Todd v. Kelly

• Citation: 251 Kan. 512,837 P.2d 381
• Decision Date: 10 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 66965,66965
• Parties: Ron TODD, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Kansas, Petitioner, v. Patrick F. KELLY, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Respondent. Darcy M. AVES, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Nasreen B. SHAH, M.D., Defendant/Appellee. Ron Todd, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Kansas, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 381

837 P.2d 381

251 Kan. 512

Ron TODD, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Kansas, Petitioner, v. Patrick F. KELLY, Judge of the United States District Court

for the District of Kansas, Respondent.

Darcy M. AVES, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Nasreen B. SHAH, M.D., Defendant/Appellee.

Ron Todd, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Kansas, Appellant.

No. 66965.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

July 10, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Some general rules of statutory construction are stated and applied.

2. In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute, but may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. In construing statutes, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the entire act.

3. In construing statutes requiring appeal bonds or undertakings, the courts are not bound to a strict and literal interpretation, but will construe them so as to effectuate the intention of the legislature instead of nullifying it.

4. In a medical malpractice action wherein the plaintiffs secured a judgment against a health care provider covered by the Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act, K.S.A. 40-3401 et seq., K.S.A. 40-3422 is construed in light of the provisions of K.S.A.1991 Supp. 40-3403(e) and other provisions of the Act and it is held: (a) To stay execution against the health care provider, the Insurance Commissioner must provide a bond in the amount of its statutory liability of not more than $3,000,000 plus interest thereon and costs, and the health care provider must provide a bond for the excess of any judgment over $3,000,000 plus interest on the excess and costs, and (b) the bond of the Commissioner as described in (a) shall be sufficient to stay the enforcement of any claim against the Health Care Stabilization Fund.

Certified Question of Law submitted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, PATRICK F. KELLY, Judge. The answer to the certified question is determined.

Steven C. Day, of Woodard, Blaylock, Hernandez, Pilgreen & Roth, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs, for appellant.

Randall E. Fisher and Donald A. McKinney, of Michaud, Hutton & Bradshaw, Wichita, argued the cause, and Arden J. Bradshaw, of the same firm, and Richard I. Stephenson, of Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, Wichita, were with them on the brief, for appellees Darcy M. Aves, et al., and Nasreen B. Shah, M.D.

Curtis J. Waugh, David E. Bruns, and Wayne T. Stratton, of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, Topeka, were on the brief, for amici curiae, Kansas Hosp. Ass'n and Kansas Medical Soc.

HOLMES, Chief Justice:

This case is before the court on a question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq.

The specific question certified to this court reads:

"1. In view of the limited liability of the Health Care Stabilization Fund, Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3401 et seq., as set forth in section 3403(e), is the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Kansas, as a condition for obtaining a stay of execution of the judgment pending appeal, required to execute a bond in the full amount of a judgment as authorized by Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3422, even if the judgment exceeds the maximum liability of the fund--

(a) as a condition for stay of execution of the judgment against the health care provider, and/or

(b) as a condition for stay of execution of judgment by way of a proper claim made against the Fund?

"2. To facilitate disposition of question 1, should this court continue beyond its current expiration date the stay we now have in effect which is scheduled automatically to expire on September 16, 1991?"

On September 6, 1991, we responded to paragraph 2 of the certified question, recommending that the stay orders previously issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals be continued until final disposition of the principal question. It is our understanding that the certifying court has continued its stay orders in effect and nothing further is required of us in connection with paragraph 2.

In its order of certification, the circuit court stated the facts as follows:

"Following a jury trial in United States District Court for the District of Kansas, judgment was entered for plaintiffs and against a defendant health care provider, as defined by Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3401 et seq., in the amount of $21,244,824.90 with interest, and for costs. Defendant's post-judgment motions were denied. [Citation omitted.] On that same date, the court also stayed execution of the judgment pending a ruling on conditions for a stay pending appeal.

"At the direction of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Kansas, acting in his capacity as administrator of the Health Care Stabilization Fund, as well as the named defendant, a notice of appeal to this court was filed and is presently pending as our No. 91-3206.

"Plaintiffs then moved in district court for an order directing the State of Kansas as insurers of the defendant doctor to file a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment against the defendant health care provider, pursuant to Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3422, plus twenty-five percent of that amount to cover interest and delay, pursuant to Dist.Ct.R. 221. Following a hearing at which counsel for the Fund entered a limited appearance for the purposes of objecting to the bond requirement, the district court entered an order directing the administrator to comply with the terms of Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3422, and specifically to file a bond in the full amount of the judgment. (This order was subsequently amended to allow more time for compliance.)

"The Commissioner filed a motion for stay pending appeal (or to authorize the taking of an interlocutory appeal), which was denied by the district court.

"The Commissioner then filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this court, which is our No. 91-3215. Petitioner [Commissioner] also sought a stay of the district court's orders directing the Commissioner to file the bond. We granted the stay, temporarily, pending further order of this court. By our order issued simultaneously with this certification question, the temporary stay will expire automatically on September 16, 1991, unless the Kansas Supreme Court indicates its desire that we continue the stay beyond that date.

"The statutes with which we are concerned are Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3403(e) ( [1991] Supp.), which reads:

"(e) In no event shall the fund be liable to pay in excess of $3,000,000 pursuant to any one judgment or settlement against any one health care provider relating to any injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services on and after July 1, 1984, and before July 1, 1989, subject to an aggregate limitation for all judgments or settlements arising from all claims made in any one fiscal year in the amount of $6,000,000 for each provider,

and Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3422 (1986), which reads:

"In any medical malpractice liability action, as defined by K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 60-3401 and amendments thereto, the proceedings shall be stayed on appeal by the filing of a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment against the health care provider signed by the commissioner of insurance as administrator of the health care stabilization fund without surety or other security.

"The federal district court held that the requirement for posting a bond in the full amount of the judgment was clear, unambiguous, and mandatory, notwithstanding the provisions of section 40-3403(e) setting the maximum liability of the Fund at $3,000,000.

"We thus respectfully request the Kansas Supreme Court to address the questions herein presented. A decision by the Kansas Supreme Court on our certified questions is expected to govern the ultimate disposition of this original proceeding."

Judge Kelly of the federal district court found K.S.A. 40-3422 to be clear and unambiguous with no need for construction of the statute or consideration of any other statutes, in particular K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 40-3403(e). The court entered an order requiring the Commissioner to execute an appeal bond in the full amount of the judgment.

Due to the number of cases pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the alignment of the parties is somewhat unusual. Ron Todd, the Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Kansas, will be referred to throughout this opinion as Commissioner Todd or the Commissioner. The original plaintiffs in the federal district court, Darcy M. Aves, et al., and the original defendant, Nasreen B. Shah, M.D., are now aligned in interest before this court, have filed a joint brief, and will be referred to collectively as appellees.

Before turning to the specific statutes which are the subject of the certified question, we pause to iterate certain basic rules of statutory construction:

Interpretation of statutes is a question of law. The function of the court is to interpret the statutes, giving the statutes the effect intended by the legislature. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 246 Kan. 708, 719, 792 P.2d 971 (1990).

"As a general rule, statutes are construed to avoid unreasonable results. Wells v. Anderson, 8 Kan.App.2d 431 659 P.2d 833, rev. denied 233 Kan. 1093 (1983). There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, Syl. p 7, 643 P.2d 168 (1982)." City of Olathe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 10 Kan.App.2d 218, 221, 696 P.2d 409 (1985).

"A construction of a statute should be avoided which would render the application of a statute impracticable or inconvenient, or which would require the...