Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments
| Decision Date | 26 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | I-,No. 98SA439,D,98SA439 |
| Citation | 980 P.2d 973 |
| Parties | 1999 CJ C.A.R. 2203 Thaylen TODD, Plaintiff, v. BEAR VALLEY VILLAGE APARTMENTS, d/b/a Bear Valley Village Investments; Western Development and Investment Corporation; R.C. Avrett, Jr., individually and as President of Western Development and Investment Corporation; Bear Valley Investors, Ltd.; Hampden Investors, Ltd.; Gateway Management, Inc.; Denver Investment Company Ltd.; Roy Ettelman; Marion Harvey; Robert S. Wham; John G. Kellog; James Louis Smith; Sabet Properties; Jack Williams; LLLL Investment Company Inc.; Victoria Simpson; Janet L. Stimach; Norman D. Whalen; Lenkay Company; Larch Manor, Ltd.; Em Arnold Brown; Jack W. Montgomery; Leonard and Marlene Weiner; and John Doesefendants. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Eric Ruderman, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Petitioner.
George D. Browning & Associates, James A. Corman, Westminster, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendants.
Petitioner, Thaylen Todd, is a plaintiff in a personal injury action against Respondents Bear Valley Village Apartments and others, owners of the property where she claims to have sustained injuries. Petitioner brought this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21 seeking relief in the nature of prohibition and mandamus. She contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, in the course of granting her motion to continue the trial, it issued orders (1) prohibiting her from presenting evidence and testimony of witnesses who had not been disclosed as of the disclosure deadline applicable to the original trial date, and (2) precluding her from obtaining prejudgment interest past the original trial date. Bear Valley argues that the trial court was authorized to issue the first order as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery deadlines. Bear Valley further argues that both orders were legitimate exercises of the trial court's discretion to place conditions on continuances. We issued a rule to show cause, and we now make the rule absolute. We hold that under C.R.C.P. 37(c), a trial court has a duty to sanction a party for failure to comply with certain discovery deadlines by precluding evidence or witnesses, unless the party's failure to comply is either substantially justified or harmless. Under the facts of this case, we hold that Todd's failure to comply with discovery deadlines was harmless to Bear Valley because the trial was otherwise continued due to counsel's recovery from emergency back surgery. We further hold that trial courts may not limit mandatory statutory prejudgment interest as a condition of a continuance.
This court has original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to review whether a trial court abused its discretion in circumstances where a remedy on appeal would prove inadequate. See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329, 1330 n. 1 (Colo.1997). "Issuance of pretrial orders that significantly disadvantage claimants in litigating the merits of a controversy" provides a basis for exercising jurisdiction in an original proceeding. J.P. v. District Court, 873 P.2d 745, 747 n. 1 (Colo.1994). We exercise original jurisdiction here to review whether the trial court's pretrial orders were an abuse of discretion because those orders have the potential to seriously limit Todd's ability to litigate and recover for the full extent of her injuries.
Todd seeks to recover for injuries she alleges she sustained in January 1994 from a slip and fall accident on property owned by Bear Valley. Todd filed a complaint against Bear Valley in January 1996. Trial was set to last for three days, beginning on July 28, 1998.
In August 1996, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16, the parties filed a case management order establishing mutually agreed upon discovery deadlines. According to the case management order, Todd's disclosure of expert witnesses pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2) was due on March 30, 1998 (which was 120 days before trial).
On May 21, 1998, more than six weeks after her expert witness disclosure deadline, Todd filed a motion to continue the trial. The basis for this motion was that Todd had recently received a preliminary diagnosis of a closed-head injury, which she believed to be a result of the January 1994 fall. This motion was supported by an affidavit from Todd stating that she was undergoing diagnostic procedures and treatment for this injury. Bear Valley opposed the continuance, arguing that they had received no expert disclosures indicating that Todd would present testimony concerning her treatment for a closed-head injury. On June 19, 1998, the trial court denied Todd's continuance motion.
