Timmins v. Russomano

• Decision Date: 01 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 41139,41139
• Parties: , 43 O.O.2d 186 TIMMINS et al., Appellants, v. RUSSOMANO, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 124

14 Ohio St.2d 124

236 N.E.2d 665, 43 O.O.2d 186

TIMMINS et al., Appellants, v. RUSSOMANO, Appellee.

No. 41139.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 1, 1968.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under Ohio law, the driver of a motor vehicle proceeding over a through street in a lawful manner has the absolute right of way over a vehicle on an intersecting stop street, and the driver on the through street may ordinarily assume that such right of way will be respected and observed by the driver of the vehicle on the intersecting stop street.

2. The driver on a through street, who intends to turn his vehicle to the right into a private driveway a short distance beyond an intersecting stop street, does not lose or forfeit his right of way by activating the right-turn signal lights on his motor vehicle in compliance with the statutory requirement before reaching the intersecting stop street.

In this action, originating in the Warren Municipal Court, Mary A. Timmins and her insurer, as plaintiffs, sought a money judgment for $631.17 against Annabelle M. Russomano, defendant, for damages to the Timmins' automobile when defendant, driving another automobile, collided with the right front of plaintiff's automobile.

Trial was had to the court. Following the trial and before the filing of a journal entry, plaintiffs 'required the court to state in writing the conclusions of facts found separately from conclusions of law.' This the court did, as follows:

'* * * as conclusion of fact, the court finds:

'Plaintiff was owner of 1960 Ford stationwagon. She was driving her automobile on E. Market Street in the City of Warren, heading east in the right curb lane. Eastland Avenue intersects E. Market Street. Plaintiff lives three houses east of Eastland on E. Market Street. Defendant was travelling north on Eastland and stopped at stop sign at intersection of Eastland and E. Market. Plaintiff turned on her right signal blinker at an undetermined distance west of the intersection and slowed her automobile as she approached Eastland. Defendant saw the right turn signal of plaintiff's and pulled out of Eastland and struck the right front of plaintiff's automobile.

'And as conclusion of law on this cause based on the foregoing conclusion of fact, the court finds:

'Plaintiff proceeding along a through street or highway protected by stop signs has the right of way at intersections over motorists on subordinate thoroughfares. However, plaintiff has the duty to exercise due care under all the circumstances. The plaintiff gave a right turn signal west of the intersection although she did not intend to turn at that point. The signal required to be given by the operator of a turning vehicle is not only for the protection of vehicles in the rear of the turning vehicle, but for the protection of all vehicles whose movements may reasonably be affected by the change in direction. 7 American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 217, Page 767.

'The court finds that under these (sic) set of facts, the signal given by the plaintiff at the particular point was a direct and proximate cause of the collision.'

Judgment was rendered for defendant on the basis that plaintiff Timmins was 'contributorily negligent.' The only facts presented here are those as found by the trial court.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court by a divided vote affirmed the judgment below, and the cause is now here for decision on the merits pursuant to the allowance of a motion to require the Court of Appeals to certify the record.

Frederick H. Loomis, Warren, for appellants.

Hoppe, Day & Ford and Robert S. McGeough, Warren, for appellee.

ZIMMERMAN, Judge.

Section 4511.39, Revised Code, states, in part:

'No person shall turn a vehicle * * * from a direct course upon a highway until such person has exercised due care to ascertain that the movement can be made with reasonable safety to other users of the highway, and then only * * * after giving an appropriate signal in the event any traffic may be affected by such movement.

'A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given in sufficient time in advance of the movement indicated to give ample warning to other users of the highway who would be affected by such movement.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In compliance with the quoted statute, plaintiff Timmins, traveling on a main thoroughfare, indicated by activating the right-turn signal lights on her automobile that she intended to turn right off East Market Street, but not necessarily into Eastland Avenue. This statute, as worded, certainly suggests that the signal of an intention to turn is for the benefit of those using the same highway as the one required to give the signal.

Section 4511.43, Revised Code,...