Tkachik v. Mandeville, Docket No. 138460.

• Decision Date: 27 July 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. 138460.,Calendar No. 2.
• Citation: 790 N.W.2d 260
• Parties: Susan TKACHIK, Personal Representative of the Estate of Janet Mandeville, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank MANDEVILLE, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

790 N.W.2d 260

Susan TKACHIK, Personal Representative of the Estate of Janet Mandeville, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Frank MANDEVILLE, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 138460.
Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 12, 2010.
Decided July 27, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

790 N.W.2d 262

Penzien Hirzel, PLLC, (by Charles M. Penzien), Clinton Township, for plaintiff.

Cashen & Strehl (by William K. Cashen), Shelby Township, for defendant.

Judith A. Curtis, Grosse Pointe, amicus curiae, for the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan.

Opinion MARKMAN, J.

This case presents a relatively narrow question, one that is accessible to both the lay and legal reader: whether a husband who has abandoned his wife for the final 18 months of her life while she was battling cancer, who had no personal contact with her during this period, and who did not even attend her funeral, should have to contribute his share of the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments that the wife alone paid during her final months on real properties that they owned together. In legal terms, the question becomes whether the doctrine of contribution can be applied between co-tenants in a tenancy by the entirety where one spouse has willfully abandoned the other before that spouse's death and, thus, is not a “surviving spouse.” See MCL 700.2801(2)(e)( i ). In either iteration of the question before this Court, the core issue is the same, and the inequities in this case are inescapable. Accordingly, the resolution of this case turns exclusively on whether the firmly established doctrine of contribution can be appropriately applied on these facts. Because

there is no adequate remedy at law for the harm plaintiff alleges, because no other governing legal or equitable principle precludes this remedy, and because the relief plaintiff seeks-when properly understood-will not upset the common law of this state, we conclude that the equitable doctrine of contribution can be appropriately applied in this context. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the probate court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND HISTORY

Janet and Frank Mandeville were married in 1975 and remained so until Janet died on July 13, 2002, after a battle with

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breast cancer. The Mandevilles acquired two properties during their marriage. In 1984, they acquired a marital residence in Macomb County, and, in 1987, they acquired a parcel of property in Ogemaw County. They owned both properties as tenants by the entirety. Accordingly, by the right of survivorship inherent in a tenancy by the entirety, the marital real properties passed to Frank upon Janet's death. Without question, he now owns them in fee simple absolute.

In the last decade of their marriage, Frank Mandeville was often out of the country for extended periods. Specifically, he was absent for the 18 months preceding Janet's death. During this period, Frank did not attempt to call Janet or otherwise communicate with her, even though, as he acknowledged, he knew that she was seriously ill. He did not attend her funeral. In Frank's absence, Janet maintained the properties and was responsible for paying the taxes, insurance, and mortgage. In Frank's absence, Janet was cared for by her sister, Susan Tkachik.

In the months before she died, Janet executed a living trust and final will that disinherited her husband and left everything to her mother, Wanda Tkachik. Janet's will stated: “It is my specific intent to give nothing to my husband under this Trust Agreement. If I am survived by my husband, for the purposes of this Trust Agreement, he will be deemed to have predeceased me.” In addition, the will named Susan Tkachik (hereafter Tkachik) the personal representative of the estate. Tkachik now brings this action in that capacity. Moreover, consistent with Janet's unequivocal intent to disinherit her husband in her will, before she died, Janet also transferred her retirement benefits so that they would not pass to Frank, and she unsuccessfully attempted to defeat the right of survivorship by transferring her interest in the marital properties by quitclaim deed.

Several months after Janet's death, Frank Mandeville filed a petition for probate as well as a complaint seeking to set aside Janet's will and trust. Tkachik, acting as the personal representative of her deceased sister's estate, moved for summary disposition, arguing that Frank Mandeville should not be considered a surviving spouse because he had been willfully absent from the marriage for more than a year. ¹ Applying the clear language of MCL 700.2801(2), the probate court

ruled that Frank Mandeville was not a “surviving spouse” and granted plaintiff's motion in October 2003.

