Tims v. Colvin, CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-70-EWD CONSENT CASE
| Decision Date | 11 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-70-EWD CONSENT CASE |
| Parties | KIMBERLY DAWN TIMS v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Plaintiff Kimberly Dawn Tims ("Plaintiff"), a pro se litigant, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of Carolyn W. Colvin, acting Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), denying her application for Title XVI supplemental security income. The parties here consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge2 and the case was transferred to this Court for all further proceedings and entry of judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).3 For the reasons assigned below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's appeal is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
On May 16, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning August 15, 2012 due to depression, anxiety, nervous breakdowns, attention deficit disorder ("ADD"), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), and seizures.4 The claim was initially denied on September 12, 20145 and Plaintifffiled a request for a hearing on November 5, 2014.6 A video hearing was held on August 7, 2015, at which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified.7 A vocational expert, Thomas Mounier, also appeared and testified.8 An unfavorable decision was rendered by the ALJ on September 25, 2015.9 On October 22, 2015, Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision.10 On December 8, 2015, the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review ("Appeals Council") denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision.11
On February 2, 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding as a pro se litigant, timely filed a Complaint in this Court.12 Accordingly, Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to her application before seeking judicial review and the ALJ's decision is the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. See, 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.13
This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision denying disability benefits is limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001). If the Commissioner fails to apply the correct legal standards, or provide a reviewing court with a sufficient basis to determine that the correct legal principles were followed, it is grounds for reversal. Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1981); Western v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1204, 1206 (5th Cir. 1981).
If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, they are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390, 91 S.Ct. at 1422; Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Bradley, 809 F.2d at 1057 (quoting Deters v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 789 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1986)). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000)). Conflicts in theevidence are for the Commissioner to decide, and if substantial evidence is found to support the decision, the decision must be affirmed even if there is evidence on the other side. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002); Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990). In applying the substantial evidence standard the court must review the entire record as a whole, but may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if the evidence weighs against the Commissioner's decision. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). However, the substantial evidence test requires more than a search of the record for evidence supporting the ALJ's findings and must take into account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence supporting the ALJ's decision. Burkhardt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., CIV. A. No. 3:08-CV-02032-B (BH), 2009 WL 3849617, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)).
A social security disability claimant has the burden of proving that he or she suffers from a disability, which is defined as a medically determinable physical or mental impairment lasting at least 12 months that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. In determining disability, the Commissioner, through the ALJ, works through a five-step sequential evaluation process. See, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Using the five-step evaluation process, the Commissioner must determine whether: (1) the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment(s); (3) the impairment(s) meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the regulations; (4) the impairment(s) prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work; and(5) the impairment(s) prevents the claimant from doing any other work. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002).
The burden rests upon the claimant throughout the first four steps of this five-step process to prove disability. If the claimant is successful in sustaining his burden at each of the first four levels then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. At step five, the Commissioner must prove, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, that he or she is capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the Commissioner proves other work exists which the claimant can perform, the claimant is given the chance to prove that he or she cannot, in fact, perform that work. Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from May 16, 2014, the date the application was filed,14 through September 25, 2015, the date of the ALJ's decision.15 At step one of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 16, 2014, the application date.16 At the second step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: affective disorder, anxiety and ADD.17 At step three of the analysis, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the required criteria for any listed impairment.18 The ALJ noted thatthe severity of Plaintiff's mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04 and 12.06.19 In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff satisfied the "paragraph B" or "paragraph C" criteria, but concluded that she did not.20
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with the nonexertional limitations of being limited to understanding, remembering and carrying out simple and routine tasks and to low stress jobs, defined as requiring only occasional decision-making and occasional changes in work setting.21 The ALJ further found that, "the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision."22 At step four of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work, as that term is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.965.23 Proceeding to the fifth step of the analysis, the ALJ found that based on the testimony of a vocational expert, as well as Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC, Plaintiff is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.24 The vocational expert testified that someone with Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC would be able to work as a janitor, maid and dishwasher, and that each occupation has a large number of jobs available in both the local and national economy.25 As such, the ALJ concludedthat Plaintiff was not disabled from May 16, 2014, the date the application was filed, through September 25, 2015, the date of the ALJ's decision.26
Although not a model of clarity, Plaintiff appears to allege that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Kongara.27 The Commissioner maintains that proper weight was given to the medical opinion evidence and that the decision to deny Plaintiff benefits is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.28
In her Memorandum filed in support of this appeal, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to give controlling weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Kongara, and that the ALJ compounded this error by failing to give Dr. Kongara's opinions any weight.29 The administrative record shows that Dr. Rama Kongara, M.D., treated Plaintiff from ...
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