Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local No. 25, 36137

• Full Citation: Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local No. 25, 383 P.2d 504, 62 Wn.2d 461 (Wash. 1963)
• Decision Date: 03 July 1963
• Citation: 62 Wn.2d 461,383 P.2d 504
• Docket Number: No. 36137,36137
• Parties: E. P. TITUS and E. R. Faure, Respondents, v. TACOMA SMELTERMEN'S UNION LOCAL #25, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a labor organization, and William Lee, in his individual capacity, and as Business Agent of said Union, and Floyd Martin, in his individual capacity, and as President of said Union, and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a labor organization, and Thomas McGuire, in his individual capacity, and as General Agent of said Union, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 461

62 Wn.2d 461

383 P.2d 504

E. P. TITUS and E. R. Faure, Respondents, v. TACOMA SMELTERMEN'S UNION LOCAL #25, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a labor organization, and William Lee, in his individual capacity, and as Business Agent of said Union, and Floyd Martin, in his individual capacity, and as President of said Union, and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a labor organization, and Thomas McGuire, in his individual capacity, and as General Agent of said Union, Appellants.

No. 36137.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

July 3, 1963.

John Caughlan, Seattle, Paul Braune, Tacoma, for appellants.

Hugo Metzler, Jr., Tacoma, for respondents.

HUNTER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment for damages in favor of the plaintiffs (respondents), E. P. Titus and E. R. Faure, against the defendants (appellants), Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local #25 and two of its officers and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the parent organization, and one international representative.

The plaintiffs were nonunion laboratory employees of the Tacoma plant of the American Smelting and Refining Company. They brought two causes of action against the defendants. The first cause of action was for the recovery of lost wages caused by the defendants' unlawful interference with the plaintiffs' employment contract consisting of conduct on the part of the defendants which forced the Tacoma plant to discontinue operations. The second cause of action was for the recovery of lost wages caused by the defendants' unlawful interference with the plaintiffs' employment contract together with damages resulting from an assault by two members of the local union which occurred while the plaintiffs were attempting to cross a picket line to assume their employment duties.

The trial court awarded summary judgment against the defendants for the damages consisting of the plaintiffs' lost wages prayed for in both the first and second causes of action. Judgment for damages resulting from the assault alleged in the second cause of action was awarded upon a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. This appeal followed.

The defendants assign error to the trial court's granting of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in their first cause of action and its failing to grant the defendants' motion for a summary judgment dismissing this cause of action.

The plaintiffs' claim for damages in the first cause of action was based upon the following pertinent facts which they alleged in their complaint:

'VIII. Local #25 as collective bargaining representative and the Tacoma Plant as employer, entered into a collective bargaining Agreement dated June 29, 1956, hereinafter referred to as 'Agreement' covering the employees in the collective bargaining unit mentioned in Paragraph VI hereof, Article VIII, Subsection 'F') of said Agreement, provides in part as follows:

'There shall be no work stoppage nor a threat of the same on the part of an individual or a group, nor a lock-out on the part of the Company, while a grievance is in the course of being presented, investigated, considered or arbitrated. In the event of such stoppage, any investigation, consideration, or arbitration of a grievance will be automatically suspended until such stoppage is ended and employees have returned to work.'

'That the Tacoma Plant, at all times hereinafter mentioned, had fully complied with the terms and conditions contained in said Agreement.'

'IX. Upon March 13, 1959, the Tacoma Plant was shut down by reason of the occurrence of a series of incidents commencing on February 1st and consisting of slow-downs, refusal to perform assigned duties, numerous work stoppages of short duration, and demonstration within the Plant on the part of employees in such collective bargaining unit, and on the part of Local #25. Such conduct was designed and intended by Local #25 and members of its bargaining unit to force the Tacoma Plant to discontinue operations. The plaintiffs are informed and believe that therefor alleged that the International, acting through its authorized representatives, agents and officers and in concert with Local #25, encouraged, ratified and assisted in such incidents for the sole purpose of compelling the Tacoma Plant to suspend operations.

