Tison v. Labeaume

• Decision Date: 31 March 1851
• Citation: 14 Mo. 198
• Parties: TISON v. LABEAUME.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

14 Mo. 198

TISON

v.LABEAUME.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1851.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT.

WILLIAMS, for Plaintiffs. Two propositions were submitted: 1. That Mrs. Tison and Mrs. Debetre were, in 1836, when their deed was obtained for $100, the owners of one-half of the land therein described; which was worth at that time $20,000 or $30,000. 2. That the inadequacy of consideration, with the circumstances surrounding and influencing the grantees, was fully sufficient to insure the relief sought.

I. The land was originally Paul G. Kiercereau's. Livre Terrein, No. 2, p. 34. It was sold at public sale in 1779, and purchased by Francois Delorier, the father of complainants, who was at that time a married man. This sale was legal and valid. 8 Peters, 308. Delorier being a married man, by virtue of the Spanish law then in force here, his wife took one-half of the land. Savenat v. LaBreton, 1 La. R. 522; Picotte v. Cooley, 10 Mo. R. 312. On the death of Mrs. Delorier in 1802, her interest descended to her children, Mrs. Tison and Debetre. Broussard v. Bernard, 7 La. R. 222; Savenat v. LaBreton, supra; Saul v. Creditors, 5 Martin, 580; Davidson v. Stewart, 10 La. R. 148; Partidas, and 10 Mo. R. 312. The land was confirmed by act of Congress of 29th April, 1816, to Paul G. Kiercereau's legal representatives. At that time they were Louis Labeaume for one-half, and Mrs. Tison and Debetre the other half, in this way. In 1808, after the death of his wife, Francois Delorier sold the tract to Louis Labeaume, and conveyed it by deed. That deed transferred only the interest of Delorier. The community that had existed between himself and wife, was dissolved at her death, and he could not sell and convey her interest, for it had descended to her children. Broussard v. Bernard supra. The confirmation did not, as has been contended by defendant's counsel, put the title into Labeaume. It is true that he presented the claim to the recorder; but, as claimant, he occupied an entirely different position from those presenting their claims before the boards of commissioners, under the acts of 1805, 1807 and 1832. Then, in 1836, Mrs. Tison, and Mrs. Debetre and her husband, were the rightful owners of one-half of the land described in their deed to Susan Labeaume. These old ladies were both married prior to the change of government, and remained femes covert till four or five years ago; so that no laches could be imputed to them. Mrs. Tison held her position in her own right, her husband having but a life-estate, from the fact that they had no marriage contract creating any community, and the law created none in paraphernal property. A succession, accruing to the wife during coverture, is paraphernal property, and without a marriage contract so directing and controling, does not enter into community. Flower v. O'Conner, 8 Martin, 556. Mrs. Debetre and husband had a marriage contract, which, by its terms, created a community in all property held or to be held in any way; so that they owed her one-fourth jointly. Picotte v. Cooley, 10 Mo. R. 312. From this view of the case. Mrs. Tison owned one-fourth of the whole tract of land conveyed in 1836, in which her husband had a life-estate, and Mrs. Debetre and her husband owned another fourth jointly.

