Tindall v. Byars
| Decision Date | 02 May 1950 |
| Docket Number | 16352. |
| Citation | 59 S.E.2d 337,217 S.C. 1 |
| Parties | TINDALL v. BYARS et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Hemphill & Hemphill, Chester, for appellant.
J. E McDonald, Chester, Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, for respondents.
Section 5 of Art XI of the State Constitution of 1895, which prescribes limits of the area of school districts, was amended in 1949, 45 Stat. 2510, 46 Stat. 23, by addition of the following 'Provided, That the limitation as to area of school districts imposed by this Section shall not apply to school districts in Chester County, but in said County, school districts shall be of such area as the General Assembly or the Board of Education of Chester County may prescribe.'
After an approving advisory referendum in 1948, see Act No. 953 of 1948, 45 Stat. 2508, by Act No. 82 of 1949, 46 Stat. 116, the whole area of Chester County was constituted one school district by the consolidation of all of the former districts. Sec. 7 of the Act was as follows:
Act No. 455 of 1949, 46 Stat. 1058, provided for the construction of a Chester County hospital and authorized the issuance of bonds in an amount not exceeding $450,000. The hospital board plans thereunder to issue $250,000 bonds for the construction and equipment of the projected hospital but it was discovered that the aggregate of county bonds and school district bonds would thereby be increased to an amount in excess of the constitutional debt limit applicable to Chester County. Sec. 5, Art. X, Constitution of 1895.
To solve that situation the General Assembly at its 1950 session passes an act, approved Jan. 30, 1950, 46 St. at Large, 1813, entitled 'An Act to consolidate the existing school districts in Chester County into a school district to be designated as 'The School District of Chester County'; to provide for the management and government of Chester County School District, the terms of office of the trustees of the said district and to provide for other matters relating to the schools of Chester County.' By the terms of section 5 this act, for the assumption by Chester County of the indebtedness of its several former school districts (provided by Sec. 7 of Act No. 82 of 1949, quoted above,) there was substituted the assumption of that indebtedness by the newly created 'The School District of Chester County.' (There was a companion act of 1950, 46 St. at Large 1813, also approved Jan. 30, of consistent provisions, which need not be further considered here.)
If the last stated legislation served its manifest purpose and relieved the county, as such, of the indebtedness of its several former school districts and transferred such indebtedness to the School District of Chester County, the proposed issue of hospital bonds by the county will not cause it to exceed the constitutional debt limit. The contrary is the contention of the plaintiff who brought this taxpayer's action for judgment (1) declaring invalid the legislative effort to create a single school district coextensive with the territory of Chester County, (2) determining the obligor upon the existing school district indebtedness, (3) enjoining the planned issuance of hospital bonds and (4) for other appropriate relief.
The Circuit Court refused to enjoin the contemplated issue of hospital bonds under the Act of 1949, 46 Stat. No. 455, page 1058, and further adjudged as follows:
1. That the indebtedness of the several school districts of Chester County, as they were constituted prior to the passage of the 1950 Act consolidating the school districts of Chester County into a single unit, is not a part of the bonded indebtedness of Chester County.
2. That Chester County may issue the bonds authorized by the 1949 Hospital Bond Act, provided the amount issued pursuant thereto does not exceed its constitutional debt limit.
3. That the Act of 1950, establishing Chester County into a single school district, is a valid act, and that The School District of Chester County is a valid and lawfully created school district.
4. That the indebtedness of the several school districts, formerly existing in Chester County, has been lawfully assumed by The School District of Chester County, and is to be paid by the new consolidated school district.
The appeal is upon numerous exceptions which are encompassed within the following questions submitted by respondents:
1. Is the 1950 Act, consolidating the several school districts of Chester County into the The School District of Chester County, a valid enactment?
2. Has there been assumed by Chester County, as such, the bonded indebtedness of the several school districts of the County, which existed prior to the 1950 enactment constituting Chester County into a single school district?
They will be discussed in that order. The restrictions upon the area of school districts, contained in sec. 5, art. XI of the Constitution, have undoubtedly been eliminated with respect to Chester County by the 1948-1949 amendment of the constitution which has been quoted. It provides that school districts therein shall be of such area as the General Assembly or the County Board of Education may prescribe, and appellant argues that the use of the plural implies the necessity for more than one district in the county. Incidentally, the amendment removes Chester County from the bans of subdivisions IV and IX of sec. 34 of art. III, with respect to the incorporation of a school district by special law and forbidding special laws in other cases where a general law can be made applicable, simply because of the express constitutional authorization, perforce the amendment, for the creation of school districts in that county, quoting, 'as the General Assembly * * * may prescribe.' The prescribing may reasonably, if not necessarily, be made by special act and not general law. But regardless of that result and without the necessity of depending upon it, the law here consolidates rather than incorporates, and thereby does not offend subdivision IV. Walker v. Bennett, 125 S.C. 389, 118 S.E. 779.
Appellant cites as contrary to the foregoing conclusion Kyzer v. Dent, 163 S.C. 403, 161 S.E. 690, a case which does not appear to have been cited in any subsequent decision. However, the facts there were different. It involved the effort of the legislature by special act annex two common school districts to another which the court held to be in conflict with an existing statute. We do not think the reasoning...
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