Timothy v. Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss, LLC

• Decision Date: 16 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 20180228,20180228
• Parties: Paul TIMOTHY and Janice Timothy, Petitioners, v. PIA, ANDERSON, DORIUS, REYNARD & MOSS, LLC, and Brennan Moss, Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

456 P.3d 731

Paul TIMOTHY and Janice Timothy, Petitioners,

v.PIA, ANDERSON, DORIUS, REYNARD & MOSS, LLC, and Brennan Moss, Respondents.

No. 20180228

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard December 12, 2018

Filed December 16, 2019

Nelson Abbott, Provo, for petitioners

J. Ryan Mitchell, John P. Mertens, William O. Kimball, Salt Lake City, for respondents

Justice Petersen authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, and Justice Pearce joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice Petersen, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 We granted certiorari in this case to address whether a law firm that deposited funds from a client into its trust account is a "transferee" under the former Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).¹ However, while this case was before the court of appeals, Petitioners allowed the judgment that formed the basis of their fraudulent-transfer claim to expire. Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness with this court. They argue that Petitioners have no remedy under the UFTA because they are no longer creditors, so even if Petitioners were to prevail on the transferee issue, it would not affect their rights.

¶2 We agree and dismiss the petition as moot. We further vacate the judgment of the court of appeals because Petitioners’ fraudulent-transfer claim became moot before that court’s opinion was issued. The judgment of the district court stands.

BACKGROUND²

¶3 Paul and Janice Timothy prevailed in a lawsuit against Thomas and Teri Keetch for, among other things, fraud and breach of contract. The Timothys obtained a judgment against the Keetches on May 6, 2009.³ But they were never able to collect it.

¶4 The record indicates that the Keetches took measures to avoid paying this debt, including depositing their money into an account held in a minor son’s name.⁴ Despite this, the Keetches testified at a supplemental hearing in March 2011 that they had no assets. And Brennan Moss, an attorney with the law firm of Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss (PADRM), wrote letters stating that the Keetches did not have significant assets.

¶5 Although the Keetches claimed to have no assets, less than a week after the supplemental hearing, PADRM deposited into its trust account (IOLTA)⁵ a check for $50,000 drawn from the minor’s bank account. The check had been written over a month earlier, and its memo line read: "Terry Keetch." With representation from Moss, the Keetches later used $20,000 from those funds to make a down payment on a house.

¶6 The Timothys tried to access the proceeds in the IOLTA by obtaining a writ of garnishment against PADRM that required the firm to hold all funds owned by the Keetches.⁶ But PADRM twice refused to accept service of the writ. And by the time it did accept service, the Keetches had moved all of their money out of the IOLTA.

¶7 Finally, in August 2012, the Timothys sued both Moss and PADRM, alleging various theories of fraudulent transfer under the UFTA, civil conspiracy, and wrongful conduct.

¶8 Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the district court, arguing that they were not "transferees" under the UFTA and were thus immune from liability on the fraudulent-transfer claims. The district court agreed and granted Respondents’ motion, holding:

Because the relevant provisions of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act were modeled on federal Bankruptcy law, the court is persuaded that "transferee" as used in the Act is most logically defined in the manner it has been defined in the Bankruptcy context. That is, a "transferee" must exercise dominion or control over the transferred asset. Here, [defendants] did not—and could not—exercise dominion and control over funds held in the firm’s trust account. ... Accordingly, [defendants were] not "transferee[s]" within the meaning of the Act and the [Timothys’] fraudulent conveyance claims fail as a matter of law. Those claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

The Timothys timely appealed that ruling.

¶9 On August 24, 2017, while the case was pending before the court of appeals, the Timothys filed in the district court an application to renew their judgment against the Keetches. In its ruling, the district court noted that judgments are valid for a period of eight years pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-5-202(1), and that "[a] judgment creditor may renew a judgment by filing a motion under Rule 7 [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] in the original action before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires."⁷ The district court concluded that because more than eight years had passed since the original judgment was entered on May 6, 2009, the statute of limitations barred the Timothys from renewing their judgment. Accordingly, the district court denied the Timothys’ renewal request.