In November 2003, Tkachik filed suit on behalf of the estate in probate court to effectuate her sister's intent to disinherit Frank Mandeville completely. Plaintiff sought a determination that, because defendant was not a “surviving spouse,” the Mandevilles should be considered tenants in common with regard to their real properties and defendant should not obtain fee ownership of the properties. The probate court denied plaintiff's request, reasoning

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that the surviving spouse statute is limited in its application and does not destroy a tenancy by the entirety. Therefore, it properly held that upon Janet's death, fee-simple title to the properties had vested in defendant.

Plaintiff amended her complaint to seek contribution from defendant for the monetary expenses Janet incurred in maintaining the properties before her death. The probate court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition on the estate's contribution claim. Plaintiff filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit on the grounds presented. Tkachik v. Mandeville, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 16, 2006 (Docket No. 270253). Initially, plaintiff's application for leave to appeal in this Court was also denied. Tkachik v. Mandeville, 477 Mich. 1057, 728 N.W.2d 436 (2007). However, this Court granted plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and, on reconsideration and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to the

Court of Appeals as on leave granted to consider “whether a contribution claim against the defendant, based on an unjust enrichment theory, is appropriate under the facts of the case.” Tkachik v. Mandeville, 480 Mich. 898, 738 N.W.2d 764 (2007). ²

On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court's decision. Tkachik v. Mandeville, 282 Mich.App. 364, 366, 764 N.W.2d 318 (2009). The panel reasoned that defendant had not been unjustly enriched because he had only received “that which was given to him by operation of law, without any obligation....” Id. at 372, 764 N.W.2d 318. Moreover, the panel emphasized the fact that Janet was deceased, and stated that it could not enter a “posthumous divorce” based on “perceived inequities” because “Michigan law does not recognize such an action.” Id. at 373, 378, 764 N.W.2d 318. Plaintiff again appealed in this Court. We granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to address the following issue:

[W]hether, when a husband has abandoned his wife for the year and a half preceding her death, and the wife alone has made mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on property held as tenants by the entirety, the wife (or her estate) may receive contribution for the husband's share of these payments. [ Tkachik v. Mandeville, 485 Mich. 853, 770 N.W.2d 878 (2009).]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff's claim sounds in equity, and requires this Court to consider whether the common law doctrine of contribution is appropriately applied in this context. We hear and consider equity cases de novo on the record on

appeal. Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 613, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969). The interpretation and applicability of a common-law doctrine is also a question that is reviewed de novo. James v. Alberts, 464 Mich. 12, 14, 626 N.W.2d 158 (2001). “ ‘[T]he granting of equitable relief is ordinarily a matter of grace, and whether a court of equity will exercise its jurisdiction, and the propriety of affording equitable relief, rests in the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised according to the circumstances and exigencies of each particular case.’ ” Youngs v. West, 317 Mich. 538, 545, 27 N.W.2d 88 (1947) (citation omitted).

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asks this Court to exercise its equitable powers. Therefore, this case requires an understanding of the principles that guide this Court in determining whether to provide equitable relief, a determination that, in this case, also requires consideration of the law governing tenancy by the entirety, the doctrine of contribution, and claims for unjust enrichment.

A. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES

In its sound discretion, this Court may grant equitable relief “[w]here a legal remedy is not available[.]” Powers v. Fisher, 279 Mich. 442, 448, 272 N.W. 737 (1937). “A remedy at law, in order to preclude a suit in equity, must be complete and ample, and not doubtful and uncertain....” Edsell v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 429, 433 (1870). Furthermore, to preclude a suit in equity, a remedy at law, “both in respect to its final relief and its modes of obtaining the relief, must be as effectual as the remedy which equity would confer under the circumstances....” Powers, 279 Mich. at 447, 272 N.W. 737, citing 1 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed), § 280. Equity jurisprudence

“ ‘mold[s] its decrees to do justice amid all the vicissitudes and intricacies of life.’ ” Spoon-Shacket Co., Inc. v. Oakland Co., 356 Mich. 151, 163, 97 N.W.2d 25 (1959) (citation omitted). While legislative action that provides an adequate remedy by statute precludes equitable relief, the absence of such action does not. This is so because “[e]very...