoining owner, or of maintaining such nuisance on premises leased to them while such nuisance existed. The counsel for the Acme Company maintains there is no evidence to sustain a recovery against it. That company took the lease of the whole property from the railroad company. There is no evidence of any assignment or sublease to the Standard Company, nor any direct evidence upon the subject of the relationship between these two. The Standard Companyadmits, for purposes of its own, that it has been the owner of the lease from the time of its execution, and that its liability is to be determined as if its name had been inserted in the lease. This does not absolve the Acme Company. The Standard may admit its own liability, but cannot by admission destroy that of the Acme Company to the plaintiff, if it otherwise exist. So far as appears, there has been at least entire acquiescence on the part of the Acme Company in the assumption of power by Strain & Reynolds, acting as agents of the Standard Company, to lease a portion of the premises to the individual defendants and in their reception of rent. The Acme Company might have thus acquiesced because they had transferred by assignment or sublease all their interest to the Standard Company at a time when they were entirely ignorant of the existence of any dangerous nuisance on the premises. They also might have acquiesced because, while taking the lease in their own name, they really took it as partners or joint owners with the Standard Company, although no formal transfer of the legal title or any portion of it had been made. An equally strong inference possibly might be drawn as to the existence of either fact, and generally such a condition of the evidence would be fatal to the position of the plaintiff, who asserted the liability of the Acme Company. But the nature of the relationship between the two companies was a matter of evidence peculiarly, if not solely, within their power to prove. Prima facie, the Acme Company, being the lessee, assumed the responsibility consequent upon such a position. If their relationship was such as to exempt the Acme Company from all liability, is it too much to assume that the fact would have been proved by it? If either one of two inferences could be drawn, the one inculpatory and the other exculpatory of the Acme Company, should not a jury be permitted to draw that one most favorable to the plaintiff, when the Acme Company, with all the evidence in its own power and possession, fails to produce it, and to thus dispel the doubt? I think the...