Timothy J. v. Superior Court, C052781.

• Citation: 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 746,150 Cal.App.4th 847
• Decision Date: 10 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. C052711.,No. C052781.,C052781.,C052711.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: TIMOTHY J., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. Dante H., Petitioner, v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

58 Cal.Rptr.3d 746

150 Cal.App.4th 847

TIMOTHY J., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento County, Respondent;

The People, Real Party in Interest.

Dante H., Petitioner, v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Respondent;

The People, Real Party in Interest.

No. C052781.

No. C052711.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

May 10, 2007.

Paulino G. Duran, Public Defender, Arthur L. Bowie and Chet Templeton, Assistant Public Defenders, for Petitioner Timothy J.

Paulino G. Duran, Public Defender, Arthur L. Bowie and Stephanie Paisley, Assistant Public Defenders, for Petitioner Dante H.

No appearance for Respondent.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles A. French, Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest in Case No. 52781.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross, Charles A. French and Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest in Case No. 52711.

BLEASE, Acting P.J.

In this consolidated writ proceeding,¹ 11-year-old Dante H. (Dante) and 13-year-old Timothy J. (Timothy) seek review of the denial of their petitions for writ of mandate and requests for stay of juvenile delinquency proceedings in the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602.) They ask that we overrule the court's rejection of their claims of incompetency to stand trial under former California Rules of Court, rule 1498(d) (hereafter rule 1498(d)).² We issued an order to show cause pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court.

Rule 1498(d) requires the juvenile court to stay the proceedings and conduct a hearing regarding the minor's competency to stand trial if the court finds a reason to doubt that the minor who is the subject of a petition filed under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (602 petition) "is capable of understanding the proceedings or of cooperating with the child's attorney...." It directs that "[i]f the court finds that the child is not capable of understanding the proceedings or of cooperating with the attorney, the court shall proceed under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6550 and sections (a)-(c) of this rule." Sections (a) through (c) provide procedures upon a finding the child is mentally ill, mentally disabled, or mentally disordered.

The juvenile court in both cases ruled that to be found incompetent under rule 1498(d), the minor must have a mental disorder or developmental disability and here both minors based their claim of incompetency on their age-related developmental immaturity.

As we shall explain, we construe rule 1498(d) consistent with the constitutional test of competency stated in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (Dusky) and hold that the rule does not require that a minor have a mental disorder or development disability before the juvenile court may hold a hearing to determine whether, or find after holding a hearing that, the minor is incompetent to stand trial.

We therefore shall issue peremptory writs of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its prior rulings and reconsider the minors' claims in light of our holding.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Dante

On June 25, 2005, Dante H. and two other minors broke windows at the Woodbridge Elementary School and took food items from the gymnasium. Dante and the other two minors confessed at the scene. An original 602 petition was filed alleging that Dante committed one count of second degree burglary. (Pen.Code, § 459.) At the arraignment on December 20, 2005, the court declared a doubt as to Dante's competency, appointed a psychologist pursuant to rule 1498(d), and ordered Dante to submit to a psychological evaluation.

The court appointed psychologist Lisa Boal Perrine, Ph.D. (Dr. Perrine), who interviewed Dante and filed a report concluding that he was incompetent to stand trial and was not likely to achieve competence for a year or more. According to Dr. Perrine, Dante, who was 11 years old at the time of the interview,³ lived with his parents and two siblings, was enrolled in the sixth grade and had never been enrolled in special education classes. Although there was some confusion concerning Dante's grades, which may have deteriorated somewhat, he generally received grades of A's and B's. In addition, he had no known criminal history or any mental health or behavioral problems.

When Dr. Perrine asked Dante if he understood the court proceedings, he replied, "no" although he said he knew he had been charged with burglary which he thought was a misdemeanor and knew that a felony is more serious than a misdemeanor. He said in order to commit a burglary, someone would have to "break in somewhere." He believed that not guilty meant the person is "not accountable for what the people think they did" and guilty means "the person being accused did something and will have to suffer the consequences." If a person is found not guilty "they go free," if the person is found guilty as charged, the possible sentence would be "community service" which he would serve at his church. Dante thought probation meant "you have to ask the [probation] officer to do stuff like play football."

