Timothy Walton v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Decision Date | 29 June 2000 |
Docket Number | 00-LW-3042,76274 |
Parties | TIMOTHY WALTON, Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee v. GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-appellee/ cross-appellant CASE |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 313,185.
For Plaintiff-appellant: ROBERT E. DAVIS, Attorney at Law, Robert E. Sweeney Co., L.P.A., 1500 Illuminating Building, 55 Public Square, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.
For defendant-appellee: RICHARD C. HUBBARD III, MICHAEL T PEARSON, Attorneys at Law, Duvin, Cahn & Hutton, Erieview Tower - 20th Floor, 1301 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.
In this action for wrongful discharge, plaintiff -appellant Timothy Walton appeals from the trial court order that granted defendant-appellee Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority's ("RTA's") second motion for summary judgment on appellant's claim.
Appellant asserts he presented adequate evidence to establish his allegations both that appellee lacked justification to discharge him and that appellee failed to act in good faith in discharging him. Appellant also asserts he was not required to follow company procedures in contesting his discharge prior to pursuing this action.
Appellee has filed a cross appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of its first motion for summary judgment.
In its cross appeal, appellee argues the evidence presented to the trial court failed to establish appellant's claim that the parties had an implied contract of continued employment; therefore, summary judgment on appellant's claim was appropriate. This court finds merit in appellee's argument. Since it is dispositive of the other issues raised and makes an entry of judgment in appellee's favor appropriate, this court need not address appellant's assignments of error and consequently dismisses appellant's appeal.
Appellant applied for employment with appellee in 1983. Appellee is a political subdivision of the State of Ohio providing public transportation through Cuyahoga County and portions of adjoining counties. Appellee accepted appellant's application and assigned him to work as an "automotive engineer."[1] Subsequently, appellee promoted appellant to the position of "Project Manager." Then, in 1987, appellant became "Director of Technical Services."
Appellant's department was among the three RTA departments that were under the supervision of RTA's Assistant General Manager of Materials. In 1988, Maynard Z. Walters assumed that position, thus becoming appellant's supervisor.
Prior to the time of appellant's initial employment by appellee, appellee had adopted a set of bylaws for its own governance. Article VIII, Sections 2 and 3, of appellee's By Laws provided in pertinent part as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Appellee's personnel policies at the time of appellant's hire were included in a pamphlet entitled "Merit System Rules." The "foreword" to these rules stated in pertinent part as follows:
Rule 14 listed nineteen "grounds for discharge or suspension" of employees, including insubordination, "conduct unbecoming an employee either on or off duty," willful or repeated violations of any of the personnel rules, and "other failures of good behavior detrimental to" RTA's operations. Section 3 of this rule authorized the "appointing Authority * * * to suspend or discharge an employee for any of the reasons set forth in Rule 14."
Rule 15 detailed the procedure for appeal of "personnel decisions for managerial employees." Managerial employees first were required to "appeal decisions by stating * * * objections in writing to * * * the General Manager." The rule further stated that any decision not so appealed within ten working days "shall be final."
In 1992, appellee adopted both a new "Personnel Policies and Procedures" manual and an "Employee Performance Code and Work Rules." Appellant received copies of these documents.
Section 1 of the new employee manual contained the following "Disclaimer":
Section 2.8 stated:
(Emphasis added.)
Section 6.2 established a "complaint procedure," reassuring employees that they were:
That section further indicated that persons in appellant's position "will use the following complaint procedure," but "Step 1" stated "[e]mployees may present concerns in writing to their supervisor within 5 working days of the event which is the source of their complaint." (Emphasis added.) No procedural alternative was set forth should the employee decline to follow the first step.
Appellee introduced its new "Employee Performance Code and Work Rules" with the following statements:
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