Tobin for Governor v. IL State Bd. of Elections
Decision Date | 05 October 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00-3097,00-3097 |
Citation | 268 F.3d 517 |
Parties | (7th Cir. 2001) TOBIN FOR GOVERNOR, JEAN L. BAKER, RAYMOND A. DUBIEL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, and its members, individually and in their official capacities, HANNELORE HUISMAN, KENNETH R. BOYLE, et al., Defendants-Appellees |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 99 C 2713--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiffs in this case are several Illinois residents who signed a petition to place a slate of candidates from the Libertarian Party of Illinois ("LPI") on Illinois' general election ballot in November 1998, and To bin for Governor, a political committee formed for the purpose of electing Libertarian candidate James L. Tobin to the governorship of Illinois (collectively "Tobin for Governor"). Tobin for Governor brought this action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, and it alleged that the Illinois State Board of Elections ("ISBE" or "the Board") and its individual members (collectively "the defendants") violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to certify and to place on the ballot the LPI's slate of candidates. It sought compensatory damages and a declaration that the ISBE's decision was null and void.1 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court dismissed the ISBE and the individual members in their official capacities on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity. It also dismissed the claims for damages against the board members in their individual capacities on the ground that they were entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity. Lastly, the district court dismissed the claim for declaratory relief as moot. Tobin for Governor now appeals. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Prior to the November 3, 1998, general election, the LPI submitted a nomination petition to the ISBE in an attempt to establish itself as a new, statewide political party. The nomination petition sought to certify the LPI's slate of candidates for statewide offices and to have those candidates' names listed on Illinois' general-election ballot. Over 60,600 signatures appeared on the nomination petition. On or about August 10, 1998, objections to the LPI's petition were filed. Hearings on the objections began on August 24, 1998, before a duly appointed hearing officer and continued intermittently throughout the summer and fall of 1998. On October 6, 1998, the hearing officer issued an opinion that sustained the objections in part but also determined that the petition had 26,610 valid signatures. Because a new political party only was required to submit 25,000 valid signatures in order to appear on the ballot, see 10 ILCS 5/10-2, the hearing officer concluded that the LPI's slate of candidates ought to be certified.
On October 12, 1998, the general counsel to the ISBE wrote an opinion letter to the board members in which he stated that he had "no reason to oppose any recommendation" in the hearing officer's decision and that the hearing officer had "correctly applied the applicable law." R.7 at A35. Nevertheless, on October 13, 1998, the Board struck an additional 4,285 signatures, which left only 22,325 valid signatures on the petition. Although the Board issued a written opinion, it did not explain the basis for its decision to strike these additional signatures. Once the Board struck the additional signatures, the number of valid signatures remaining on the petition did not meet the statutory requirement of 25,000 signatures. Therefore, the Board refused to certify the LPI's slate of candidates, and those candidates were unable to appear on the general election ballot in November 1998.
On October 23, 1998, the Libertarian candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot as a result of the Board's decision filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) the LPI was a necessary party that had not been named and (2) the candidates did not serve the objectors or the LPI with a copy of the petition for judicial review within ten days of the Board's decision, as required by 10 ILCS 5/10-10.1. The circuit court therefore dismissed the candidates' petition. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the circuit court's judgment, and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied the candidates' petition for leave to appeal.
On April 26, 1999, Tobin for Governor filed this action in federal district court against the ISBE and its members in their individual and official capacities. The complaint alleged that the ISBE's refusal to certify the LPI's slate of candidates violated Tobin for Governor's First Amendment rights to associate and to vote effectively and also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tobin for Governor asked for money damages as well as for a declaratory judgment that the ISBE's decision was unconstitutional and void.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the ISBE and its members in their official capacities on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity.2 The court then dismissed Tobin for Governor's claims for monetary relief against the board members in their individual capacities because it determined that the board members were entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity. The court found that the board members were acting in an adjudicative capacity when they evaluated the nomination petition and that the necessary safeguard of judicial review was available, thus making absolute immunity appropriate.
Lastly, the court held that Tobin for Governor's request for a declaration that the Board's decision was unconstitutional and void was moot because the election already had taken place by the time Tobin for Governor had filed suit. Following the district court's judgment, Tobin for Governor filed this appeal.
We review the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. See Crenshaw v. Baynerd, 180 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999). We accept all of the well-pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See id. We shall affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Crenshaw, 180 F.3d at 868.
Tobin for Governor argues that the district court erred in granting the board members absolute immunity. It also contends that its request for a declaratory judgment was not moot and that the district court erred in dismissing it on those grounds. We examine each of these arguments in turn.
We must take a functional approach to determining whether absolute immunity is appropriate. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985). Title or rank alone is an insufficient basis on which to confer absolute immunity; instead, whether absolute immunity ought to be afforded must be determined by the nature of the responsibilities of the official in question. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 (); Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201. Absolute immunity is available to members of quasi-judicial adjudicatory bodies when they perform duties that are functionally comparable to those of a judicial officer. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978); Crenshaw, 180 F.3d at 868. "[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have." Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226. Thus, the cloak of immunity is designed to prevent a situation in which decision-makers "act with an excess of caution or otherwise . . . skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct," id. at 223, out of a fear of litigation or personal monetary liability, see Crenshaw, 180 F.3d at 868.
"[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). Toward that end, the board members argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting in an adjudicative capacity when they considered and ruled on the objections to the nomination petition. We agree.
Although the ISBE is charged with many diverse responsibilities with respect to the administration of elections, the Election Code of Illinois specifically gives it the statutory duty to "hear and pass upon objections to the nominations of candidates for State offices." 10 ILCS 5/10-9(1).3 The statutory provision that governs the means by which the ISBE may evaluate petitions gives the ISBE many of the same powers as a court:
The electoral board shall have the power to administer oaths and to subpoena and examine witnesses and at the request of either party the chairman may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and subpoenas duces tecum requiring the production of...
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