Tippett v. Hart

• Decision Date: 18 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 8368,8368
• Citation: 497 S.W.2d 606
• Parties: W. H. TIPPETT, Jr., Appellant, v. Lorean HART, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 606

497 S.W.2d 606

W. H. TIPPETT, Jr., Appellant, v. Lorean HART, Appellee.

No. 8368.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Amarillo.

June 18, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1973.

Williams, Broughton & Forbis, John T. Forbis, Childress, for appellant.

John E. Chamberlain, Memphis, for appellee.

ELLIS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment awarding damages arising from the defendant's alleged tort of interference with the plaintiff's performance of her contractual obligations under a Cropland Adjustment Agreement with the United States Department of Agriculture. This agreement prohibited grazing, under the conditions specified, upon a certain portion of plaintiff's land, and a monetary penalty was assessed against her in consequence of the non-compliance with the non-grazing provision occasioned by the defendant's unauthorized grazing of his cattle upon plaintiff's land . This conduct on defendant's part was held to be an intentional interference with the performance of her contract and resulted in the rendition of the judgment against him for the amount of the penalty assessed against her. Affirmed.

Lorean Hart, plaintiff-appellee, instituted a suit against W. H. Tippett, Jr., defendant-appellant, seeking to recover damages based upon the tort of interference alleged to have been committed by the defendant which resulted in her loss of payments under the Corpland Adjustment Program of United States Department of Agriculture, as hereinafter set out. She alleged, among other matters, that she was the owner of a tract of land containing approximately 170 acres, completely fenced, located in Hall County, Texas, and that the defendant maliciously, wrongfully, willfully and unlawfully opened the gate located on the east side of the land and turned cattle he was pasturing into her 170 acre tract. She further alleged that the defendant, without having any right to possession of the field, expressed or implied, on and before April 15, 1971, pastured her field, maliciously, willfully and unlawfully. Also, her petition set out that prior to April 15, 1971, she had entered into a contract with the United States of America, acting through the Agricultural Stabilization & Conservation Committee for Hall County, Texas, involving 121.6 acres of the 170 acre tract. She further alleged that the defendant knew of this government contract which prohibited the grazing of the cattle. She alleged that the defendant thereby knowingly and intentionally interfered with the existing contractual relationship and acted with a total disregard for her rights and thereby caused her to breach such contract and suffer damages thereby in the sum of $2,553.60, in that she would have been paid such sum if the defendant had not caused the grazing of the field. Her final allegation was to the effect that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the monetary damages suffered.

In addition to certain special exceptions to the plaintiff's pleadings, which were overruled, the defendant denied opening the gate, breaking a fence or intentionally turning any cattle under his control and management upon the land in question. Also, he specifically denied that his cattle ever grazed upon the land in question and alleged that if they did so it was because they broke through a fence or gate or went through a gate inadvertently left open. He further alleged that he never observed the cattle upon the land in question, and if their presence on the land had been called to his attention, he would have immediately removed the livestock. Also, he contended that the vegetation on the land was exceedingly sparse, and the value of the forage or feedstuff would have been substantially less than $1.00 per acre, and that there was no permanent damage done to the land even if the livestock did enter such land without the defendant's knowledge thereof.

The case was tried by the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment for the appellee. From that judgment the appellant has brought this appeal.

Pursuant to request of the defendant, the court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

'FINDINGS OF FACT

'1. Plaintiff is the owner of 170 acres of land in Hall County, Texas, involved in this suit.

'2. The 170 acres of land is enclosed by a fence with a gate on the east side of the tract.

'3. 121.6 acres of this 170 acres is, and was on the date of the acts complained of by Plaintiff, the subject of a Cropland Adjustment Agreement between Plaintiff and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which agreement provided for annual cash payments to Plaintiff for her agreement to divert acres from farm production and to maintain vegetation cover on the acres.

'4. The agreement prohibited the use of the land for grazing livestock.

