TNS Mills, Inc. v. SC Dept. of Revenue
| Citation | 503 S.E.2d 471,331 S.C. 611 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 24810.,24810. |
| Parties | TNS MILLS, INC., Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant/Respondent, and County of Cherokee, Cherokee County School District No. 1, and Cherokee County Council, Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Frank W. Cureton and Margaret C. Pope, of Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Columbia, for appellants.
General Counsel Harry T. Cooper, Jr., Chief Counsel for Revenue Litigation Ronald W. Urban, and Counsel for Revenue Litigation Sarah G. Major, all of the South Carolina Department of Revenue, Columbia, for appellant/respondent.
Moffatt G. McDonald, of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, L.L.P., Greenville, for respondent.
In 1992, respondent TNS Mills, Inc. filed amended tax returns for tax years 1985 through 1991 asking for exemptions for its pollution control equipment. After a hearing, the Commission of the Department of Revenue1 refused TNS's request. The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision. This appeal is from the order of the circuit court. We reverse.
TNS operates greige mills in Spartanburg and Cherokee Counties. TNS was entitled to an exemption for pollution control equipment for the tax years 1986 through 1991 pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 12-37-220(A)(8) (Supp.1980-1992). Property tax returns have a line on which taxpayers report certain pollution control equipment in order to have that amount exempted from the assessed value of their property. On its tax returns for 1986 through 1991, TNS left these lines blank.
Pollution control equipment typically forms an integral part of the production process in a greige mill; therefore, assigning a separate value to a greige mill's pollution control equipment is difficult. To remedy this problem, the South Carolina Textile Manufacturer's Association (SCTMA) and the Department negotiated and agreed in the mid-1980s that the Department would reduce the assessed value of greige mills by 20%. TNS was not a member of the SCTMA, and the Department reproachably did not publish the policy, so TNS was unaware of the 20% compromise. The Department assessed TNS's greige mills at 100% of their value throughout the late 1980s.
In 1992, TNS filed amended property tax returns with the Department claiming a property tax exemption for pollution control equipment for tax years 1986 through 1991. The Property Division of the Department (Property Division) granted the exemptions and mailed amended assessment notices to Spartanburg and Cherokee Counties, thereby reducing the assessed value of TNS's mills and entitling TNS to a refund. Spartanburg County issued TNS a refund in excess of $400,000. Cherokee County (County) and Cherokee County School District Number 1 (School District) opposed the granting of the exemptions and appealed to the Commission. After a hearing, the Commission determined TNS was not entitled to the retroactive property tax exemptions it was trying to claim. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission. County, School District, and Department, referred to collectively hereafter as appellants, are appealing this decision.2
The circuit court found TNS did in fact timely apply for the exemptions for pollution control equipment by merely signing its tax returns for the years in question. Appellants argue this was error. We agree.
Initially, this issue should not have been addressed by the circuit court because TNS admitted in its brief to the Commission that it filed its tax returns for the years in question without claiming an exemption for pollution control equipment. An issue conceded in a lower court may not be argued on appeal. Ex parte McMillan, 319 S.C. 331, 461 S.E.2d 43 (1995). Accordingly, the circuit court erred when it considered this issue.
If the issue had been disputed, the findings of the circuit court would be erroneous. The General Assembly has the power to provide for methods and procedures in applying for exemptions for the purpose of property taxes. S.C. Const. Art. X, § 3. According to the General Assembly, a taxpayer does not automatically get an exemption for pollution control equipment, but must apply for it. During the tax years in question and at the time TNS filed its amended returns, a taxpayer was required to file an application before the sixteenth day of the fourth month after the close of the accounting period regularly employed by the taxpayer for income tax purposes to claim an exemption for pollution control equipment. S.C.Code Ann. § 12-4-720 (Supp.1991-1992) (amended in 1994 and 1995); S.C.Code Ann. § 12-3-145(B) (Supp.1985-1990) (repealed 1991). The Department was required to determine annually which exemptions it would grant and notify the appropriate county officials by June first of each year. S.C.Code Ann. § 12-4-710 (Supp.1991-1992); S.C.Code Ann. § 12-3-145(A) (Supp.1985-1990) (repealed 1991).
