Todd v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 16-CV-2124 (LDH)(LB) |
| Parties | MAXINE A. TODD, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS; CLAIMS DIVISION; EMILY STONE, AS EXECUTOR OF DIANE STONE'S ESTATE; DEEP LOHIA, MD, LIC # 268559; NNAMDI ODIAH MD, LIC # 260378; ALEX DOMPREH, NP; LILY ZOU, RN; MANUELA LORICO, RN; JOHN DOE, RN; PARK CITY 3 & 4 APARTMENTS, INC.; LOUIS KRAMBERG, PRES. OF CO-OP BOARD; CHANDRA JAIN, CO-OP MGR.; P.O. BERLINGERIO, SHIELD #2501; P.O. MARCELLA VCLAK, SHIELD # 951423; FRANCISCO BALDANZA, NYC FIRE DEPT EMT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Maxine A. Todd, proceeding pro se, brings the instant action against Park City 3 & 4 Apartments, Inc., Louis Kramberg, and Chandra Jain (together, "Park City Defendants"), asserting claims for selective apartment inspections under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and Sergeant Gianfranco Berlingerio, Officer Marcella Vlack, and Emergency Medical Technician ("EMT") Francesco Baldanza (together, "City Defendants") asserting claims for unlawful entry and unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety.
Plaintiff owns shares allocated to Apartment 4k in Park City 3 & 4 Apartments, Inc ("Park City"), a cooperative apartment building complex. (Pl.'s Park City 56.1 Statement Opp'n ("Pl.'s Park City 56.1 Opp'n") ¶ 1, ECF No. 211 at 9-20.2) According to Plaintiff, she is one of the few Black individuals who owns, rents, or resides at Park City. (Id. ¶ 8.)
All Park City residents are subject to certain inspections, such as those required to ensure compliance with local laws concerning smoke detectors, carbon monoxide detectors, lead-based paint hazards, bed bugs, and allergen hazards such as mold. (A.G. Chancellor III Decl. Supp. 56.1 Statement ("Chancellor Decl."), Ex. 3 ¶ 7, ECF No. 195-2.) According to Plaintiff, her apartment was subject to special inspections that other residents were not subjected to. (Pl.'s Park City 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 4.) For example, building employees entered her apartment for annual inspections to test her smoke detector and carbon monoxide detector between 2007 and 2009. (Chancellor Decl., Ex 1 at 22:16-23:22, ECF No 195-2.) Plaintiff never heard or saw inspections happening in her white neighbors' apartments after her inspections occurred, even though all apartments on her floor share a small vestibule. (Pl.'s Park City 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 4.)
On July 23, 2013, at approximately 11:28 a.m., an individual called 911 and reported that there was a "water leak in [Plaintiff's apartment]," that "the tenant is a mentally disturbed person refusing to open door," that there were no weapons, and that the tenant was "not violent." (Decastro Decl. Supp. City Defs' Mot. Summ. J. ("Decastro Decl."), Ex. E at D000010, ECF 200-5.) A few minutes later, Officers Vlack and Berlingerio received a radio run indicating that an emotionally disturbed person had "barricaded" herself in her apartment and was refusing togrant the Fire Department of the City of New York ("FDNY") access. (City Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement Mat. Facts ( ) ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 199.) When Officers Vlack and Berlingerio arrived on the fourth floor of Plaintiff's apartment building, they were met by FDNY firefighters and an individual who identified himself as the building's superintendent. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) At some point, EMT Baldanza was also dispatched to Plaintiff's apartment building. (See id. ¶ 16-17.) The superintendent informed Officers Vlack and Berlingerio that there was a condition inside the building that required accessing Plaintiff's apartment in order to address a potential fire hazard, and Plaintiff was refusing access to her apartment. (Id. ¶ 14.) At some point, Plaintiff opened the door to her apartment and allowed Officers Vlack and Berlingerio to enter. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff states that she was "happy" that New York City Police Department ("NYPD") officers entered her home. (Pl.'s Opp'n City Defs.' 56.1 ( ) ¶ 21, ECF No. 248 at 30-46.)
City Defendants' version of what happened after City Defendants entered the apartment is largely disputed by Plaintiff.3 City Defendants state that Plaintiff appeared frail or malnourished, disheveled, ungroomed, and agitated, and that her apartment appeared dusty and unkept. (City Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 22-23.) Plaintiff was "fixated" on the officers, and stared at Officer Vlack with "wide protruding eyes and pursed lips." (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff stated several times, "I'm going to get you." (Id. ¶ 29.) At some point, Plaintiff positioned herself within theapartment such as to prevent anyone from moving further inside to inspect for hazards. (Id. ¶ 28.) At some later point, Plaintiff attempted to barricade herself in the bathroom. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff became combative when she was informed she would need to be taken to the hospital for an evaluation. (Id. ¶ 40.) At some point, Office Vlack handcuffed Plaintiff, after which point Plaintiff became verbally and physically abusive towards EMT Baldanza. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.)
According to Plaintiff, her apartment was "spotless," she was wearing clean clothes, she was not malnourished, and she had clean, combed hair. Plaintiff disputes that she stared at or threatened Officer Vlack. (Id. ¶¶ 5(iv)-(v).) Moreover, Plaintiff states that she was not combative or physically abusive towards EMT Baldanza. (Id. ¶¶ 6(v), 7(vi).) Plaintiff further asserts that she did not attempt to barricade herself in her apartment. (Id. ¶ 7(vi).)
It is undisputed that at some point Plaintiff was escorted out of her apartment to an ambulance and transported to the hospital by EMT Baldanza and Officer Vlack. (City Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 43, 46.) City Defendants state, and Plaintiff disputes, that during the ride to the hospital, Plaintiff continued to state she was going to "get" Officer Vlack and continued to stare at her. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 47.)
Summary judgment must be granted when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant[s] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The movants bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330-31 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004). Where thenon-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movants' initial burden at summary judgment can be met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the non-movant's claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movants meet their initial burden, the non-movant may defeat summary judgment only by producing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court is to believe the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, but the non-movant must still do more than merely assert conclusions that are unsupported by arguments or facts. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996).
"It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), including when facing a summary judgment motion, Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the "application of this different standard does not relieve plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In order to establish a § 1981 violation, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of race; (2) that the discrimination was intentional; and (3) that the discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the defendants' actions. Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Park City Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence that she was discriminated against with respect to apartment inspections due to her race. (Park City Defs.' Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ( ) 5-7, ECF No. 229.) The Court agrees.
Plaintiff maintains that she was subject to special inspections, or more frequent inspections than white residents. (Pl.'s Park City 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 4.) In support of her claim, Plaintiff states that she never heard or saw inspections happening in her three white neighbors' apartments after inspections of her apartment occurred. (Id.) However, Plaintiff has adduced no other evidence to support her claim. Plaintiff could have, for example, adduced deposition testimony or other sworn statements from neighbors attesting to the fact...
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