Titcomb v. Carroll
| Decision Date | 26 June 1934 |
| Citation | 287 Mass. 131 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | ALBERT C. TITCOMB, trustee, v. J. E. CARROLL& others. |
December 7, 1932.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., CROSBY, PIERCE FIELD, & LUMMUS, JJ.
Real or Personal Property. Estoppel.
A lot of land was leased for several years to be used as a location for a dining car. The lessee then purchased a heavy dining car of "stock pattern" under a contract of conditional sale, and later gave a chattel mortgage thereof. The car was rolled on its own wheels to the lot and remained there on the wheels for a time. Subsequently, large wooden blocks were substituted for one pair of wheels. Still later, a wall was built adjacent to the car, in such a manner that the ends of eight steel beams running crosswise under the floor of the car rested on wooden blocks embedded in the wall, the ends of two truss rods attached to the ends of the car projected into the wall, and the car could be readily removed from the lot but not without substantial injury to the wall. The car was not peculiarly adapted to use on the lot in question, nor was it or the wall essential to the enjoyment of the land in its condition at the time when the car was placed thereon or the time when the wall was built. Held, that (1)The car did not become a part of the realty when it rested on its wheels or thereafter when wooden blocks were substituted for a pair of the wheels previous to the building of the wall; (2) After the building of the wall, the car was not within the class of property which is part of the realty irrespective of the intention of the parties, but was within the class of property, the nature of which, as real or personal, depends in part on the intention of the parties; (3) The physical facts with respect to the car and the mode of its attachment to the land, which were not as matter of law conclusive of the nature of the car as real or personal property, but were to be weighed with other facts showing intention, did not preclude a finding that the car remained personal property if such was the manifested intention of the parties to the lease; (4) The evidences of the intention of such parties that the car should remain personalty overcame any inference of intention, that the car should become a part of the realty, which might be drawn from its mode of annexation to the land; (5) The proper conclusion was that the car remained personalty and the property of the lessee subject to the chattel mortgage.
One, who had purchased the land above described, subject to certain leases and tenancies, including "Dining car," subsequent to the erection of the wall and without knowledge of the time when or the circumstances in which it was built and without other notice of the lessee's title to the car, commenced a suit in equity against the lessee and the mortgagee to enjoin the removal of the car from the land after the expiration of the lease. The plaintiff made no claim that the car belonged to him until shortly before the commencement of the suit. Held, that (1) The defendant lessee was not estopped to remove the car; (2) A decree favorable to the defendants was proper.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on February 11, 1932, and afterwards amended, described in the opinion.
The suit was referred to a master. Material findings by him are stated in the opinion. By order of Whiting, J., an interlocutory decree confirming the master's report was entered; and by order of Gray, J., the final decree described in the opinion was entered. The plaintiff appealed from the final decree.
W. P. Everts, for the plaintiff. H. Hoffman, for the defendants.
This is a suit in equity wherein the plaintiff seeks to have determined the title to an alleged building situated on land of the plaintiff and to enjoin the defendants McAndrews and Carroll from removing it. By amendment the Union Market National Bank was joined as defendant, the plaintiff alleging that said bank claims to be the owner of a mortgage upon said building. The case was referred to a master who made a report which was confirmed. Thereafter a final decree was entered adjudging that the so called building -- a dining or lunch car -- situated on the land of the plaintiff is personal property in which the plaintiff has no right, title or interest, but that it is the property of the defendant Carroll subject to a chattel mortgage held by the defendant Union Market National Bank; and the plaintiff appealed.
The decree was right. The facts admitted by the answers or found by the master include the following: In September, 1925, Anna A Walker and Alice M. Morse, predecessors in title to the plaintiff, leased to the defendant McAndrews and one John J O'Leary, for a term of three years from September 1, 1925, "a lot of land . . . in Watertown . . . in rear of
591 Mt. Auburn Street . . . to be used as location for dining car." The lease was extended for an additional term of three years, but has not been further extended. The defendant McAndrews and said O'Leary bought a dining or lunch car under a conditional sale agreement dated October 15, 1925, which contained a provision that title thereto should remain in the vendor until payment in full of the purchase price. The car was placed on the leased land. At some time said O'Leary assigned his interest in the lease, and sold his interest in the dining or lunch car, to the defendant McAndrews. October 31, 1929, the defendant McAndrews gave a chattel mortgage of the dining or lunch car to one Busconi, which was duly recorded in the town clerk's office, to secure the payment of a promissory note of said defendant McAndrews, and this note and chattel mortgage were assigned by said Busconi to the defendant bank as collateral security for his own promissory note. Both notes are unpaid. May 4, 1931, the plaintiff entered into a written agreement to acquire by exchange from Alliston D. Walker -- whose title does not seem to be questioned -- "a certain parcel of land with the building thereon . . . said building being numbered 583 to 591 on . . . Mt. Auburn Street," subject to certain leases and tenancies including "Dining car in rear of said building . . . leased to Dennis McAndrew expiring September 1, 1931." (This numbered building was not the dining or lunch car.) May 21, 1931, one Burr, "a straw man for said Alliston D.Walker," conveyed to the plaintiff by a deed in statutory form with quitclaim covenants "a certain parcel of land with the buildings thereon situate and now numbered 583-591 Mt. Auburn Street in Watertown, XXX Being the same premises conveyed by Alliston D. Walker to the grantor herein by deed dated May 6, 1931," subject to "several tenancies and leases." The defendant McAndrews paid rent under his lease through the month of May, 1931. August 31, 1931, the defendant McAndrews notified the plaintiff that he was to vacate the leased premises by November 30, 1931. The plaintiff made no claim that the dining or lunch car belonged to him until early in 1932, after the defendant McAndrews had notified him that he was going to move it from the premises. It has not been removed.
The dining or lunch car is a "stock pattern car," weighing...
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