Tindle v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 05-91-01068-CV,05-91-01068-CV
• Citation: 837 S.W.2d 795
• Parties: Camille H. TINDLE, Appellant, v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Kevin W. Roberts, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 795

837 S.W.2d 795

Camille H. TINDLE, Appellant, v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Kevin W Roberts, Appellees.

No. 05-91-01068-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas,

Aug. 24, 1992.

Carl Luna, Kenneth A. Garner, Garland, for appellant.

S. Shawn Stephens, Kevin P. Erwin, Houston, John F. Bell, Jr., Ft. Worth, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, MALONEY and KAPLAN, JJ.

OPINION

THOMAS, Justice.

Camille H. Tindle appeals from a summary judgment rendered in favor of Jackson National Life Insurance Company (the insurance company) and Kevin W. Roberts (the agent) in her suit for negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. We conclude that Tindle's claims against the insurance company are barred by the compulsory-counterclaim rule embodied in rule 97(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and that Tindle has failed to challenge all of the agent's grounds for summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 1987, Tindle and her husband contacted the agent to purchase life insurance. They told the agent that they wanted Tindle to be the primary beneficiary if she survived her husband and Sasha Tindle, their minor daughter, to be the contingent beneficiary. That month, the insurance company issued a $250,000 policy on the life of Tindle's husband. In February 1988, Tindle told the agent that it was not clear to her that she was the primary beneficiary on the policy. The insurance company told the agent that it interpreted the policy to name Tindle as the primary beneficiary and Sasha as the contingent beneficiary. As a result, no change-of-beneficiary form was filed. Tindle's husband died on January 26, 1989.

On March 28, 1989, Tindle demanded that the full proceeds of the policy be paid to her. The insurance company asserted that Tindle and Sasha were co-beneficiaries under the policy. The next month, the insurance company filed an interpleader action naming Tindle and Sasha as defendants and tendered the policy proceeds into the registry of the trial court. Throughout the interpleader action, Tindle stated that she was entitled to and claimed only one-half of the policy proceeds. She agreed that Sasha was entitled to the remaining one-half of the proceeds. As a result, on November 9, 1989, the trial court entered a judgment, approved as to form by the parties, dividing the proceeds equally between Tindle and Sasha. The order further released the insurance company from further liability under the policy.

In August 1990, Tindle filed this suit against the insurance company and the agent. She alleged that the agent negligently failed to submit a change-of-beneficiary form when he was notified of the error on the policy and that the insurance company negligently told the agent that no change-of-beneficiary form was required. She further asserted that the agent and the insurance company misrepresented the effect of having both her and Sasha listed on the policy after they were informed of the mistake, causing the proceeds to be inappropriately divided. Tindle also alleged that she and her husband contracted for her to be the sole beneficiary if he predeceased her, not for her and Sasha to be co-beneficiaries. In this action, Tindle requested, inter alia, $125,000 as benefits payable under the policy and a statutory penalty for failure to pay after demand.

The insurance company moved for summary judgment alleging that Tindle's negligence, misrepresentation, and breach-of-contract claims were barred by res judicata and were compulsory counterclaims in the interpleader action. The agent moved for summary judgment on the grounds of judicial estoppel, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and collateral attack on a final judgment. The agent also incorporated the insurance company's motion for summary judgment. ¹

SUMMARY JUDGMENT--STANDARD OF REVIEW

In the first and second points of error, Tindle complains that the trial court erred in granting the motions for summary judgment. In reviewing a summary-judgment record, we apply the following standards:

1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.

3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.

Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When, as here, the trial court's judgment does not state the grounds for granting summary judgment, an appellant must show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion is insufficient to support summary judgment. McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If any ground asserted by the insurance company and the agent supports the summary judgment, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS

The insurance company asserted in its summary-judgment motion that Tindle's claims for negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of contract were compulsory counterclaims in the interpleader action. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 97. The agent, by incorporating the insurance company's motion for summary judgment into his motion, also asserted this ground. Tindle's summary-judgment response restated her present claims, but offered no specific grounds to avoid summary judgment. On appeal, Tindle argues that her present claims were not compulsory counterclaims because they are not based on the policy and they arose after the court entered the order in the interpleader action.

Rule 97 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim. TEX.R.CIV.P. 97(a). The rule was promulgated to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits. Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.1988). Rule 97 provides in relevant part as follows:

(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim within the jurisdiction of the court, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against an opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction....

TEX.R.CIV.P. 97(a) (emphasis added).

"Transaction" is a flexible term and may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much on the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship to one another. Jack H. Brown & Co. v. Northwest Sign Co., 718 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610, 46 S.Ct. 367, 371, 70 L.Ed. 750 (1926)). Texas courts apply the logical-relationship test to determine whether two causes of action arise from the same transaction or occurrence. See Jack H. Brown & Co., 718 S.W.2d at 400. Application of the rule requires that at least some of the facts be relevant to both claims. Jack H. Brown & Co., 718 S.W.2d at 400. There is no logical relationship when none of the same facts are relevant to both claims. Jack H. Brown & Co., 718 S.W.2d at 400.

In support of her contention that the present claims were not compulsory counterclaims in the interpleader action, Tindle cites Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Industrial Services, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Livingston v. Gage, 581 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). ² We conclude that Tindle's authorities are distinguishable. In Reliance Universal, Inc., the court held that a buyer's claim for negligence was not a compulsory counterclaim in the seller's action for breach of contract for failing to pay for material supplied because the claims did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 688 S.W.2d at 891. The sales contract was completed upon delivery of the materials to the buyer, and the seller's cause of action arose out of the failure to pay for the materials. On the other hand, the negligence claims arose after the sales contract was completed, and the alleged negligent acts were separate from any contract for the sale of materials. Reliance Universal, Inc., 688 S.W.2d at 891. In Livingston, the court held that a suit to recover money obtained by fraud was not a compulsory counterclaim in a prior suit for collection of a note because the two suits were based on separate transactions that occurred eight months apart. 581 S.W.2d at 192. Here, unlike in Reliance Universal, Inc. and Livingston, the interpleader action and Tindle's present claims are based upon the policy and concern payment of the policy proceeds. The actions, therefore, are based on the same transaction or occurrence and are logically related.

We have not been directed to, nor have we located, a Texas case directly on point. However, we have found a similar case in Schoeman v. New York Life Insurance Co., 106 Wash.2d 855, 726 P.2d 1 (1986) (interpreting a rule identical to TEX.R.CIV.P. 97(a)). There, the court held that a wrongful-death claim against the insurer was a compulsory counterclaim in a prior interpleader action. Schoeman, 726 P.2d at 7. Prior to the wrongful death action, the insurer filed an interpleader action and named several defendants, including the wife of the insured, as possible claimants to the insurance proceeds. Schoeman, 726 P.2d at 2. In her cross-claim, the wife charged the other defendants with responsibility for her husband's death. However, she asserted no claim against the insurer and raised no objection to the entry of an order discharging the insurer from further liability other than the amount of the interpleaded funds. Schoeman, 726 P.2d at 2. Following the conclusion of...