Tingier v. Chamberlin

• Decision Date: 09 March 1899
• Citation: 42 A. 718,71 Conn. 466
• Parties: TINGIER v. CHAMBERLIN et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

42 A. 718

71 Conn. 466

TINGIER

v. CHAMBERLIN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 9, 1899.

Case reserved from superior court, Tolland county; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Suit by Lyman T. Tingier, administrator of the estates of Eunice Chapman and Elijah S. Chapman, against James F. Chamberlin, executor of the will of Doremus D. Chapman, and others. On question reserved from the superior court of Tolland county.

The facts found in the present case are substantially the same as those stated in 70 Conn. 363, 39 Atl. 734, when, in another phase of it, this case was before this court; and for the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to recite them here at length. The plaintiff is administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, both upon the estate of Eunice Chapman and upon the estate of Elijah S. Chapman, her husband. Elijah S. Chapman died in March, 1879, leaving a will, the material portions of which were as follows: "Second. I give, devise, and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Eunice Chapman, the use and improvement, rents, profits, and income, of all my estate, real and personal and wheresoever the same may be situated; to her during her natural life. Third. I give, devise, and bequeath all my said estate, at the decease of my said wife, unto such person or persons, and in such shares or portions, as my said wife, Eunice Chapman, by her last will and testament, duly executed, shall name, designate, and appoint (provided she shall not give the same to Otis and Ambrose D. Snow, or either of them); to them and their heirs forever." He left surviving him Eunice, his widow, and three children,—Adeline, wife of Ambrose Snow, Mary, wife of Otis Snow, and Doremus. Eunice, the widow, died in April, 1884, leaving a will, in which she gave all the estate of her husband of which she had the power to dispose under his will, and all her own estate, to a trustee, in trust to pay over the net income to her son, Doremus, during his life, with power in the trustee to appropriate and apply, in his discretion, so much of the principal of the trust estate, for the purposes of the trust, as he should deem necessary. The trust estate that might remain at the death of Doremus she disposed of as follows: "Fourth. If, upon the decease of my said son, Doremus D. Chapman, any portion of said trust estate shall be remaining in the hands of said trustee, undisposed of, I authorize and direct said trustee to distribute, transfer, and convey all said remaining estate, absolutely, to such persons as would then be entitled to the same as heirs at law of the said Doremus D. Chapman, if said estate belonged to him, under the statute laws of the state of Connecticut then in force, if the same were intestate estate; that is to say, said trustee shall distribute said estate as aforesaid to those persons who are the natural heirs at law of my said son at the time of his decease." She left surviving her the three children aforesaid, and three grandchildren, children of her daughter Mary, all of whom, with the exception of her son, Doremus, are now living. Doremus, after the death of his mother, married, and subsequently, in December, 1896, died, without ever having had any child born to him. He left a widow, who is still living, and a will by which he gave all of his estate to his widow. The duly-qualified executor of his will and his widow are made parties to this suit. The trust estate, the life use of which was given to Doremus, consisted of the estate of his father, Elijah S. Chapman, and the estate of his mother, Eunice Chapman, including both real and personal estate; and what remained of both of said estates is now in the possession and control of the plaintiff, to be disposed of according to law. The complaint sets forth several questions, concerning which it is alleged that the plaintiff is in doubt; but they may all be resolved into this single question, namely, whether the disposition of what remains of these estates after the death of Doremus, contained in the will of Eunice Chapman, does or does not contravene the provisions of the statute of perpetuities in force when her will took effect, in April, 1884.

Lewis Sperry and Charles Phelps, for Mrs. Otis Snow and Mrs. Ambrose Snow.

William W. Hyde and Joel H. Reed, for Mrs. Ella H. S. Chapman.

TORRANCE, J. (after stating the facts). Under the will of her husband, Mrs. Eunice Chapman had the power to dispose by will of the remainder of her husband's estate, after her life use thereof, to such persons, except Otis and Ambrose D. Snow, and in such portions, as she pleased; and under the law, of course, she had the power to dispose of her own estate by will as she chose. By her will she gave her son, Doremus, through her trustee, the life use of the property belonging to both estates, and concerning this disposition of such property no question is made in the present case. She further provided in her will that what remained of this property after the death of Doremus should go as follows "To those persons who are the natural heirs at law of my said son at the time of his decease." Whether this is a valid or a void disposition is substantially the only question in the case, and its validity must be determined by the law as it was when her will took effect, in 1884. Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288. 292, 39 Atl. 153. At that time the statute against perpetuities (section 2952, Gen. St. 1888) was in full force, though it has since been repealed (Pub. Acts 1895, c. 249). Under this statute, as construed by this court, the issue or descendants of persons unborn at the death of a testator cannot take under his will; and a gift, devise, or bequest which may by possibility offend against the statute in this respect is void and of no effect. This has been the construction put upon the statute, whenever its construction has been before this court, for a period of nearly 70 years,— from the decision in Allyn v. Mather, 9 Conn. 114, in 1832, down to that in Security Co. v. Snow, supra, in 1898. This uniform construction for so long a period has acquired the force of a fixed rule of property, and is no longer open to doubt or question. If a gift, devise, or bequest offends against the statute as thus construed, it is void and of no effect. That the disposition here in question does thus offend against the statute is clear, beyond all question. The testatrix used the words "heirs at law" of Doremus, not as meaning his children,...