Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp.
| Citation | 775 F.3d 448 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1567.,14–1567. |
| Parties | Maryangela TOBIN, individually and as Parent on Behalf of her Minor Children, L. and M., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
Rory FitzPatrick, with whom Cetrulo LLP was on brief, for appellant.
Thomas W. Southerland III, with whom Gareth W. Notis and Morrison Mahoney LLP were on brief, for appellee.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SELYA and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Maryangela Tobin sued defendant-appellee Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) for invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. After some preliminary skirmishing, FedEx asked the district court to enter summary judgment in its favor on the principal ground that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the preemption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). The court, ruling ora sponte, granted FedEx's motion. The plaintiff appeals.
Our primary task is to determine whether and to what extent ADA preemption fits the atypical fact pattern limned by the record. After careful consideration, we conclude that preemption fits as to the plaintiff's common-law claims. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision (although our reasoning differs in certain respects).
We draw the facts from the summary judgment record, construing them in the light most flattering to the plaintiff. See Griggs–Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 114 (1st Cir.1990).
In October of 2012, a package was shipped from a FedEx location in Eureka, California. The sender requested priority overnight delivery and specified the recipient's address on a handwritten label. That label, affixed to the package, reflected a sender name of “R. Mason” and an intended delivery address of “L. Tobin, 21 Standish Avenue” in Plymouth, Massachusetts.
At the drop-off facility, a FedEx employee inputted the handwritten information into a computer and produced a printed address label, which inadvertently showed an incorrect address. This incorrect address was the plaintiff's home address.1 The package made its way across the country and, for aught that appears, no FedEx employee sought to reconcile the two inconsistent labels. A FedEx courier responsible for delivering the package to its final destination brought it to the address shown on the printed label (the plaintiff's home).
Plaintiff and her eleven-year-old daughter opened the package. Two vacuum-sealed bags of what turned out to be marijuana were inside. The plaintiff and her daughter understandably became agitated.
The police responded quickly to a call from the plaintiff. An officer told the plaintiff that he was concerned for the safety of her and her children as the intended recipient could come looking for the package.
The officer then asked FedEx to flag the shipment and refrain from disclosing any information regarding the actual delivery address to anyone who might inquire about the package. A FedEx customer service agent noted this request in FedEx's electronic customer service system.
That same day, an individual identifying herself as Sue Mason called FedEx, stated that she was expecting a package that had not been received, supplied the tracking number, and requested the address to which the package had been delivered. A FedEx customer service agent initiated a “trace.” Later that day, Mason contacted FedEx for a second time. She maintained that the package had been misdelivered and voiced her belief that it had been dropped off somewhere in Plymouth (at a house numbered 21 on a street beginning with the letter “S”). At the end of the conversation, she indicated that she would simply get the package herself.
Meanwhile, a man came to the plaintiff's door asking whether the plaintiff had received a package. The visitor's car was parked in the plaintiff's driveway with two men seated inside. Terrified, the plaintiff slammed the door shut and again contacted the police. In the aftermath of these events, the plaintiff and her minor daughters have suffered fear and anxiety manifested in a range of symptoms.
Alleging that FedEx was responsible not only for mislabeling and misdelivering the package but also for wrongfully disclosing her address to the sender or intended recipient, the plaintiff (on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children) sued for damages in a Massachusetts state court. Her complaint contained claims for invasion of privacy under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. FedEx removed the case to the federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441.
Following discovery, FedEx sought summary judgment. Its motion papers raised, inter alia, the argument that the claims were preempted by the ADA. The plaintiff opposed FedEx's motion and cross-moved for partial summary judgment on certain of her common-law claims. Ruling from the bench, the court below granted FedEx's motion and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion. This timely appeal ensued.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006). We take the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in that party's favor. See Griggs–Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115. We are not married to the district court's rationale but, rather, may uphold its entry of summary judgment on any ground made manifest by the record. See Iverson, 452 F.3d at 98.
The object of summary judgment is to “pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992). Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, she can thwart summary judgment only by identifying competent evidence in the record sufficient to create a jury question. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano–Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010).
Refined to bare essence, the plaintiff's claims rest on three factual premises: that FedEx mislabeled the package; that FedEx misdelivered the package; and that FedEx disclosed the plaintiff's address to third parties (the sender and/or the intended recipient). FedEx does not dispute the accuracy of the first two premises. It does, however, dispute the accuracy of the third premise, vigorously denying that any FedEx employee revealed the plaintiff's address to a third party. Our initial task, then, is to ascertain what the record shows (or fails to show) as to whether such a disclosure occurred. Once that task is performed, we will examine the effect of ADA preemption on the plaintiff's remaining claims.
The plaintiff's claims were brought under Massachusetts law. Disclosure (that is, proof that FedEx disclosed the plaintiff's address to a third party) is an essential element of the plaintiff's privacy claim. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B ; Spencer v. Roche, 755 F.Supp.2d 250, 271–72 (D.Mass.2010), aff'd, 659 F.3d 142 (1st Cir.2011). To prevail on that claim, the plaintiff must, at a bare minimum, carry the burden of proving that a disclosure took place. See Spencer, 755 F.Supp.2d at 271–72. Insofar as the plaintiff's common-law claims rest on the alleged disclosure of her information, the plaintiff likewise must carry the burden of proving disclosure. See Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 629 N.E.2d 986, 994 (1994) ; Sullivan v. Bos. Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129, 605 N.E.2d 805, 807 (1993) ; see also Fithian v. Reed, 204 F.3d 306, 308 (1st Cir.2000).
In support of its summary judgment motion, FedEx asserted that the record contained no competent evidence of any disclosure of the plaintiff's address. At first blush, this assertion appears ironclad: a veritable army of FedEx employees were deposed and all of them staunchly denied that any leak of the plaintiff's address to a third party ever transpired. FedEx's records fully corroborate this denial.
In an effort to vault this formidable wall of evidence, the plaintiff argues that FedEx's policies for responding to tracking inquiries, combined with the routine implementation of those policies, compels the conclusion that a FedEx employee disclosed or confirmed the plaintiff's address to a third party at some point after the package was delivered to her home. To buttress this argument, the plaintiff points to FedEx policies indicating that when a customer service inquiry is resolved in a single call with no follow up needed, a record of the call may not be maintained. Moreover, if a caller possesses certain information regarding a package (such as the sender's address, the tracking number, and the intended or actual delivery address), a customer service agent may confirm or disclose the actual delivery address. The plaintiff submits that these policies, taken together, constitute affirmative evidence that FedEx released or confirmed at least a portion of the plaintiff's address.
This argument will not wash. What the plaintiff characterizes as evidence amounts to nothing more than a laundry list of possibilities and hypotheticals. Although the policies relied on by the plaintiff make it possible that some unknown FedEx agent at some unknown time disclosed or confirmed the delivery address to a third party, the plaintiff has not pointed to a shred of competent evidence adequate to elevate her surmise from the realm of the possible to the realm of the probable. Speculation about mere possibilities, without more, is not enough to stave off summary judgment. See Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989...
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