With the exception of witnesses, Dante did not understand the functions of the court participants and thought his chances of being found not guilty were "zero out of 100." He did not know what plea he planned on entering, nor did he know what rights he would have to give up in order to get a plea bargain. Dante told Dr. Perrine that he had an attorney, that he had confidence in his attorney, and he thought he could help his attorney "by trusting in him." He did not know what he should do if he disagreed with his attorney. Dante stated that he remembered everything that happened, would be expected to tell his attorney everything he knows and remembers, and expected no difficulty doing so.

Dr. Perrine's report indicates that Dante would defer to his parents or his attorney to make decisions regarding his case, that if he disagreed with them, he would not be able to stand up for himself, and that he is not able to appreciate the long term effects of his decisions. Dr. Perrine also found that Dante was currently experiencing a mental "adjustment disorder," which included "depressive symptoms manifested in behavioral problems, impaired decision-making abilities, difficulties managing his emotions, and limited ability to think clearly."

At the contested hearing, the juvenile court received into evidence the written competency evaluations of Dr. Perrine and Dr. Daniel Edwards, who had been retained by defense counsel. The court also heard their testimony. Dr. Perrine's testimony was consistent with her report. She opined that Dante did not have the ability to effectively work with his attorney to prepare this case because as a result of his age, he had not reached the developmental stage where he can process information, make sense of it, and develop a preferred decision-making strategy.

Dr. Edwards, a clinical and forensic neuropsychologist, reported that Dante's I.Q. is 102, which he classified as average. Dr. Edwards found Dante was performing in the normal range for his age with no psychological problems or personality disorders. As an 11-year-old, Dante had little or no concept of the future so the idea of prolonged punishment or supervision had no meaning to him and because he had not yet developed a desire to be independent of his parents, the impositions of physical restrictions would not have the same meaning and effect on him as it would have on an adult. Dante was also unable to explain what a trial is or what his rights are. Dr. Edwards concluded that "these abstract concepts are still beyond his appreciation developmentally" and opined that Dante's "competency to stand trial is limited by his developmental level...."

Dr. Edwards explained that a young child has mildly developed frontal lobes. As the person reaches puberty around the ages of 11, 12, and 13, the myelination process⁴ takes place in the frontal lobes and the individual begins to develop the ability to think logically, abstractly, and to have a.sense of the future. Dante's developmental level limited his ability to think in those terms. Dr. Edwards concluded that Dante was incompetent to stand trial because he was unable to understand the issues, including the role of the courtroom participants, and the nature of the punishment.

The juvenile court found Dante had failed to meet his burden of proof, which in the court's view, required that Dante establish "by a preponderance of evidence that he suffers from a mental disorder or developmental disability that impairs his ability to understand the nature of the delinquency proceedings or to assist or cooperate with counsel with his defense in a rational manner." The court found unpersuasive the opinions of both experts. Dr. Perrine's opinion was based on an unsubstantiated adjustment disorder and on Dante's developmental immaturity while Dr. Edwards' opinion was based on Dante's age, his lack of maturity, and his ability to think in abstract terms.

On May 25, 2006, Dante filed a petition for writ of mandate and a request for immediate stay of the juvenile proceedings. This court denied the petition on June 1, 2006. However, on June 12th, Dante filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which granted the petition, issued a stay of the juvenile proceedings, and transferred the matter back to this court, with directions to vacate our order denying mandate and to issue an alternative writ. We complied with the order by issuing an alternative writ of mandate on August 4, 2006.

B. Timothy

On May 25, 2005, an amended original 602 petition was filed alleging that Timothy, age 12, had entered Fern Bacon Elementary School after being suspended from the school (Pen.Code, § 626.2) and stole personal property from...