'X. The incidents referred to in paragraph IX hereof were occasioned by defendant's attempt to illegally coerce the management of the Tacoma Plant to resolve a settlement of a grievance in its favor contrary to the terms of Article VIII of the Agreement. The United States District Court, Western District of Washington, Southern Division, determined the closure of the Tacoma Plant to be in violation of the Agreement and order the defendants to cease and desist from continuing or reinstigating any of the instances set forth in paragraph IX hereof; as more particularly appears from the files and records of the District Clerk's Office in Cause No. 2403. As a result of said decision, the Tacoma Plant resumed operation and its employees continued their work without further interference with employees by the defendants. (Italics ours.)'

As to the defendants' liability for the unlawful interference with the plaintiffs' employment contracts, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was supported only by the affidavit of Robert E. Shinkoskey, the manager of the Tacoma plant. The following constituted the part of Mr. Shinkoskey's affidavit pertinent to this issue:

'That heretofore and during the months of February and March, 1959, members of the Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, Local No. 25, engaged in a concerted effort, in that they refused to perform normal work loads, refused to perform assigned duties, created work stoppages of short duration and held demonstrations within the Plant; and, that as a result of such conduct, the Laboratory of the Tacoma Plant was unable to operate and closed from April 14, 1959 to May 18, 1959, and was reopened by reason of an order made and entered, upon the application of the Tacoma Plant, by the Honorable Judge Boldt, sitting as Judge of the United States District Court, Western District of Washington, Southern Division, ordering the Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, Local No. 25, and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, to cease and desist from continuing or instigating any of the instances set forth hereinabove.'

The plaintiffs contend the breach of the defendants' collective bargaining contract with the Tacoma plant constituted, as a matter of law, illegal and unjustifiable interference with their contracts of employment.

The defendants contend the above pleadings and affidavit excerpts do not show an illegal interference with the plaintiffs' contracts but, on the contrary, show nothing more than a breach of an agreement between the union and the Tacoma plant to which the plaintiffs are not parties.

It is well-recognized that one may be liable for his interference with the contract relations of others unless such interference is justified. See Carpenter, Interference With Contract Relations, 41 Harv.L.Rev. 728; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766. However, where one does not induce the promisor to break the contract nor acts for the purpose of such interference or with knowledge that such interference will result, but merely interferes with the contract in an incidental or indirect manner, no liability exists. See Carpenter, supra; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766. As explained in RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766(d):

'* * * The rule stated in this Section applies to any purposeful causation whether by inducement or otherwise. The essential thing is the purpose to cause the result. If the actor does not have this purpose, his conduct does not subject him to liability under this rule even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the third person from dealing with the other. It is not necessary, however, that the purpose to cause the breach of contract or failure to deal be the actor's sole or paramount purpose. It is sufficient that he designs this result whether because he desires it as an end in itself or because he regards it as a necessary, even if regrettable, means to some other end * * *' (Italics ours.)

We fail to find any statement in the plaintiffs' pleadings or supporting affidavit indicating the defendants acted for the purpose of terminating or interfering with the plaintiffs' employment contracts. There is no evidence that the defendants' conduct was for any purpose other than to obtain a favorable disposition of its grievances with the Tacoma plant. Allegation No. X of the plaintiffs is consistent with this finding:

'The incidents referred to in Paragraph IX hereof, were occasioned by said defendants' attempt to illegally coerce the management of the Tacoma Plant to resolve a settlement of a grievance in its favor, contrary to the terms of Article VIII of the Agreement. * * *'

We agree with the defendants. At most, the plaintiffs have shown a breach of contract between the union and the Tacoma plant. The plaintiffs were not intended to be a beneficiary of this contract and therefore may not hold the defendants liable for damages resulting from its breach. Pacific Mercantile Agency v. First Nat. Bank, 187 Wash. 149, 60 P.2d 6 (1936).

Because of our disposition of this cause of action, as discussed above, we need not consider the plaintiffs' contentions that the defendants' conduct was illegal nor their citation to American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, 175 F.Supp. 750 (W.D.Washington, S.D.1959), in support of it.

The plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment in the first cause of action should have been denied and the defendants' motion for dismissal of the first cause of action by summary judgment should have been granted.

In regard to the second cause of action, the defendants assign numerous errors to the trial court's rulings in denying the introduction of evidence and...