¶10 However, neither party informed the court of appeals that the judgment had expired. And the court of appeals issued its ruling on February 23, 2018, affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis that PADRM "had no legal right to put the funds to its own use" and therefore "lacked the requisite dominion" to be considered a transferee under the UFTA. See Timothy v. Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss LLC , 2018 UT App 31, ¶ 27, 424 P.3d 937 (citation omitted).

¶11 The Timothys then petitioned for certiorari. We granted the petition on the issue of whether the court of appeals erred when it used the dominion-and-control test to determine whether PADRM was a "transferee" under the UFTA. Respondents then filed a suggestion of mootness, arguing that we should not reach the merits of the petition because the Timothys’ fraudulent-transfer claims became moot when their judgment expired. We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(5).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court." Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm’n , 2006 UT 58, ¶ 8, 147 P.3d 1189 (citation omitted). And where "the decision of the court of appeals rests on questions of statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness, affording no deference to the court of appeals’ legal conclusions." Id.

ANALYSIS

¶13 The merits of this case call for us to review the court of appeals’ interpretation of the UFTA sections 25-6-5(1)(a)–(b) and 25-6-6(1). However, we must first address the mootness argument raised by Respondents. The question we face is whether a fraudulent-transfer claim based on a judgment becomes moot when the underlying judgment expires. We conclude that the Timothys’ fraudulent-transfer claim is moot and do not reach the merits of the issue presented. Further, because their claim became moot before judgment was entered in the court of appeals, we vacate that ruling.

I. MOOTNESS

¶14 The Timothys’ judgment against the Keetches was entered on May 6, 2009, and it expired as a matter of law eight years later on May 7, 2017. See UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202(1). When they attempted to renew the judgment on August 24, 2017, the district court denied their renewal motion as untimely. The Timothys concede this voided their judgment, and they do not raise any argument that the underlying debt is somehow still collectible. Respondents argue this renders the Timothys’ fraudulent-transfer claim against them moot because the Timothys are no longer creditors with a claim and therefore have no remedy under the UFTA. We agree with Respondents.⁸

¶15 "Mootness ... presents one of the several bases that may prevent a court from reaching the merits of a case." State v. Legg , 2018 UT 12, ¶ 13, 417 P.3d 592. "An issue on appeal is considered moot when ‘the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.’ " State v. Sims , 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). Unlike standing, which must be determined by the facts that existed at the time the suit was filed, "[a]n appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated." Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co. , 2010 UT 45, ¶ 15, 234 P.3d 1105. And we typically will not decide an issue that becomes moot while on appeal. State v. Black , 2015 UT 54, ¶ 10, 355 P.3d 981.

¶16 Although the Timothys concede that their judgment against the Keetches is void, they argue that their fraudulent-transfer claim against Respondents is not moot for a number of reasons. First, they assert that under Porenta v. Porenta , the UFTA requires a debtor-creditor relationship only at the time the action is filed—not throughout the entirety of the case—as evidenced by "the fact that the act uses present tense when defining the term ‘claim.’ " (Citing 2017 UT 78, ¶ 12, 416 P.3d 487.) But the Timothys misread the holding of Porenta .

¶17 In Porenta , after a married couple filed for divorce, the husband transferred his interest in the couple’s marital home to his mother to prevent that property from being distributed as part of the marital estate. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. While the divorce case was pending, the husband died, causing the divorce court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 5. Soon after, however, the wife sued the husband’s mother under the UFTA. Id. ¶ 6. Following trial, the district court ruled that the husband’s transfer of the marital home to his mother was fraudulent under the UFTA. Id. ¶ 8.

¶18 On appeal, the mother argued that a debtor-creditor relationship must exist at the time a UFTA claim is filed, and that any such relationship had been extinguished in that case because the husband died before the wife had filed her claim. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. Relying on the use of present-tense language in the statute, see id. ¶ 12, we agreed with the mother that the UFTA does indeed "require[ ] an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship when a claim under the [UFTA] is filed." Id. ¶ 1. But we ultimately determined that the wife’s claim survived the husband’s death because she had maintained a debtor-creditor...