Tinch v. Walters

• Decision Date: 24 June 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-5926,83-5955,s. 83-5926
• Citation: 765 F.2d 599
• Parties: William Howard TINCH, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Harry N. WALTERS, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Veterans Administration, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 599

765 F.2d 599

William Howard TINCH, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Harry N. WALTERS, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Veterans Administration Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 83-5926, 83-5955.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 6, 1984.

Decided June 24, 1985.

John W. Gill, Jr., U.S. Atty., Jimmie Baxter, J. Michael Haynes, Knoxville, Tenn., Anthony J. Steinmeyer, John S. Koppel (argued), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.

Thomas H. Dickenson, Knoxville, Tenn., Peggy Hooker (argued), Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.

Before KEITH and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by Harry N. Walters, in his official capacity as the Administrator of the Veterans Administration, from a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The issue presented is whether a V.A. regulation,

                38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.301(c)(2), 1 which equates primary alcoholism with "willful misconduct" was rendered ineffective by the 1978 amendment to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act).  29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. 2   Primary alcoholism, unlike other forms of the disease, is not attributed to underlying psychological problems.  The amended version of Section 504 prevents discrimination against handicapped people in programs receiving government aid.  Plaintiff-appellee Tinch, who suffers from primary alcoholism, contends that because Section 504 prevents such discrimination, it precludes application of the regulation equating primary alcoholism with willful misconduct.  As a veteran, Mr. Tinch was eligible for educational benefits.  Benefits were to be available until the delimiting date defined by 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662(a)(1) as being ten years after Mr. Tinch's discharge or May 31, 1976, which ever is later in time.  In attempting to prevent the application of 38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.301(c)(2), Tinch seeks to take advantage of a provision in 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662(a)(1) 3 which extends the time during which educational benefits are available to veterans.  The time extensions are not available to those who are handicapped as a result of their own willful misconduct.  Tinch claims that because the V.A. regulation equating primary alcoholism with willful misconduct was no longer valid after enactment of the 1978 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act, he is entitled to an extension of his delimiting date.  The district court held in favor of Mr. Tinch.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the ruling of the district court
                

I. FACTS

Primary alcoholism does not result from an underlying psychological disorder. The V.A. considers primary alcoholism to be the result of "willful misconduct" barring an otherwise eligible veteran from receiving a delimiting date extension under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662(a)(1). However, a primary alcoholic who acquires an organic disability as a result of his alcoholism is not barred by the willful misconduct provision, if the organic disability--rather than the primary alcoholism--prevents use of the educational benefits within the basic period prescribed by 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662(a)(1). Thus, only primary alcoholism is treated as "willful misconduct" within the meaning of V.A. statutes and regulations, and its victims presumptively Plaintiff-appellee served on active duty in the armed forces from January 12, 1955 to December 31, 1957, when he was honorably discharged. Based upon this service, plaintiff was entitled to 45 months of educational assistance under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1661(a). Plaintiff applied for and received educational assistance to pursue a mechanical operation course from January 1975 through May 31, 1976. However, these benefits were terminated effective June 1, 1976, because plaintiff had reached his delimiting date pursuant to 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662(a)(1).

prevented from obtaining extensions of the delimiting date.

In 1977, Section 1662(a)(1) was amended to extend the delimiting date for those who had been prevented during their period of eligibility from completing their education due to some physical or mental disability which was not the result of their own "willful misconduct." Based upon this new provision, plaintiff filed a claim for extension on February 9, 1978, contending that he was prevented from engaging in an educational pursuit from 1966 to 1974 due to his alcohol addiction and its associated social, psychological, emotional and physical debilitations. On April 7, 1978, the V.A. denied this claim on the ground that plaintiff's alcoholism constituted "willful misconduct" as defined under 38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.1(n): "an act involving conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited action."

Plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice of Disagreement and perfected a timely appeal to the Board of Veteran Appeals (Board). On March 7, 1979, the Board denied the appeal. The Board found that the incapacitating disability resulting from plaintiff's alcoholism was due to his own "willful misconduct," and that he had no innocently acquired disability from June 1966 to January 1975 of sufficient magnitude to prevent him from pursuing his education.

Plaintiff reopened his claim in 1981 with additional medical documentation. The regional office, finding that the evidence submitted was not new and material, denied the claim. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before the Board concerning the reopened claim. On December 13, 1982, the Board ruled that no new factual basis had been presented to warrant a change in its 1979 denial of appeal. It noted that the evidence supported the finding that the plaintiff's primary alcoholism prevented his utilization of educational benefits, but that this condition was due to plaintiff's willful misconduct. It also noted that his documented "innocently acquired" organic disabilities (e.g. impaired liver function) were not so severe as to interfere seriously with educational pursuits.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, plaintiff filed the instant action, challenging the V.A.'s willful misconduct regulations on both constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds. The district court rejected plaintiff's due process and equal protection claims. However, the court held that the V.A. policy of treating primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct" violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this ground. The defendant appeals from this decision while plaintiff cross-appeals the district court's dismissal of his constitutional claims. ⁴

II. DISCUSSION

A.

The Rehabilitation Act As Amended in 1978 Invalidated the Willful Misconduct Standard As Applied by 38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.301(c)(2).

The Rehabilitation Act, as amended in 1978, protects "an otherwise qualified individual" from discrimination "solely by The government contends that, in amending the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, Congress did not intend to invalidate the willful misconduct standard of the 1977 G.I. Bill Improvements Act, found in 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662(a)(1), as interpreted in 38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.301(c)(2). The government cites the legislative histories of the post-1978 amendments to the G.I. Bill Improvements Act of 1977 and the Veterans' Rehabilitation & Education Amendments of 1980 to demonstrate that Congress did not enact the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act with the intention of nullifying the willful misconduct standard of the 1977 G.I. Bill Improvements Act.

                reason of his handicap."    29 U.S.C. Sec. 794.  We find that, contrary to the mandate of the Rehabilitation Act, 38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.301(c)(2) discriminates against an otherwise qualified individual, Mr. Tinch, solely by reason of his handicap, primary alcoholism.
                

After the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, veterans' legislation was introduced into the House of Representatives in 1979, H.R. 5288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and into the Senate in 1980, S. 870, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The Senate bill contained an amendment to 38 U.S.C. Sec. 1662, which stated that for the purpose of determining eligibility for an extension of the delimiting date because a disability had prevented a veteran from pursuing training, alcohol dependence or abuse from which the veteran had recovered would not be considered the result of willful misconduct. The final legislation did not contain such a provision. See Veterans' Rehabilitation and Education Amendments of 1980, 38 U.S.C. Sec. 101. The V.A. contends that had Congress originally intended to invalidate the willful misconduct standard, it would not have attempted to do so through amendment in 1980. Thus, the V.A. construes these events to mean that Congress did not intend to include recovered alcoholics within the parameters of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended in 1978.

We reject the government's argument. The views of members of Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted by a previous Congress "have very little, if any, significance." United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 895, 902 n. 9, 63 L.Ed.2d 171 (1980) (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170, 88 S.Ct. 1994, 2001, 20 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1968) and Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593, 78 S.Ct. 946, 949, 2 L.Ed.2d 996 (1958)); see also American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 712 F.2d 640, 647 (D.C.Cir.1983) ("It is well settled that courts construing statutory language should give little weight to post-enactment statements by members of Congress."). Therefore, we should not read a later Congress' attempt to abolish the willful misconduct standard as "proof" that an earlier Congress had not already vitiated the willful misconduct standard, as applied by 38 C.F.R. Sec. 3.301(c)(2), by enacting ...