Todd v. Berryhill, CA 16-00333-C
| Decision Date | 22 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | CA 16-00333-C |
| Parties | PAMELA CARNIECE TODD, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Pamela Carniece Todd brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her applications for a period of disability ("PoD") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 16 ()).
Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, (Docs. 13 & 14), the administrative record, (Docs. 11), "), and the arguments presented during the hearing held on February 22, 2017, it is determined that the Commissioner's decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision.2
Todd was born on September 11, 1975, (R. 211 [SSA Ex. B1E]). Todd completed four (4) or more years of college. (R. 225 [SSA Ex. B3E]). Todd was employed as a clerk and a nutritionist. (R. 215 [SSA Ex. B2E]).
Todd filed applications for PoD and DIB with the Social Security Administration (the "SSA"),3 on August 8, 2013. (R. 20). Todd, also, filed anapplication for SSI on August 8, 2013.4 (R. 20). In Todd's applications, she alleged disability beginning on July 19, 2013, and, later, amended her alleged onset date to April 1, 2012.5 (R. 20). After Todd's claim was denied, she requested a hearing, which was held via videoconference before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for the SSA on September 9, 2014. (R. 20). On February 17, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Todd's claims, finding her "not disabled" under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (R. 17-35).
Todd requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council for the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. (R. 20). The Appeals Council denied Todd's request for review on June 2, 2016, which made the ALJ's the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-7). On June 29, 2016, Todd filed this action pursuant to § 405(g)6 and § 1383(c)(3)7 to review the final decision of theCommissioner. (Doc. 1, at 1-2).
Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Id. (citations omitted). "Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (). "Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [the Court does] not 'act as automatons.'" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455U.S. 912, 102 S. Ct. 1263, 71 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1982)). The Court "must scrutinize the record as a whole, [Ware, 651 F.2d at 411]; Lewis v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 584, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1975), to determine if the decision reached is reasonable, Todd v. Harris, 602 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), and supported by substantial evidence, Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1981)." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239.
"In contrast to the deferential review accorded to the [Commissioner's] findings of fact, the [Commissioner's] conclusions of law, including applicable review standards are not presumed valid." Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (citing MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053; Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 1983), Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1076 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). "The [Commissioner's] failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient basis for a determination that proper legal principles have been followed mandates reversal." Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (citing Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 622 (11th Cir. 1986); Bowel v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith, 707 F.2d at 1285; Wiggins, 679 F.2d at 1389; Ambers v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir. 1984)).
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment orcombination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, at 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004)).
1. "[T]he ALJ erred by failing to fulfill his duty to develop the record when he chose not to re-order a rheumatologic evaluation." (Doc. 13, at 3).
2. "[T]he ALJ's RFC lacks the support of substantial evidence as it fails to include any non-exertional limitations imposed by her pain." (Doc. 16, at 3).
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (alterations in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) & (b)). "If however, the claimant is not currently 'doing gainful activity' then the ALJ moves on to the second step." Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237. At the first step, the ALJ determined Todd had "not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2012, the alleged onset date." (R. 22).
At the second step, the ALJ is to "consider the medical severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). When considering the severity of the claimant's medical impairments, the ALJ must determine whether the impairments, alone or in combination, "significantly limit" the claimant's "physical or mental ability to do basic work skills." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the ALJ concludes that none of the claimant's impairments are medically severe, the ALJ is to conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) & (c). If, however, the ALJ concludes that the claimant's impairments are medically severe, then the ALJ moves on to the third step.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (alterations in original). At Step Two, the ALJ determined Todd had the following severe impairments: "fibromyalgia (FM), systemic lupus erythematous (SLE), osteoarthritis (OA), and cardiac arrhythmias/mitral valve prolapse MVP." (R. 59).
At the third step, the ALJ again considers the "medical severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s)" in order to determine whether the claimant's impairment(s) "meets or equals" one of the listed disabilities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Although the list is too voluminous to recite here, the idea is that the listings "streamline[ ] the decision process by identifying those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2297, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987). If the ALJ concludes that the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the listed disabilities and meet the duration requirement, the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) & (d). If, however, the ALJ concludes that the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal the listed impairments, then the ALJ will move on to step four.
Phillips, 257 F.3d at 1238 (alterations in original). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Todd "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meetsor medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments" in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. (R. 25).
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