Todd v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 09 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1820,1820 |
| Parties | TANESHA TODD v. MICHAEL HARRISON, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-19-002983
UNREPORTED
Fader, C.J., Beachley, Woodward, Patrick L. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Fader, C.J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Tanesha Todd, the appellant, was terminated from her position as a sergeant with the Baltimore City Police Department (the "Department") following an investigation for misconduct. Sgt. Todd contends that the charges against her were filed in violation of § 3-106 of the Public Safety Article (2011 Repl.; 2019 Supp.), a provision of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"), because they were not "filed" within one year after the Department became aware of the conduct for which she was terminated. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City disagreed. Based on the reasoning in this Court's recent decision in Baltimore Police Department v. Brooks, 247 Md. App. 193, 199 (2020), we agree with the circuit court and, therefore, will affirm.
The LEOBR is the "exclusive remedy" for law enforcement officers "in matters of departmental discipline." Montgomery County v. Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, 427 Md. 561, 573-74 (2012) (quoting Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dep't, 369 Md. 108, 122 (2002)). The LEOBR "guarantee[s] that certain procedural safeguards be offered to police officers during any investigation and subsequent hearing which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal." Stone v. Cheverly Police Dep't, 227 Md. App. 421, 423 (2016) (quoting Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 341 Md. 680, 691 (1996)). "[T]hose safeguards include standards governing the investigation of complaints against an officer, the right to a hearing following a recommendation for disciplinary action, and standards governing the conduct of such a hearing and the decisionof the hearing board." Prince George's County Police Dep't v. Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. 168, 171-72 (2001) (quoting Cochran v. Anderson, 73 Md. App. 604, 612 (1988)).
In 1988, to alleviate officers' "anxiety . . . from not knowing if or when [a] charge will be officially brought," Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. at 173, the General Assembly established a one-year limitations period for a law enforcement agency to file charges, see id. at 172-73 (citing 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 330). Currently codified as § 3-106(a) of the Public Safety Article, the statute provides in relevant part:
[A] law enforcement agency may not bring administrative charges against a law enforcement officer unless the agency files the charges within 1 year after the act that gives rise to the charges comes to the attention of the appropriate law enforcement agency official.1
This appeal concerns what it means to "file[] the charges." The statute itself provides no "explanation, elaboration, or definition" of the phrase, nor does legislative history shine any light on it. Brooks, 247 Md. App. at 199. As a result, the LEOBR "leave[s] to local police departments the task of putting in place their own policies and practices[.]" Id. at 197. We turn now to the Department's policies.
In 2017, the Department implemented Policy 308, which establishes the following steps to be taken upon receiving a complaint of officer misconduct:
The Department uses a standard, written form for its charging documents, which, among other things, "lists the accused officer, the investigated allegations, whether the allegations were sustained, a summary of the facts, and a handwritten recommendation for discipline." Brooks, 247 Md. App. at 200. It is the Department's practice that "at some point following completion of a DRC meeting, a member of the DRC and the commissioner's designee, respectively, sign [the charging documents]." Id. The form thus contains separate signature and date lines for the DRC member and the commissioner's designee.
On January 18, 2018, the Department received a complaint that Sgt. Todd had violated Department policies, the details of which are not relevant to this appeal. Pursuant to Policy 308, the OPR investigated and sustained the allegations, and then submitted the proposed charges to the DRC.
On January 17, 2019, the DRC held a meeting to review the charges against Sgt. Todd. Captain Donald Diehl of the Special Investigations Response Team Unit attended the meeting in person and "served as the Police Commissioner's Designee." Atthe conclusion of the meeting, the DRC recommended that Sgt. Todd be terminated. "At that time, [Capt. Diehl] stated [his] approval to the recommended discipline" and affixed his signature to the charging documents along with the date. No member of the DRC signed the document, however. The signature page thus appears as follows:
Sgt. Todd was subsequently served with, and acknowledged receipt of, the charging documents.
In May 2019, while the administrative proceedings were pending, Sgt. Todd filed a petition for a show cause order in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in which she alleged that the charging documents were not properly filed pursuant to § 3-106(a) because theywere not signed by a DRC member.2 In response, the Department produced an affidavit sworn by Capt. Diehl, in which he averred that he had signed and approved the charges on January 17, 2019, and, as a result, the charges "were deemed formally filed."
Following a hearing, the circuit court issued a written decision in favor of the Department. Sgt. Todd timely appealed.
Md. Rule 8-131(c); see Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 243 Md. App. 557, 581 (2019) . However, "[w]here an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law," we review de novo "whether the trial court's conclusions are 'legally correct[.]'" Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 85 (2010) (quoting Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006)). Because this appeal "involves the interpretation and application of the LEOBR, we [ ] review the case . . . under a de novo standard of review." Cave, 190 Md. App. at 85.
THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING SERGEANT TODD'S PETITION FOR A SHOW CAUSE ORDER.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the charging documents at issue had to be signed by a DRC member by January 17, 2019 to comply with Public Safety § 3-106(a), or whether Capt. Diehl's signature as the commissioner's designee was sufficient. Based on this Court's reasoning in our recent decision in Baltimore Police Department v. Brooks, 247 Md. App. 193 (2020), we conclude that Capt. Diehl's signature was sufficient. Because Brooks was decided after briefing in this appeal was completed,3 we will briefly review the analysis employed in that decision.
In Brooks, the Department received complaints regarding 15 individual officers, each involving alleged violations of departmental policies. Id. at 201-04. The Department investigated each complaint pursuant to Policy 308. Id. In each case, the OPR sustained the charges and submitted them to the DRC, the DRC held a meeting within the one-year period to review and consider the discipline recommendation, and the police commissioner's designee provided "oral approval" of the DRC's recommendation within the one-year period. Id. at 197-98. In none of the cases, however, did the commissioner's designee sign the charging documents within the one-year deadline to "file[] the charges." Id. at 198.
The officers argued that the charges were not timely filed because they were not signed within the one-year limitations period provided by § 3-106(a). Id. The Departmentresponded that the designee's oral approval was sufficient. The circuit court agreed with the...
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