Tkaczevski v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 95 Civ. 5743(LBS).

• Decision Date: 16 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 95 Civ. 5743(LBS).,95 Civ. 5743(LBS).
• Citation: 22 F.Supp.2d 169
• Parties: Lidia TKACZEVSKI, Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Valentin Tkaczevski, Plaintiff, v. RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC., Frank Martz Coach Company, Storage Office Solutions, Inc., and Alvinia Schoof, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

22 F.Supp.2d 169

Lidia TKACZEVSKI, Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Valentin Tkaczevski, Plaintiff, v. RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC., Frank Martz Coach Company, Storage Office Solutions, Inc., and Alvinia Schoof, Defendants.

No. 95 Civ. 5743(LBS).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 16, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin Concagh, PC, Myles L. Tintle III, New York City, for Lidia Tkaczevski.

Connors & Connors, PC, Elanor Della Sala, Staten Island, NY, for Ryder Truck Rental.

Thurm & Heller, LLP, Roula Theofanis, New York City, for Frank Martz Coach Co.

Ginsberg, Becker & Weaver, Robert Becker, New York City, for Storage Office Solutions, Inc., Alvinia Schoof.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAND, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM

The Plaintiff, Lidia Tkaczevski, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Valentin Tkaczevski, brought suit against the Defendants, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. ("Ryder"), Frank Martz Coach Company ("Martz"), Storage Office Solutions, Inc., and Alvinia Schoof, alleging negligence as a result of a 1994 automobile accident in Blakesly, Monroe County, Pennsylvania. Presently before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 filed by Defendants Ryder and Martz. For the reasons set forth below, both Motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed.

On December 9, 1994, at approximately 8:26 p.m., Valentin Tkaczevski was fatally injured while attempting to cross a two-lane road designated SR 115 in the town of Blakesly, Pennsylvania. Mr. Tkaczevski parked his car close to the southbound lane of SR 115 and attempted to walk across both lanes of SR 115 toward a coach owned by Defendant Martz. The bus was parked on the shoulder of the northbound lane of the roadway discharging passengers.

In the course of walking from his car toward the bus, Mr. Tkaczevski was struck by a truck owned by Defendant Ryder that had been proceeding north on SR 115. Mr. Tkaczevski received injuries that ultimately proved fatal. At the time of the accident, the truck was being operated by Joseph Peter Schoof, an agent of Defendants Alvinia Schoof and Storage Office Solutions.

Plaintiff commenced this action on August 3, 1995, and filed the Amended Complaint on June 4, 1996. Defendants Martz and Ryder asserted cross-claims against each other and all other defendants. On March 19, 1998, and April 29, 1998, respectively, Defendants Martz and Ryder moved for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and all cross-claims. The Court heard oral argument on both Motions on June 4, 1998, and the Motions became fully submitted on July 31, 1998.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Choice of Law

1. Overview

A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Accordingly, this Court must apply New York choice of law rules. See Bader v. Purdom, 841 F.2d 38, 39 (2nd Cir.1988). In the tort context, New York courts perform an "interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions has the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation." Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519, 620 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311, 644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994).

When the law at issue concerns standards of conduct, such as rules of the road, a New York court will apply the law of the situs of the tort. See id. at 311, 644 N.E.2d 1001; see also McCann v. Somoza, 933 F.Supp. 362, 365 (S.D.N.Y.1996). When the rule "prohibit[s], assign[s], or limit[s] liability after the tort occurs" — so called "loss-allocating rules" — New York courts apply a three-part test adopted by the Court of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y.1972). Padula, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 312, 644 N.E.2d 1001; see also McCann, 933 F.Supp. at 366.

The Neumeier framework is designed to determine which of two conflicting loss-allocating rules should apply:

1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.

2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed on him under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not — in the absence of special circumstances — be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.

3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.

Neumeier, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70. The rule was soon expanded beyond guest-statutes to include other loss-allocating laws, see Padula, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 312, 644 N.E.2d 1001 (citing cases), including vicarious liability rules for automobile owners, see McCann, 933 F.Supp. at 366.

In this case, Plaintiff and the decedent are domiciliaries of New York. Defendant Martz is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Defendant Ryder is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Defendants Storage Office Solutions, Inc. and Alvinia Schoof are New Jersey domiciliaries. The situs of the tort is Pennsylvania. Choice of law is not determined in toto for an entire litigation but must be analyzed as to each claim in an action. See Boxer v. Gottlieb, 652 F.Supp. 1056, 1062 (S.D.N.Y.1987); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 96-98, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y.1985) (performing the Neumeier analysis on a party-by-party basis).

2. Defendant Martz

The parties do not brief the choice of law issue as to the claims against Martz, and the Court has little difficulty concluding that the law of the situs, Pennsylvania, must govern. The question of Martz's liability for parking its coach on the shoulder of SR 115, allegedly interfering with the flow of traffic along SR 115 and in a zone in which parking was prohibited, is a question of conduct-regulation and lex loci delicti "is almost invariably employed" in such a situation. Heisler v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 884 F.Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y.1995).

3. Defendant Ryder

Choice of law as to the claims asserted against Ryder presents a more difficult question. The threshold issue in this analysis is whether the loss-allocation rules of the relevant jurisdictions are in conflict. In this case, the Court is concerned with the laws of New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania because the significant contacts for Neumeier purposes are, "almost exclusively, the parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort." Schultz, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 95, 480 N.E.2d 679. The relevant portion of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides:

Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.

N.Y. Veh. & Traf.Law § 388 (McKinney 1997). Florida reaches a similar conclusion to New York via the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine and imposes vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts it to another. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.1993); see also Dooley v. Harris, 714 So.2d 1206, 1998 WL 454044, at *1 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App. Aug.7, 1998).

Under Pennsylvania law, by contrast, "the lessor of a motor vehicle is generally not liable for the negligence of a lessee who operates its vehicle." Strouss v. Seidle, 1997 WL 277340, at *1 (E.D.Pa. May 21, 1997) (citing Jahn v. O'Neill, 327 Pa.Super. 357, 475 A.2d 837 (Pa.Super.Ct.1984)). Because Ryder is presumptively liable for the lessee's negligence in both New York and Florida but not Pennsylvania, the laws of the three jurisdictions are in conflict and this Court must perform a Neumeier analysis to determine the appropriate choice of law. See Heisler v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 884 F.Supp. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y.1995).

The Court believes that this case implicates both the first and third Neumeier principles. The third Neumeier rule controls when, as here, the parties are not domiciled in the same state and neither is domiciled in the state of the situs. That rule presumes application of the law of the situs as a default. However, when considering conflicting loss-allocating rules, such as vicarious liability laws, "the locus jurisdiction has at best a minimal interest in determining the right of recovery or the extent of the remedy." Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2nd Cir.1996) (quoting Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Prods., 807 F.Supp. 941, 944 (W.D.N.Y.1992) (quoting Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 96, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y.1985))). The presumption dictating application of the law of the situs is overcome when applying another state's law will "advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants." Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 854 (2nd Cir.1998) (quoting Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64,...