Tirado v. City of Torrington

• Decision Date: 09 January 2018
• Docket Number: AC 39273
• Citation: 179 A.3d 258,179 Conn.App. 95
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Brenda I. TIRADO v. CITY OF TORRINGTON

179 Conn.App. 95

179 A.3d 258

Brenda I. TIRADO

v.CITY OF TORRINGTON

AC 39273

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 24, 2017

Officially released January 9, 2018

Brenda I. Tirado, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Jaime M. LaMere, corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).

Keller, Elgo and Bear, Js.

BEAR, J.

The plaintiff, Brenda I. Tirado, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to her failure to (1) file her complaint within one year of the tax assessment pursuant to General Statutes § 12–119, and (2) exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing an action pursuant to General Statutes § 12–117a.¹ We agree that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit pursuant to § 12–117a, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On March 22, 2010, the city of Waterbury issued a certificate of change for the 2004 grand list, removing the plaintiff's motor vehicle therefrom, after receiving information from the plaintiff that she resided in Torrington on October 1, 2004.² The city of Waterbury forwarded its certificate of change to the defendant, the city of Torrington. On March 24, 2010, after receiving the Waterbury certificate of change, the defendant's tax assessor issued a certificate of change and added the plaintiff's motor vehicle to its 2004 grand list.³

On February 10, 2014, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the judicial district of Waterbury, claiming that the defendant issued a certificate of change after the three year statutory limit set forth in General Statutes § 12–57.⁴ On March 3, 2014, the defendant filed an answer, denying that the expiration of any limitations period required the defendant's tax assessor's office to remove the plaintiff's name from the list of individuals owing taxes to the defendant. On October 20, 2015, the plaintiff filed a certificate of closed pleadings and a claim for trial.

On February 8, 2016, the court, Shapiro, J. , granted the defendant's motion to transfer the matter to the judicial district of Litchfield because an aggrieved taxpayer must bring an application for relief in the judicial district where the town or city is located. See General Statutes §§ 12–117a and 12–119.

On April 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support thereof, claiming that the defendant acted without authority when it added the plaintiff's motor vehicle to its 2004 grand list on March 24, 2010, pursuant to General Statutes § 12–60. On April 27, 2016, the defendant objected to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, arguing that the certificate of change was issued pursuant to § 12–57 (b), not § 12–60. On April 28, 2016, the plaintiff filed a reply brief in further support of her motion for summary judgment, but she withdrew her summary judgment motion on May 4, 2016. Thereafter, on May 12, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant's answer, which the court, Shah, J. , denied on May 17, 2016, on the grounds that the motion was untimely filed more than two years after the filing of the defendant's answer and did not contain an accompanying memorandum that was required pursuant to Practice Book § 10–39.

A one day bench trial took place on May 17, 2016. Following trial, the court rendered a judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because "[t]he plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before she filed the present action pursuant to ... § 12–117a.... She also failed to file her complaint within one year of the assessment if she had proceeded under ... § 12–119."⁵ (Citations omitted.) This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. "A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stones Trail, LLC v. Weston , 174 Conn. App. 715, 735, 166 A.3d 832, cert. dismissed, 327 Conn. 926, 171 A.3d 59 (2017).

In the present case, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was raised by the court sua sponte, as it was entitled to do.⁶ "[I]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction .... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 736, 166 A.3d 832. "[W]henever it is found ... that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss the action." Practice Book § 10–33.

Because our determination of whether the court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends, in part, on whether § 12–119 or § 12–117a applies to the plaintiff's claim, we first address the plaintiff's argument on appeal that §§ 12–119 and 12–117a do not apply to an appeal of a tax assessment under §§ 12–57 and 12–60.⁷ We agree with the plaintiff that the court erred in ruling that § 12–119 was applicable to her claim, and that she violated § 12–119, but we disagree with her that the court erred in ruling that § 12–117a was applicable to her claim.

"When a taxpayer is aggrieved by the assessment of his property, there are statutory procedures in place for the taxpayer to challenge the assessment. [T]he legislature has established two primary methods by which taxpayers may challenge a town's assessment or revaluation of their property. First, any taxpayer claiming to be aggrieved by an action of an assessor may appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 12–111, to the town's board of [assessment appeals]. The taxpayer may then appeal, pursuant to ... § [12–117a], an adverse decision of the town's board of [assessment appeals] to the Superior Court. The second method of challenging an assessment or revaluation is by way of § 12–119." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat , 253 Conn. 531, 537, 754 A.2d 153 (2000).

Our Supreme Court has defined the applicability of § 12–119 as follows: "[ Section] 12–119 allows a taxpayer one year to bring a claim that the tax was imposed by a town that had no authority to tax the subject property, or that the assessment was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of [the] property .... The first category in the statute embraces situations where a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the municipality where it is situated .... The second category consists of claims that assessments are (a) manifestly excessive and (b) ... could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of statutes for determining the valuation of the property." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 537–38, 754 A.2d 153. Thus, "[§] 12–119 addresses two different types of cases: (1) When it is claimed that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town or city in whose tax list such property was set; and (2) a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and [must] have been arrived at ... by disregarding the [proper] ... valuation of such property ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 538, 754 A.2d 153.

In the present case, the plaintiff filed an action, claiming that the defendant acted without authority when it issued a certificate of change for the 2004 grand list because it was prohibited from doing so by the three year statute of limitations in § 12–57 (a).⁸ We agree with the plaintiff that this claim does not fall within the scope of the categories of claims available under § 12–119. The first category of § 12–119 does not apply because the plaintiff admitted that she lived in Torrington on October 1, 2004, and she thus is not claiming that the tax in question "has been laid on property not taxable in the town or city in whose tax list such property was set ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat , supra, 253 Conn. at 538, 754 A.2d 153 ; cf. Hotshoe Enterprises, LLC v. Hartford , 284 Conn. 833, 836–37, 937 A.2d 689 (2008) (owners of condominium hangar units at airport brought action pursuant to § 12–119, claiming that property was tax exempt as "land ... held in trust ... for state-owned airport"); Faith Center, Inc. v. Hartford , 192 Conn. 434, 435, 472 A.2d 16 (religious organization brought action pursuant to § 12–119, claiming that its property was tax exempt), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 432, 83 L.Ed.2d 359 (1984). The second category of § 12–119 does not apply because the plaintiff does not claim that the tax is "manifestly excessive" in that it "disregard[s] the [proper] ... valuation of [the] property ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat , supra, at 538, 754 A.2d 153 ; cf. Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P. v. Bridgeport , 320 Conn. 332, 340–41, 133 A.3d 402 (2016) (plaintiff brought action pursuant to, inter alia, § 12–119, claiming that "valuations were excessive"); Griswold Airport, Inc. v. Madison , 289...