II. Was the deed of those old women to Susan Labeaume obtained fraudulently? Was there fraud in fact, of such presumption of fraud as to vitiate the deed and reinstate the parties? 1st. Was there fraud in fact used in its obtainment? I think so, for the following reasons: Louis A. Labeaume, the son and agent of his mother, to whom the land had been devised by her husband, in his answer to the bill, acknowledges that he had been informed of the defect of title by Josiah Spalding, Esq., but that he believed the title was good in his mother. At all events, he thought so little of it that he took no steps to perfect the matter from May or June, till October. At that date, he drew up a deed at St. Louis, in the English language, and went for the first time in his life to see the old women. When he reached Florissant, where they lived, what took place? He saw the old ladies, Mrs. Tison first, whom he got the consent of, to Tison for ten dollars. But on going for Mrs. Debetre, she thought he should pay them more, as they were very poor. At last, after talking some time, out of charity, he agreed to pay them $50 each. In the interview, he represented to them that the land had been sold by their father to his father, but that the deed was defective. That their deed would be worth nothing to him; that they had a mere shadow of claim; that he only wished to save litigation; that theirs was a mere pretense which he wished to purchase; read the deed and explained it to them just as it was upon its face, &c. He heard the old women appeal to their husbands, and they answered that it was their own matter--“do as you please,” and he opened not his mouth. He told them that the defect in their father's deed was such as might be cured by a suit, but that he did not want to sue them, &c. I hardly state the conversation as strongly against him as his answer sets it out, but it seems to me sufficient to fix upon him the charge of fraud most indubitably. He knew that Tison was entitled to a life-estate. He knew Debetre was entitled to half of his wife's interest, and yet he was silent when they said there w no interest wever in them. 1 Story's Eq. Ju. 197, and following; East v. Matheny, 1 A. K. Marsh. 192; Shackford v. Handley, 1 A. K. Marsh. 500; Belcher v. Belcher, 10 Yerger, 121; Lewis v. McLemore, 10 Yerger, 206; Harding v. Randall, 15 Maine R. 332; McConnell v. Wilcox, 1 Scam. 365; Bryan v. Primm, Breese, 33; Waters v. Mattingly, 1 Bibb, 244; White v. Flora, 2 Tenn. R. 429; Smith v. Richards, 13 Peters, 26; Needer v. Fonda, 3 Paige, 94; Livingston v. Pennsylvania Iron Works, 2 Paige, 390; Woods v. Hall, 1 Dev. Eq. 411. 2nd. But if there were no fraud in fact, are you not forced to presume it from the circumstances of the case? Inadequacy of consideration alone, if so gross as to shock the conscience, or make one exclaim, no one in his senses would have made such a bargain! will be sufficient to set aside a deed, unless explained. Here the inadequacy was enormous--one hundred dollars paid for thirty thousand dollars worth of land. 1 Story's Eq. Ju. 250, &c. 2 Kent's Com. 482; 2 Johns. Ch. R. 1; 14 Johns. Ch. R. 527; 4 Johns. Ch. R. 118; 3 Cowen, 445, 518, 537, 590; Gilman, 230; 2 Root, 216; 3 McLean, 332; 1 Dessau. 250; 2 Dessau. 636; 3 Dessau. 292; 4 Dessau. 652, 687; 9 Cond. Eng. Ch. R. 65; 1 Starkie, 352; 1 Bro. C. C. 68; 2 Bro. C. C. 167-75; 10 Vesey, 209; 2 P. Williams, 293; 7 Bro. Par. Cases, 70. Although from mere inadequacy when very gross, fraud will be inferred, yet it is a stronger case where other circumstances are connected with it. 6 Har. & Johns. 435; 21 Maine, 474; 7 Law R. 100; 1 Munford, 557; 1 Munford, 519; 2 Litt. 118; 1 Atkins, 301; 1 Vesey, 503; 2 Vesey, 161, 257, 155; Car. Temp. Talb. 111; 2 Vesey, 155; 1 Bro. C. C. 124; and the cases before referred to, and particularly the great case in 3 Dessau. 292. In no case of the hundreds that exist, have the circumstances surrounding the parties been such as to call more loudly upon a court of equity for relief, than in the one at bar. The purchaser had the advice of distinguished counsel--was a man well educated and highly intelligent--a man remarkable for his shrewdness and ability to manage his affairs--was wealthy and influential, and he sought out parties whose deed he procured for the very purpose of getting it. The grantees were married women--very old, one of them 65, the other near 70 years old. They were very ignorant--could neither read nor write, nor could they speak any language but the French. They were certainly induced to make the deed by the representations of Labeaume. They were not told that they had any estate in the land, &c., but were induced to believe that theirs was a mere shadow, a pretense. Nor did the husbands know that they had any interest whatever i the property; whereas one had a life-estate ten times more valuable than the amount paid for the fee. The other owned one-eighth absolutely, and yet neither of them got a cent. They were not told to consult counsel, or friends, but to come into town and acknowledge the deed, and they would be paid. They came, and during that visit they were with Labeaume all day--dined at his mother's where they had never before been seen, and those with whom they had always before stopped saw nothing of them. No such case, taken in all its phases, can be found on record. But in conclusion, if there was no fraud in fact, and fraud will not be presumed from the inadequacy of consideration and disparity in condition and position of the parties, ought not the deed to be canceled on the ground of mutual mistake? The old women certainly made their marks, confiding in the representations of Labeaume, which were all false, whether he knew they were or not. Mutual mistake is good ground for relief. See the cases before referred to, and the strong case of Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172. In any and all views of the controversy, it does appear to me that the court are forced to grant the relief sought. I say forced, for unless they are in a measure compelled to do so, I know the difficulties that environ the administrators of the law. You have great desires to keep claimants in possession of their lands, and in all such cases as this, the influence of wealth and family is necessarily felt, and too often has controling effect upon the bench--the judges being but poor, frail mortals at best. It seems to me however that there is not a case where any appeal can be successfully made in favor of defendants, on the ground that it is upsetting their titles, and such like scare-crow argument, too often resorted to in the halls of justice, but better suited to frighten others than those whose...