On July 1, 1998, Todd filed a motion titled "Combined Motion to Reconsider Previous Court's Denial of Plaintiff's Previous Motion to Continue and New Motion to Continue Re: Plaintiff's Counsel's Medical Condition With Authority." In this motion, Todd moved to continue the trial on the ground that her counsel, a sole practitioner, would be significantly incapacitated for several weeks because he had undergone emergency back surgery on June 25, 1998. Todd also asserted that her new treating physician had not made the preliminary diagnosis of closed-head injury until April 22, 1998 (more than three weeks after her expert witness disclosure deadline established by the case management order). Finally, Todd asserted that the first appointment she was able to schedule with a neurosurgeon for the purpose of confirming her closed-head injury diagnosis was on August 4, 1998 (one week after the trial was scheduled to begin).
Bear Valley filed a response motion asserting that, in the event of a continuance, it would be prejudiced (1) by the accrual of prejudgment interest until the new trial date; and (2) if the court were to grant Todd new deadlines for the disclosure of expert witnesses. Based on Todd's counsel's medical condition, Bear Valley agreed to the continuance of the trial provided that the court issue orders to prevent these two forms of asserted prejudice.
On July 8, 1998, the trial court granted the continuance and further ordered (1) that prejudgment interest be stayed as of the original trial date; and (2) that no evidence or testimony of witnesses undisclosed or improperly disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a) calculated from the original trial date be allowed into evidence.
On July 29, 1998, Todd filed a motion objecting to both sanctions that the trial court imposed when it granted the continuance. On August 27, 1998, the trial court denied this motion.
The decision to grant or deny a request for a continuance is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Voelker, 859 P.2d 805, 809 (Colo.1993). Continuances "shall be granted only for good cause." C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-11; see Herrera v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 416, 418 (Colo.App.1987).
We note that credible trial dates are a vital component of our civil justice system. Parties should be able to rely on the firmness of trial dates so that they can plan and prepare accordingly. The American Bar Association has recognized that credible trial dates also increase the quality of justice achieved by litigation:
Unless attorneys believe that deadlines and trial dates are meaningful, timely preparation or compliance is problematic. If timely preparation helps assure a just result, the absence of certainty degrades the potential quality of the outcome.
Maureen Solomon and Douglas K. Somerlet, American Bar Association, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court: Now and For the Future 8 (1987). Delay resulting from continuances creates a host of problems for the parties and for the justice system as a whole:
Delay devalues judgments, creates anxiety in litigants and uncertainty for lawyers, results in loss or deterioration of evidence, wastes court resources, needlessly increases the costs of litigation, and creates confusion and conflict in allocation of court resources.
National Conference of State Trial Judges/American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Court Delay Reduction 1 (1984). As a result, "[c]ontinuance of scheduled trials should be limited to circumstances in which unforeseen and exceptional circumstances require diligent attorneys to request an adjournment." Solomon and Somerlet, supra, at 8.
Here, the trial court denied Todd's first motion to continue the trial, which was based on the allegation that Todd had recently received a preliminary diagnosis of a closed-head injury which she believed to be a result of her January 1994 slip and fall accident. We conclude that it was properly within the trial court's discretion to find that Todd had then failed to demonstrate good cause for a continuance, given the limited documentation supporting Todd's motion.
The trial court later granted a second motion to continue the trial by Todd. In part, this motion provided greater detail concerning the closed-head injury issue and asked the court to reconsider its previous ruling on that ground for the continuance. As a separate and independent ground for continuing the trial, this motion also asserted that Todd's counsel, a sole practitioner, would be significantly incapacitated for several weeks because he had recently undergone emergency back surgery. 1 In granting this motion, the court issued additional orders precluding Todd from endorsing further witnesses and limiting her ability to recover prejudgment interest following the original trial date. Since it would not have been logical for the court to continue the trial on the basis of Todd's preliminary closed-head injury diagnosis while simultaneously precluding her from presenting evidence of such injury, we assume that the basis for the court's decision to grant the continuance request was counsel's medical condition. This basis clearly constitutes good cause under Rule 121, section...
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