Tippins v. Belle Mead Development Corporation

• Decision Date: 17 October 1933
• Citation: 112 Fla. 372,150 So. 719
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: TIPPINS v. BELLE MEAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

150 So. 719

112 Fla. 372

TIPPINS v. BELLE MEAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

October 17, 1933

Rehearing Denied Nov. 24, 1933.

Suit by the Belle Mead Development Corporation against the Florida East Coast Bulb Farms, Inc., and others. From certain interlocutory orders and the final decree rendered against him, the defendant George L. Tippins appeals.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause remanded in accordance with opinion. Appeal from Circuit Court Volusia County; M. G. Rowe, Judge.

COUNSEL

Millard B. Conklin, of Daytona Beach, for appellant.

B. F Brass, of Daytona Beach, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS Chief Justice.

On the 25th day of August, 1932, a bill of complaint for the foreclosure of two mortgages--one a real estate mortgage and the other a chattel mortgage--was filed in the circuit court of Volusia county. The complainant sued as the assignee of the notes and mortgages in suit. The defendants were Florida East Coast Bulb Farms, Inc., the original mortgagor, and one George L. Tippins, an individual. In the bill, Tippins was charged with having some subordinate interest in the property sought to be foreclosed. Later, certain additional defendants were brought in by an amendment. But as this appeal is by George L. Tippins alone, from certain interlocutory orders and the final decree that was rendered against him, a consideration of the rights of any of the other defendants is made unnecessary.

On September 27, 1932, the court appointed a receiver for the mortgaged property. Inventoried as the property he took into his possession, was the following: 1,000,000 paper white narcissus bulbs, 50,000 soleil 'dor narcissus, 50,000 amaryllis replanting seedlings, 3,000 calla lilies, all plants in the field lying to the north of the residence on the bulb property, 1 Fordson tractor, 4 Bradley plows, 1 spring tooth harrow, 1 shovel, 1 hoe, 3 potato diggers, 1 spading fork. It was assumed by the receiver, and upon that assumption was his action taken, that the personal property aforesaid was the same personal property that had been on the premises of the mortgagor, at the time when the mortgage was executed, or in so far as the bulbs are concerned, that the bulbs seized were either the original bulbs, or were the outgrowth of the original bulbs, or the product thereof.

The real property sought to be foreclosed in the suit was simply described in the mortgage as certain real estate (giving legal description), together with all tenements hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and 'the rents, issues and profits thereof.' The chattel mortgage was described as having been given upon 'all the goods, chattels and personal property mentioned in the schedule hereunto annexed and now in its (mortgagor's) possession.' The annexed schedule referred to was as follows: 1,000,000 paper white narcissus; 100,000 soleildor narcissus; 20,000 gladiola; 12,000 Roman hyacinths; 400 hybrid amaryllis; 50,000 hybrid amaryllis seedlings; 3,000 Godfrey callas; 1 Fordson tractor No. 505036; 4 David Bradley plows; 1 three-section spring tooth harrow; shovels, rakes, and small tools.

As to the personal property described in the schedule annexed to the chattel mortgage as being in the mortgagor's possession at the time of execution, that mortgage was good as between the mortgagor and mortgagee. This is so, notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 10279, Acts of 1925 (sections 5741, 5742, C. G. L.).

We have held in a companion appeal in this same case taken by a different defendant (Weber v. Belle Mead Development Corporation, 150 So. 594) that the effect of the 1925 statute was not to invalidate any chattel mortgage on agricultural, horticultural, or fruit crops that would have been valid and enforceable between the parties without the statute.

In the opinion just mentioned, it was held that the 1925 statute merely established as to crop mortgages, three distinct rules: (1) It recognized an existing right, and extended that right, by providing for the giving of valid chattel mortgages on agricultural, horticultural, and fruit crops, in those cases where, but for the statute, a chattel mortgage would be invalid, for example, an instrument given as a mortgage on products to be grown, the mortgage being made before preparation of the yearly crop began; (2) it fixed and defined the exclusive method by which any and all crop mortgages given on agricultural, horticultural, and fruit crops can be made a valid lien as against subsequent incumbrances and subsequent purchasers without notice, that is to say, it requires such mortgages to contain a description of the land upon which the crops are grown, or are to be grown, and requires such mortgages to be recorded, in order to bind third parties; (3) it limits the authority to give a valid mortgage on future crops prior to the time preparation of same is begun, to those mortgages only wherein the land on which such crops are to be produced, is definitely described in the mortgage.

The statute, as we have just pointed out, was not intended to render invalid, as between the parties to it, an ordinary mortgage lien on agricultural, horticultural, or fruit crops, in those cases where, under the laws of this state as they had been construed by judicial decisions prior to the statute, such mortgage lien could have been created and held good inter partes.

Therefore the chattel mortgage sued on in this suit, being a mortgage on an annual crop of growing bulbs, which, it is alleged, was in existence at the time it was given, was not unenforceable between the parties to it, regardless of whether it is enforceable against third parties or not. See Shomaker & Co. v. Waters & Davis, 56 Fla. 559, 47 So. 936. Compare Farmers' Union Warehouse Co. v. T. L. Wells & Bros., 65 Fla. 350, 61 So. 745; Davis v. Horne, 54 Fla. 563, 45 So. 476, 127 Am. St. Rep. 151.

The bill of complaint, also, was filed to foreclose a mortgage on real estate. Upon such mortgaged real estate it was alleged there was being grown and produced a large number of mortgaged bulbs, that these bulbs required constant care and cultivation in order to be available to complainant for subjection to its mortgaged security. As against the mortgagor, at least, the circuit court, taking into consideration the allegations of the bill made in support of the prayer for receiver, was warranted in the appointment of a receiver to take charge of, manage, and operate the res in suit. Especially is this true...