'5. Sometime prior to April 15, 1971, while the agreement was in effect, the cover crop on Plaintiff's land was grazed off.

'6. Cattle were seen on the acres in question on April 15, 1971, by Larry Rogers and B. B. Gibson of the Hall County ASCS Office.

'7. Defendant opened the gate to Plaintiff's land intentionally and left it open, allowing his cattle to enter the field through the opened gate.

'8. The cattle on Plaintiff's land belonged

'8. The cattle on Plaintiff's land belonged land without her consent or knowledge.

'9. Plaintiff owned no livestock of her own.

'10. Defendant had actual knowledge that Plaintiff's government contract prohibited grazing of her land and knew of the special damages to Plaintiff if a breach occurred.

'11. Defendant admitted his liability to Plaintiff for her loss under the government contract.

'12. Defendant's acts in opening the gate and allowing his cattle to graze Plaintiff's land were intentional and done for the purpose of receiving the benefit of the use of Plaintiff's land.

'13. Plaintiff's cover grass was completely grazed off by Defendant's cattle in violation of Plaintiff's contract.

'14. The Hall County ASCS Committee assessed a penalty of $2,553.60 against Plaintiff, to be withheld from funds payable to her under her government contract.

'15. The sole reason for the penalty assessed and the damages to Plaintiff was the unauthorized grazing of Plaintiff's land by Defendant.

'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

'Defendant's act of grazing Plaintiff's land constituted an intentional interference with the performance of her government contract resulting in her breach of the contract and rendering him liable to Plaintiff for her monetary loss from such breach in the amount of $2,553.60.'

The appellant presents nine points of error. In his first five points he urges that the facts alleged by the appellee do not form the basis of a recovery for the tort of interference, but merely for the tort of trespass. Also, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the plaintiff's recovery for the tort of interference. In his points nos. 6 and 7, respectively, he contends that the trial court erred in finding that a contract existed between the appellee and an agency not a party to these proceedings which prohibited the acts of appellant complained of by appellee's pleadings, and that any contractual obligations of appellee with any third party were breached. In his points nos. 8 and 9, he asserts that there was 'no evidence' and 'insufficient evidence,' respectively, to establish the existence or breach of contractual obligations on the part of the appellee. Primarily, the appellant challenges the propriety of the court's judgment against him on the basis of the tort of interference, and, in any event, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that tort.

The nature of the tort of interference as recognized in Texas was succinctly stated in the 1907 decision by the Texas Supreme Court in the case of Lytle v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., 100 Tex. 292, 99 S.W. 396, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 437 in the following language:

'That one who willfully and without legal justification or excuse interferes so as to bring about a breach of a contract between others is guilty of an actionable wrong is no longer a question in this court.'

In 33 Tex.Jur.2d, Interference § 2, Essential Elements of Interference, at 96, we note the following statement:

'A cause of action for wrongful interference with a contract is shown where there have been intentional and willful acts, the acts were calculated to cause damage to the contracting parties in their lawful business and were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right of justifiable cause on the part of the actor, and where actual damage and loss resulted.'

Also, in the case of Cooper v. Steen, 318 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1958, no writ) the law regarding tortious interference is set forth as being any intentional invasion of or interference with property rights causing injury without just cause or excuse. Also, it was pointed out in that case the the defendant must have knowledge that his conduct will interfere with the performance of the contract.

The appellant insists that the appellee has the burden of alleging and proving by competent evidence that there was a breach of the contract in question by the appellee, Lorean Hart, and that the breach was intentionally procured or induced by the appellant in this case. He further contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the appellee breached her contract and that there is no evidence to the effect that the appellant intentionally procured or induced appellee to breach her contract. It is appellant's position that inducement or procurement is a necessary element which must be proved prior to recovery under the theory of interference and cites various cases wherein the defendant had induced one of the parties to the contract to breach that contract. In support of his position that 'inducement' is a necessary element in the tort of interference, the appellant has quoted this general statement in 33 Tex.Jur.2d Interference, § 1, at 93:

'A person who...