The burden is on claimants to prove their rights to an exemption by bringing themselves clearly within the conditions imposed by the statute. York County Fair Assoc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 249 S.C. 337, 341, 154 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1967); see also Asmer v. Livingston, 225 S.C. 341, 82 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1954) (). One is estopped to claim an exemption with respect to property included in the list of taxable properties and for which no exemption has been claimed before the taxing officers. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 226 (1954).
TNS did not clearly comply with the requirements for applying for an exemption. Taxpayers may apply for exemptions separately from their tax returns, thereby filing two forms instead of one. Or, as most taxpayers do, they may apply for an exemption on their tax returns. TNS did not file a separate application, nor did it apply on its tax returns. As noted above, Schedule 55, Gross Plant Account Summary, appears on TNS's filed tax forms. This schedule instructs the taxpayer to list gross capitalized cost of seven different items in order to have their value exempted from the taxpayer's taxable property. Item number six is "Water & Air Pollution Equip." In order to claim an exemption for this type of equipment, a taxpayer must indicate the value of the equipment on line six and attach a list of this type of equipment. On all of its returns, TNS left item number six blank and did not attach a list, thereby including its pollution control equipment in its taxable properties. Clearly, TNS did not intend to apply for this exemption when it filed its tax returns.
The tax forms filed by TNS had the following preprinted language above the preparer's signature line: "By filing this return within the time prescribed by law, I hereby make application for exemption from county taxes in accordance with the provisions of Section 12-37-220(A)(7)(8) Code of Laws of South Carolina." Relying on the presence of preprinted language, the circuit court found, "TNS made a request for all exemptions for pollution control devices by executing this pre-printed form." Appellants argue this finding is erroneous. We agree.
The preprinted language has effect only if the taxpayer acts as the form requires by claiming an amount of exempted property on Schedule 55 and separately listing property. The presence of this language without the required information does not comprise an application for an exemption. Furthermore, testimony at the hearing revealed the purpose of the preprinted language was not to give the exemption to every taxpayer who signed a return, but to enable a taxpayer to apply for an exemption and file tax returns with the same form.
Accordingly, the lower court should not have decided this issue, and its finding that TNS timely filed exemption applications for tax years 1986 through 1991 was erroneous because TNS's tax filings were too incomplete to clearly satisfy the requirements of the code.
The circuit court found the plain language and the history of S.C.Code Ann. § 12-4-730 (Supp.1992) gave the Department the authority to grant retroactive exemptions. Appellants argue this was error. We agree.
S.C.Code Ann. 12-4-730 (Supp.1992). In construing statutory language, the statute must be read as a whole, and sections which are part of the same general statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect. Higgins v. State, 307 S.C. 446, 415 S.E.2d 799 (1992). The Court must presume the legislature did not intend a futile act, but rather intended its statutes to accomplish something. State ex rel. McLeod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 136 S.E.2d 778 (1964). The language of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
WILLIAMSBURG RURAL v. WILLIAMSBURG
...and fair interpretation, consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers." TNS Mills, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 624, 503 S.E.2d 471, 478 (1998). Section 33-35-90 unambiguously required the County to respond to Williamsburg Water's proposal within nin......
-
Hall v. United Rentals, Inc.
...and fair interpretation, consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers." Id., (quoting TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 624, 503 S.E.2d 471, 478 (1998)). The Workers' Compensation Act does not limit the Appellate Panel's ability to order a change in medi......
-
State ex rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc.
...until March 21, 2011, to make an offer of proof of his testimony. The offer of proof came too late. TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Rev., 331 S.C. 611, 628, 503 S.E.2d 471, 480 (1998) (noting that a failure to make a proffer of what an excluded witness's testimony would have been precludes......
-
Jamison v. Ford Motor Co.
...evidence will preclude review on appeal. State v. Simmons, 360 S.C. 33, 46, 599 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2004); TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 503 S.E.2d 471 (1998). Generally, a party must request the opportunity to present an expert witness in order for the issue to be pr......